THE PHILOSOPHICAL, THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOPATHOGENIC IMPLICATIONS OF EXISTENTIALISM AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO A CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF MAN

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by

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CHAPTER I

THE INTRODUCTION

Existentialism has been one of the major influences in contemporary philosophical and psychological thought. Due to the interrelatedness of all dimensions of knowledge, it was assumed that such influences could not be ignored by the religious thinker. The vastness of the existentialists movement and the divergence of the individual thinkers identified with it, made it necessary to limit the study to several basic concerns. This thesis has concentrated primarily on the existentialist view of the human condition as it appeared in the thought of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Karl Jaspers, Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich.

These seven men were chosen because they were (1) contemporary; and (2) representative of the extremes within existentialism. Heidegger and Sartre were chosen because of their professed and/or implied atheism. Camus and Jaspers were selected on the basis of the points they held in common with both the atheistic and theistic types of existentialism. The remaining three offered alternative approaches to the theistic type, namely; Buber the Jewish, Marcel the Roman Catholic and Tillich the Protestant viewpoints.

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. Virtually, every philosophy has dealt with man and his condition. Like many other philosophies, existentialism has made a distinction between what man is and what he might or could become. Each of the seven men in this study made a similar distinction in their thought. The central concern of this inquiry was to examine (1) how each of these men stated the human condition, (2) what solution, if any, they offered, and (3) its relevance to an Orthodox Christian interpretation of the human condition as well as its contributions toward a theory of psychopathogenesis.

Significance of the problem. The problem of man and his condition has been of particular interest to the religious thinker. The term 'fall' has often been associated with the Christian view of the human predicament. It was a symbol connoting a prior condition in which man was considered free of guilt and responsibility, i.e. innocent. Insofar as the mythological concept had meaning, it had to be applied to man and his situation. Any branch of knowledge which offered some explanation of the genesis of man's condition or offered a more thorough analysis of the predicament had more or less relevance in understanding the mythos.

It was stated at the outset that the interrelatedness of all dimensions of knowledge was assumed in this inquiry. Because of this assumption, this study attempted to bring together the existentialist analysis of the human condition and evaluate it in terms of one possible orthodox understanding of man. There have been several segments of Christianity, particularly Fundamentalism, which have not accepted the relevance of any field of inquiry which did not presuppose 'supernatural revelation.' For them religious revelation was totally and radically different from knowledge gained through any other media. It was this particular notion which was rejected in this study.

Finally, this inquiry has significance because most of the studies in existentialism have had a tendency to be more generalized. Much of the secondary source material was more concerned to outline each man's entire thought as opposed to dealing with more specialized interests. In this thesis the interest has centered on each author's interpretation of the human condition and his respective solution for it.

II. ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE

Types of existentialism. As a matter of convenience this study has divided existentialism into three major divisions. When viewed from the orthodox perspective,

existentialism was divided into atheistic, transitional and theistic types. These divisions were not taken as final or as precise but as developmental categories which allowed more systematic investigation.

Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre were included under the atheistic type; Heidegger because he felt that the concept of God had lost its meaning and consequently its relevance and Sartre because he explicitly assumed atheism. Albert Camus was called transitional because it best described the movement within his thought. While some critics had called him atheistic, others had seen in him a type of "Humanistic Christianity." As sympathetic as Jaspers appeared to be toward an orthodox viewpoint, his basic interests never allowed him to transform his agnosticism and tentativism into anything approximating the traditional conception of faith and belief. The theistic existentialists attempted to set forth those assertions which had to be verified if the atheistic and transitional positions were to be evaluated as inadequate.

Each man in this study was prefaced with a short biographical introduction. Each was then examined in terms of his basic presuppositions, both implicit and explicit. It was assumed that each position started from certain rational and/or intuitional assumptions. This inquiry was primarily concerned with those presuppositions which

pertained directly to the author's understanding of the human predicament. It was also assumed that the basic presuppositions, i.e. "root metaphors," in order to be adequate had to have an internal consistency. As was shown in the subsequent chapters, all of the authors under consideration shared many presuppositions in common with certain orthodox positions. However, there were some points where comparison was not possible because the starting assumptions were rooted in different metaphors.

After discerning the essential presuppositions, the author's conception of the human condition was examined. Most of the existentialists divided man into two groups. There was a majority who were designated as those who live "unauthentically" and a minority who constituted those who live "authentically." Since the authentic were preferable to the unauthentic, a process of conversion or awakening was necessary. The awakening and its subsequent transformation constituted each author's solution for the human predicament.

Finally, there was a critical analysis of the writer's position in terms of internal consistency. His thought was analyzed to see whether or not the stated condition and its subsequent solution were logically deductible from his basic presuppositions. This was

followed by a comparative study of the authors within the same divisional category of existentialism.

The Orthodox Judeo-Christian mythos concerning man's condition. This inquiry into the human condition and its solution has recognized that there are many feasible interpretations of the Christian understanding of man. However, some criteria had to be outlined if a comparative evaluation were to be possible.

It was assumed that the orthodox position has traditionally included: (1) a primordial condition of man prior to the realization of guilt and sin, i.e. innocence; (2) an individual with sufficient freedom to 'fall' or become alienated from that innocent paradisical condition, i.e. being personally responsible for his estranged predicament by choosing to exist ('existere'); (3) the fact that such a decision was freely exercised on the part of man, i.e. that existence was no longer merely potential but actualized; (4) the notion that through his free and responsible decision man had brought to actualization a separation between his standing in God, i.e. his essential being, and his standing forth from God, i.e. his existential being; (5) the possibility that man could realize, whether through his own powers of reason or a prior call on the part of God, that his decision had also included the possibility of

unauthenticity, which had also been accepted, and repent, i.e. the recognition through anxiety and guilt that he was responsible for his fallen condition; (6) the fact that such feelings were possible because man's separation from God and his essential being was not complete, i.e. that essence preceded existence; (7) a God that remained available and open to forgive man and redeem him when through conversion he repented, i.e. that the estranged condition between man's essence and his existence was not final nor permanent; and (8) that redemption freed man from his previous unauthentic attitudes and allowed a salvation from estrangement and a salvation toward a reuniting of essence and existence, i.e. God and man. This latter notion of salvation was usually visualized as communitarian in structure.

It was recognized that these eight criteria did not exhaust the Orthodox Judeo-Christian Mythos concerning the human predicament and its solution. However, it was felt that these eight covered the essential structure of paradise, sin, fallenness, repentance, forgiveness and salvation. These eight criteria were presupposed in the critical evaluations of the seven men examined in this study.

The final thematic study of existentialism and its applications from the writings of the seven authors attempted to depict what they seemed to have in common and

applied it to the religious experience and psychopathogenesis. Insofar as the psychoanalytic movement and psychotherapy have been playing a major role in rehabilitating the emotionally disturbed it seemed directly relevant to any study of the solution to the human condition. At the present time many schools of existential psychoanalysis have been developed in other countries. It has only been in recent years that it has had any significance on the American scene.

The sources used in this study were: (1) the major works of each author were available in translation; (2) secondary authors, including some periodical literature; (3) lectures offered at the University of Chicago and Drake University covering various aspects of existentialist thought; and (4) classes in existential psychiatry given at the College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery by Dr. Erle Fitz.

CHAPTER II

ATHEISTIC EXISTENTIALISM

It was stated in Chapter I that Existentialism was divided into three major divisions which were used as a matter of convenience. Copleston has stated that when authentic existence involves man's free affirmation of the transcendent, or God, or when authentic existence could be affirmed without God or any given set of absolute values, then existentialism can be divided into theistic and atheistic types.[1]

In examining the Orthodox Christian tradition it was noted that the concept of 'fall' has often been used. This was to indicate that human existence was not arbitrary but stood in judgment from God's perspective. In other words, there was an essence or essential nature to man's existence. The concept of 'fall' implied a distinction between what man is and what he 'ought' or could become by virture of certain principles, i.e. God's will for man, which transcended human existence after the fall. The immanence of divine will was 'hidden' or 'clouded' by man's

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[1]Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy, Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism (London: Burns & Oates, 1956), p. 147.

free and responsible decision to disobey or ignore the structure of his primordial existence. In one sense it could be said that God's will was immanent in authentic existence while it was transcendent in unauthentic existence. The proportion of transcendence determined the degree of 'alienation.' However, the orthodox tradition held that God was never exhausted in immanence and always maintained a degree of transcendence.

The theistic approach had to find a way of overcoming the alienation of God's transcendent will and make it immanent in human existence. For the orthodox position alienation was the keynote to the human condition, while repentance and forgiveness were the keystonesto the solution of that condition. Through forgiveness, man could return to a state of immanence and overcome alienation.

It must not be construed from the above that whenever essence preceded existence that the view was necessarily theistic. However, traditional Orthodox Christianity has accepted the priority of essence over existence in determining the basis for the human condition.

It was assumed in this inquiry that where an author, such as Sartre, explicitly stated his atheism that he was entitled to be dealt with as an atheist. However, such has not been the case with Heidegger's thought. He has insistently denied that he was atheistic in his approach. Yet,

he has openly admitted the "death of God" in the sense that the Christian idea of God is no longer relevant to the thinking of contemporary man. Heidegger saw his thought as an interim type which appeared between the death of the traditional god and the birth of a new one, which could challenge modern man to a more authentic type of existence. "Heidegger tells us that his philosophy is waiting for God, for a new manifestation of the divine, and that here lies the problem of the world."[1]

Orthodox Christianity has been willing to examine the relevance of secular theory, but it has insisted on the authenticity of its 'kerygma.' It has recognized that the 'kerygma' must be stated in an apologetic which could be meaningfully apprehended by the 'Homo Religiosi' in any particular historical situation. The orthodox view has tended to accept in Buber's sense the 'eclipse of God' as opposed to his death in Heidegger's interpretation.

I. MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND THE PROBLEM OF DEATH

Biographical introduction. Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 in Messkirck in the Black Forest of Baden. His parents were Roman Catholic and he started his early education with the intention of entering the Catholic priesthood. He was actively interested from early youth in

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[1]Ibid., pp. 182-183.

Western theology and philosophy. In 1915 he received a lectureship in philosophy at Freiburg where he came under the most decisive personal influence of Edmund Husserl. Because of his stimulating and original teaching ability, he was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at Marburg in 1923. While at Marburg, he wrote Sein und Zeit and published it in 1927. In 1929 he returned to Freiburg as the successor to Husserl in the Chair of Philosophy.

Heidegger became a politically controversial figure in his acceptance speech of the rectorship of Freiburg University in 1933, when he gave his full support to the newly elected National Socialists. However, he resigned the post early the following year. After his resignation, he continued to teach at Freiburg until the end of the war. In 1945 he was removed from The Chair of Philosophy on the charge that he had served the interests of the Nazi movement. Since his removal, he has spent a secluded life in a ski-ing hut high in the mountains of the Black Forest in the neighborhood of Freiburg.

It should be noted that as early as 1937 Heidegger refused to be classified with the so-called existentialist movement. Heidegger was primarily an ontologist and metaphysician. Since 1927, he has relied heavily on the writings of the mystics and the poets to balance out Kant and Schelling in his thought.

His concern for 'the Holy' has suggested to this author that Heidegger might have been influenced at Marburg by Rudolf Otto. Otto had held the Chair of Theology from 1917 until he became Professor Emeritus in 1929. It was in 1917 that the monumental Das Heilige was written and just six years later that Heidegger took the Chair of Philosophy at Marburg.

Heidegger's basic presuppositions. It was Heidegger's purpose to return to the pre-socratic notion of ontology which he distinguished into three terms: (1) Being-in-itself or Pure Being (Das Sein); (2) the concrete instance of particular beings (das Seiende); and (3) the human being-in-the-world (das Dasein). Like the early Greeks he sought the persistent behind the changing. He saw Being-in-itself as that which was permanent, that which was always present. Thus he used the definition 'constancy in presence' (Bestandigkeit in Anwesenheit). Being-in-itself, i.e. what-is, was for Heidegger absolute while being-in particular, i.e. 'existents,' was contingent.

Heidegger started with man in his phenomenological analysis of Being. He felt that the fundamental structure of man was being-in-the-world (Dasein). Man differed from the other existents in that he possessed the necessary freedom to transcend any particular existence or meaning

structure and analyze his relations with Being-in-itself. Heidegger deduced from this that man is a metaphysical animal because he is capable of asking questions about his own existence. Because Dasein is not outside Being and has the ability to stand in relation to it, Heidegger felt that human reality could not be defined as something given. As he viewed it, Dasein is in constant question. Man had the possibility 'to be.' For Heidegger man had to choose from the possibilities that were open to him, and since his choices were never final, his existence was indeterminate because it was not complete. However, this indeterminacy did not mean that human existence was structureless. Quite the contrary, Heidegger saw the structure of human existence in its being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world was the being of a self and its relations with the other-than-self, i.e. other existents.

In Sein und Zeit Heidegger dealt with 'Verfallenheit,' a mode of existence in which Dasein loses itself in the ordinary distractions of everyday life.[1] Dasein, for Heidegger, had an underlying and basic feeling which was one of being-thrown-into-the-world. Man suddenly found himself thrown into a world without his consent. When man

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[1]Marjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom, A Critique of Existentialism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 68.

commences to ask himself about his existence, he does so from 'inside' existence and feels himself abandoned and caught in a process which will only end in the abyss of death. It was Heidegger's contention that if man pursued the analysis of being-in-the-world far enough he would find the absolute nonsense as well as the nothingness of his meaning structures. This insight would consequently be accompanied by a feeling of dread (Angst).

Dread, for Heidegger, was the experience of Nothing. It was the brute experience of existence stripped of human meanings which pierced to the heart of pure 'is-ness' and demonstrated the finitude and contingency of existence. However, Heidegger insisted that this experience of Nothing must be understood as positive because it could not be isolated from Being-in-itself. As Grimsley has pointed out, "Nothing is revealed in the experience of dread through which we lose our awareness of specific objects and are confronted by an 'uncanny' sense of being there in the midst of crude existence, which is quite different from the comfortable and reassuring presence of the familiar world."[1] Heidegger viewed this active positive force which 'nihilates' (das Nichts nichtet) as one which opens, or calls, man to

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[1]Ronald Grimsley, Existentialist Thought (Wales: University of Wales Press, 1955), p. 85.

become aware of the fuller implications of his relationship with Being-in-itself.

Heidegger did not feel that Nothing was 'not-being' (Nichtseiendes) but an integral part of 'what-is,' i.e. Being-in-itself. It becomes one with Being as the contingency of being-in-particular (das Seiende) fades into Being (das Sein). When Dasein is faced with Being, it is 'projected into Nothing.' Heidegger felt that the awareness of Nothing through dread (Angst) revealed Being. This awareness on the part of Dasein presupposed an ability on the part of man to respond to Being-in-itself. It was also assumed that man was 'attuned' with such revelatory events which tend to 'shatter' everyday experience. Heidegger carried the notion of contingency to the 'I' and its numerous and diverse experiences and meanings. These, too, tended to fade, or dissolve, in the 'mysterious experience' of participation in which the only thing that remains is the feeling of 'being-there' (Dasein). Heidegger held that because man is more than 'das Seiende' that he could freely 'project' himself into Nothing and even relate himself to himself, i.e. self-related. Thus, man's freedom was grounded between 'what-is' and Nothing.

Heidegger saw man as capable of falling away from 'what-is' by failing to listen for its 'call' and, therefore,

remain closed to Nothing. As opposed to the classical notion of man having an essence Heidegger saw man as a process of becoming. Man was capable of becoming, i.e. creating his own essence or self, by fusing the modes of temporality together in the 'now.' Because Heidegger saw man as running forward in thought, the past could serve the future in terms of the meanings which the person attached to it. In this view man recognized that the meaning of the world comes entirely from himself. This presupposed a split between factuality and the projected meaning structures. Troisfontaines has stated,

> The meaning of the world comes, I can see, entirely from myself, from my pro-ject, that is to say, from the original and free manner in which I set out, in which I realize myself in the world. I exist in an authentic fashion when, in the expectation of ultimate death, I conceive projects which will be at once my meaning and the meaning of objects. . .and all for nothing.[1]

Heidegger did not try to identify Being-in-itself, or the ground of that-which-is, with God. It was not out of disrespect or indifference but out of his appreciation for the limits of philosophical inquiry. He saw philosophy as the study of Being (ontology) but it could not identify such Being with the mythical projection of God. Thus the philosopher cannot make any final decision concerning theism. Yet,

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[1]Roger Troisfontaines, Existentialism and Christian Thought (London: Dacre Press Westminster, 1949), p. 12.

Heidegger was never willing to go as far as Sartre and see man as a constant 'passion' to become God. He stated on one occasion, "Man can never put himself into the place of God because the essence of his human being never reaches the realm of God's Being."[1]

Even though the philosopher cannot affirm theism, Heidegger felt that he did play a very significant role in leading men to listen to the 'call of Being.' It was the philosopher who was constantly wandering in the neighborhood of Being. It was the philosopher that was to stimulate Dasein to go beyond what-is in order to reveal that Nothing is the ground of freedom. The natural scientist could never tell man his essential nature because all his pursuits are confined to what-is, i.e. existents. He recognized that Dasein could never be known through objective thought since it could never become an object for a knowing subject. Because Heidegger saw Dasein as purely subjective, its meanings were hidden from objectivity. From his position it was only possible for Dasein to reveal itself to itself in a type of super-rational mode of apprehension. It was only possible to understand it from a phenomenological analysis.

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[1]Carl Michalson (ed.), Christianity and the Existentialists (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), p. 116.

Such an analysis was not possible for the natural sciences and required a special 'ontological science.'

Because Dasein was within Being, in his thought, it became indispensable to deal with man in the quest for Being-in-itself. The philosopher must begin with himself and his ability to raise the ontological question as to why there is something instead of nothing. Even though he finds himself 'thrown into the world,' man can still transcend this situation by exposing himself to the totality of Being. Yet, such 'ex-isting' does not withdraw him from the world of existents.

Though Heidegger tried to reduce ontology to phenomenological analysis, he still had to predicate a certain set of experiences which he felt were ontologically significant. Obviously, he had to use a process of selectivity because not all such experiences are given equal weight in his thought. The explicit statement of the necessary criteria for the priority of certain feelings had to be omitted because they would have required absolute values resident in Being and would have destroyed the initial starting point as well as the existential quality of his position.

Briefly, it was shown that without man (Dasein) Being (Das Sein) would have remained unconscious. While Being was shown to be the source of all existents (das Seiende), it in itself was sourceless, i.e. from Nothing.

The mystical trend in Heidegger's thought was quite evident. There was also a strong Eastern flavor in the over-all position. Being-in-itself sent forth man out of Nothing in order that he (man) might become conscious of his having been thrown into the world of existents, i.e. the feeling of Dasein. This experience issued in dread which allowed man the possibility of apprehending his relations to Being-in-itself. In other words, authentic man had to synthesize his consciousness with the source of his consciousness, i.e. Being. As Amstutz has observed, Being as consciousness (Dasein) is like a snake trying to bite its own tail.[1]

The human condition as 'objectification' and 'concern'. It has been shown that Heidegger saw man as thrown into existence (Geworgenheit). Once there, however, Heidegger saw Dasein oriented toward other existents in terms of care (Sorge). In other words, he saw the basic structure of Dasein as a feeling of care (Stimmung der Sorge). Dasein was always busy with various tasks which utilized the objects and things of the world. The process of utilization and the giving of meanings to these existents was called 'objectification.' Thus, Heidegger saw the existence of Dasein as one being-concerned-in-the-world (sorgend-in-der-Welt-sein).

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[1]Jakob Amstutz, "Origins and Types of Existentialism," The Journal of Religion, XLI, No. 4 (October, 1961), 249-262.

Dasein was also in the world with other human beings, i.e. being-together (mit-sein). It was here that Heidegger saw public life. This public life was a type of common denominator represented by the everyday life (Alltaglichkeit) of the average person. It was constituted of those individuals who had sacrificed uniqueness for anonymity and resided in a kind of mass ego (das Man). Since, for Heidegger, man was free to decide whether or not he would 'listen' to Being or ignore it, he divided man into those who exist authentically and those who exist unauthentically. The latter were represented by their 'fallenness' (Verfallenheit). Heidegger saw man possessing the necessary freedom to fall away from Being-in-itself, i.e. failing or refusing to recognize his relations to Being and his subsequent responsibility.

Das Man has 'fallen' victim to the 'thingness' of the world into which he has been thrown. Heidegger felt that it was quite evident in communication. Instead of man being able to communicate in genuine speech (Rede), he used the conventional form of chatter (Gerede). The everyday forms of speech tended to lose contact with the objects about which it was supposedly conveying meaning. Heidegger thus concluded that language was central in communicating the untruth of the unauthentic form of existence. Instead of leading the person to the recognition of the dominant

purpose or meaning (Verstehen) of life, it tended to 'hide' the true nature of Dasein as transcendent. This type of self deception lead to 'self-estrangement' (Selbstentfremdung). It also meant that das Man developed a conscience which was guided by the interests of the established conventions. Das Man lost sight of his personal responsibilities as Dasein. Unauthentic conscience binds 'Dasein' to Das Man.'

When Heidegger tried to understand Dasein more fully, he discovered that Dasein was concerned about its own existence as well as its possibilities. In other words, Dasein was basically characterized as 'care' (Sorge) or concern. Dasein found itself thrown into a world in which it was to use its own devices and work out its own meanings and potentialities. Heidegger noticed that dread (Angst) was one of the primary feelings of Dasein. From 'care' and dread he tried to investigate and analyze Dasein as a 'whole' (im Ganzen) and how its authenticity could be established.

In order to analyze Dasein as a whole it was necessary to take into account the end or finitude of its existence. Thus, it was found that Dasein was a being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode). For das Man death was put off into the future and forgotten as much as possible as far as the present was concerned. Heidegger noted that death was ever

present and casts its shadow on all the activities of Dasein. Death was to be numbered in the possibilities of Dasein as soon as it was thrown into existence. Being-toward-death became axiomatic for Heidegger's thought. Because death was viewed as individual, it had far reaching ramifications in terms of the public characteristics of 'das Man.' Dasein could not obscure itself in the obituary columns of the daily newspaper or in its occasional observations of public funerals. It had to face the inevitable individuality of its own finitude. Such an experience brought into question all previous meaning structures.

Dasein, as was stated above, was also concerned about its potentialities. It was clear to Heidegger that Dasein 'pro-jects' itself forward into the future. This self-projection is not only the source of freedom and transcendence but also questions the whole structure of time (Zeit). Time was, for Heidegger, no longer some abstract mathematical calibration but something personal. Time became personal because it determined possibilities as well as the span of life. Time took on a new sequence as a result of Dasein. It was no longer running from the past through the present to the future but, as Marjorie Grene has said, out of the future through the past to the present.[1]

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[1]Marjorie Grene, Martin Heidegger (London: Bowes & Bowes Publishers, 1957), p. 36.

Dasein could, out of anticipation, determine the effect of the past by the meaning it projected. This meaning in authentic existence was conditioned by man's being-toward-death. This constant movement toward the future (vorlaufen) made man's condition precarious and involved a 'risk.' This 'risk' included anxiety. The anxiety brought a feeling of forlornness which accompanied the sense of being thrown into the world of existents in order to project meanings which would be inevitably trivialized by a being-toward-death. Death judged all pro-jected meanings as inadequate.

It was stated that Dasein was characterized by care. Dasein had care over the fact that man's existence was thrown-Existence (Geworfensein) and that he had no choice in the matter. Dasein found that existence included other human beings and there was a sense of being-together (mit-sein). Heidegger sensed that everyday existence was in a condition of 'fallenness' which was public in nature. This affected man's forms of communication as well as his projected meanings. It was dread that caused man to sense a superficiality about his everyday interpretations of the world and raise the question of personal responsibility. Ultimately, it was man's realization that he was a being-toward-death which spelled finitude for all his meanings and

presented the feeling of forlornness which characterized his senseless condition. These feelings in turn provided the necessary motivation for Dasein to question its own existence. This had the effect of turning man toward his relations with Being-in-itself and away from existents. The existents were experienced as Nothing when they had been stripped of man's unauthentic projections. Thus, man had an impulse to project inadequate meanings, the very inadequacy of which filled man with anxiety. The anxiety in turn motivated a search for new meanings.

The solution to the human condition as 'resolve.' In Heidegger's thought the unauthentic life (Uneigentlichkeit) of 'das Man' was a type of pseudo existence which failed to penetrate to the heart of 'Dasein.' The human condition was seen to proceed from a mass illusion which allowed the individual to accept a set to relative and finite meanings and values as if they were absolute and eternal. Man let himself become detached from the authentic indicators of his existence while becoming attached to the illusory ones. This was primarily evident in the case of death and time. By making death impersonal and placing it in an abstract and indefinite period of time in the future he deluded himself of the real meaning of 'Dasein.' Such a condition, in Heidegger's thought, was considered to be unauthentic, i.e. distorted perception of what-is.

This raised the question as to how man could be changed from an unauthentic existence to an authentic mode of being. Heidegger's answer was once again centered in dread. From his position dread was not to be confused with anxiety. As Heidegger has pointed out,

> By "dread" we do not mean "anxiety" (Aengstlichkeit), which is common enough and is akin to nervousness (Furchtsamkeit)--a mood that comes over us only too easily. Dread differs absolutely from fear (Furcht). We are always 'afraid' of this or that definite thing, which threatens us in this or that definite way. "Fear of" is generally "fear about" something. Since fear has this characteristic limitation--"of" and "about"--the man who is afraid, the nervous man, is always bound by the thing he is afraid of or by the state in which he finds himself.[1]

It was his feeling that when dread was felt that it cut through the everyday experiences and brought man to the basic structure of his existence (Da-sein). In dread there is a movement away from something, i.e. existents, which holds man in a condition similar to being spellbound (gebannt). While there was a retreat from existents, there was an advancement toward Nothing.

There were three basic modes revealed in dread: (1) the feeling of thrown-ness (geworfenheit), i.e. man's existence was not self caused; (2) the sense that 'Dasein' is responsible for its choices between possibilities; and (3) the fact that 'Dasein' is a being-toward-death.

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[1]Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being, trans. Werner Brock (Chicago: A Gateway Edition, Henry Regnery Company, 1949), p. 335.

Heidegger saw dread awakening the authentic conscience of 'Dasein.' Conscience was a state of existence which was grounded in uneasiness. 'Dasein' no longer felt at home in the world of existents. This uneasiness of the conscience over unauthentic being aroused a feeling of guilt (Schuldigsein). Heidegger noted at this point that 'Dasein' recognized the deficiency in itself as a being thrown into existence. As Roberts stated, ". . . the call of conscience makes man aware of guilt. Basically guilt is connected with a deficiency, a lack of something which the individual might become . . . ."[1] Thus, Heidegger saw conscience calling man to break away from the world of 'das Man.'

'Dasein' felt guilt over the realization of its failure to make responsible decisions in the face of its basic existence. Man had sacrificed his freedom in order to conform with the neurotic regulations of 'das Man.' Knowledge of his freedom required a sense of Nothing which could shake him loose from his unauthentic style of living. Death above all brought to light that all human existence was finite and meaningless. However, it also opened up the possibility of a fuller type of existence. When man 'resolved' to carry on his life in the face of death, i.e.

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[1]David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief, ed. Roger Hazelton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 156.

keeping it open as an ever-present possibility, he commenced to live 'authentically.' This notion was made quite clear by Reinhardt when he said,

> The authentic understanding of my own "being-toward-death," . . . restores to me my true selfhood; it personalizes me, and it also imparts to me true insight into the Being of my fellowmen. In virtue of the "resoluteness" (Entschlossenheit) with which I face my own death I am freed from the bondage of those inconsequential concerns and activities which engulf the everyday existence of 'das Man.' By overcoming in my "freedom-toward-death" the self-delusions of 'das Man,' I can at last arrive at an understanding of my 'Dasein' as a "whole."[1]

Heidegger tried to solve the human condition through the use of conscience, guilt, and resolve, which were all motivated by care. When 'Dasein' faced the Nothingness of Being-in-itself, it recognized the senselessness of 'das Man' and was moved by the feeling of guilt to face the deeper aspects of its being. 'Dasein' then 'resolved' to live in the truth of its being as opposed to trying to disillusion itself with pseudo meanings, i.e. neurotic perceptions which blinded 'das Man' to his responsibilities. 'Dasein' resolved to 'pro-ject' meaninglessness in the midst of Nothing. In so doing 'Dasein' was existing authentically. Heidegger preferred man to live in meaningless honesty as opposed to meaningful dishonesty.

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[1]Kurt F. Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1960), p. 138.

For Heidegger it was the philosopher who wandered in the vicinity of Being and goaded others to do the same. Heidegger felt man was in a transition period in which the old god was dead and the new god had not yet emerged. From his viewpoint the traditional god of religion had always been of a type which was a 'Superior Being' in relationship to 'lesser beings' within the sphere of existents. In Heidegger's thought a god that existed was not a god at all. Existence came from a prior source which from the human level of apprehension was Nothing. Yet this Nothing could call to man through the poets, artists, and philosophers.

Criticism and evaluation of Heidegger's position. In Chapter I (page 8) eight criteria were set forth to be used for evaluative and comparative purposes of the traditional orthodox viewpoint with each of the seven authors included in the study. Because Heidegger refused to identify Being-in-itself with God, the first criterion of innocence was only deducible as that which was prior to a feeling of guilt. Out of the feeling of anxiety 'Dasein' asked metaphysical questions about the authenticity of his own existence. 'Dasein' was free to live authentically or unauthentically but he was not responsible for his original condition, i.e. "thrownness," which was synonymous with the realization of existents. It was precisely at that point that Heidegger encountered his greatest difficulty in

accounting for his emphasis on dread, guilt and resolve. Under the conditions of fallenness there was nothing in man as existent which could introduce guilt or anxiety. No answer was given to explain why 'Dasein' should have felt guilty by an encounter with 'Das Sein.' It could explain dread but not guilt. 'Dasein' awoke to find himself a part of the fallen world. But whence the awakening? Why the feeling of guilt over one's given condition? Apparently, Heidegger was contending that once man transcended the world of 'das seiende' in an encounter with 'Das Sein' he was able to pass his own enlightened judgment on his original existence.

It was at this point that a great deal of ambiguity arose. The type of experience necessary to encounter this judgment was definitely of a mystical type. It was very much akin to the Hindu and Buddhist notions of experiencing the 'absolute.' Because Being-in-itself could never become an object of a knowing subject, an entirely different type of knowledge and media of experience was assumed. In such an encounter the subject/object form of experience was transcended, and Being-in-itself revealed itself as Nothingness. Thus, it shattered the meaning structures based on the subject/object form of awareness.

However, Heidegger endangered his existential approach to man by suggesting that man shared the essence of 'Das

Sein' as 'Dasein.' It was man's awareness of such an essence that called him to a more authentic existence. Yet, he insisted that 'Dasein' created its own essence through its "projections.' It was not at all clear as to how a being without essence could be called away from arbitrariness without giving up that arbitrariness in the name of a more essential nature. In any event, Heidegger accepted a separation between authentic and unauthentic existence.

Heidegger was not content to allow man to live in authenticity, i.e. as 'Das Man.' He agreed with the orthodox contention that man's failure to open himself to his relations with 'Das Sein' resulted in 'angst' and guilt. At that point he seemed to be affirming that essence was prior to existence. However, man was only given the possibility of turning away from the delusions of 'das Man' and accepting the meaninglessness of his existence and the priority of Nothingness. He did contend, however, that there was a type of "peacefulness" or rest found in meditating on Nothingness. However, this feeling did not possess the comprehensiveness of the orthodox notion of hope implied in repentance and salvation. It was more closely related to the Eastern conception of 'Nirvana.' The hope of transforming creation was replaced by a type of esthetic rapture. Thus, the experience of Nothingness commenced with 'angst' and revealed an esthetic peacefulness. It would appear

that the encounter with Nothingness tended to clear the perceptual distortions involved in the stereotyped thinking and perceiving of 'das Man.' Life became authentic when it was oriented toward reality, i.e. Being-in-itself.

Even if Heidegger had equated Being-in-itself with God, he would have lacked many of the traditional features of the orthodox view. However, it could be argued that such features might be of less value than has been heretofore recognized. There was little doubt that there was far more in common with the traditional viewpoint than in opposition with it. The Christian influence was quite evident in such terminology as conscience, guilt and the fallenness of mass society. Heidegger's type of atheism was almost religious. He actually denied atheism as well as existentialism, but both were rather obvious when evaluating his thought from a theistic position. Yet, the average Christian feels much more at home with Heidegger than with the asserted atheism of Jean-Paul Sartre.

II. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OTHER

Biographical introduction. Jean-Paul Sartre was born on June 21, 1905, in Paris. Sartre's father, a sailor, died in Indo-China while Sartre was still a young boy. He received his earliest education at the Lycée at St. Rochelle and the Lycée Henri IV in Paris. In 1925 he studied at the

'Ecole Normale Supérieure' and in 1928 received his 'Agrégation de Philosophie.' He was then appointed Professor at Laon and later at both Le Havre and Lycée Henri IV. In 1934 he went to Berlin as 'pensionnaire' at the 'Institut Francais' where he studied contemporary German philosophy. While in Germany, he attended Husserl's lectures and studied under Martin Heidegger. He then returned to the post of professor on the staff of the 'Lycée Condorcet' in 1935. While there, Sartre applied his phenomenological method to Imagination (1938) and Emotion (1939). In 1938 he also wrote 'La Nausée.'

In September of 1939 he was taken into the army and sent to the Maginot Line, and June of 1940 he was taken prisoner. After nine months in a prisoner of war camp, Sartre returned to occupied France and took an active part in the resistance and underground movement. In 1942 he published The Flies under the noses of the Nazi occupation forces, and in 1943 his famous volume, 'L'être et le Néant,' appeared. At that time he was a professor at the 'Lycée Pasteur.' In 1944 he gave up his teaching assignments in order to devote himself entirely to literary pursuits. In 1945 he travelled a great deal throughout the United States. It was in the following year in October that his monthly periodical "Les Temps Modernes," first appeared. It was also during that year that Sartre published the first two

two sections of his trilogy, The Age of Reason, which was completed in 1949. During that period and the following years, Sartre was often seen in the cafes of Paris where he wrote many of his literary works and lectured on "Phenomenological Ontology."

Sartre's basic presuppositions. As was pointed out above, Heidegger tried to deal with classical ontology by using the methodology of phenomenology. Sartre, who had studied under both Husserl and Heidegger, also tried to reduce ontology to phenomenology. However, he remained much closer to the phenomenological assumptions laid down by Husserl. This was most evident when he refused to divide Being (Être) into Being-in-itself (Heidegger's 'Das Sein'), being-in-particular (Heidegger's 'das seiende'), and human existence (Heidegger's 'Da-sein'). In Heidegger's thought 'Das Sein' was the underlying "is-ness" of all existents while 'Dasein' had the potentiality of freely mediating between 'Das Sein' and 'das Seiende.' This division within Being-in-itself gave rise to a dualistic type of epistemology through which 'Dasein' could know or feel both 'Das Sein' and 'das Seiende.' This apparent dualism tended to undermine the basic assumptions inherent in the phenomenological methodology.

In Sartre's thought, Being (Être) was analyzed

consciousness ('le pour-soi') and the object of consciousness ('l' en-soi'). Consciousness could come only into existence as differentiation within a given objective world. Thus, consciousness presupposed the objective world. Consciousness ('pour-soi') appeared within the context of the phenomenological structure ('en-soi') as a nothing or "hole" in the matrix of Being. In other words, 'pour-soi' was conspicuous by its absence from the fabric of which it was intricately woven. Consciousness was negative in relationship to Being, but it was not something other than Being. It was a spontaneous condition which constantly called itself into question during every moment of existence. Because 'pour-soi' was always conscious of something ('en-soi'), it entered the world as separation, i.e. a state of "splitness."

Sartre disagreed with Husserl that the 'Être' of phenomenon was identical with its perception. He felt that there was a "transphenomenality of being" which held that reality was not exhausted in the process of perception. Likewise, perception itself was a mode of Being (Être) which excluded any possibility of identifying Sartre's position with traditional Idealism. Also, the perceived object was in relation to other perceivers and their perspectives. It was this notion of transphenomenality and the subjectivity

of the Other which Sartre claimed took his ontology beyond the criticism of Idealism or solipsism.

In his The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre postulated an existentialist theory of consciousness. It was his contention that the ego belonged to the "outside world." He felt that Descartes had failed to really understand the true nature of the 'cogito.' For Sartre there was an internal side to the "cogito ergo sum" that denied any transcendental ego which he called "prereflective consciousness." He pointed out that the 'I' was an existent and concrete. It appeared only in reflection. Sartre stated,

> The 'Cogito' affirms too much. The certain content of the pseudo-"Cogito" is not "I have consciousness of this chair," but "There is consciousness of this chair." This content is sufficient to constitute an infinite and absolute field of investigation for phenomenology.[1]

Thus, for Sartre the "transcendental ego" was on the psychic side of the "reflective Cogito." In other words, consciousness created or produced the ego as a result of a unity of its own actions, modes, and qualities. In actuality Sartre was attempting to demonstrate the impersonal quality of pure unreflective consciousness in its most spontaneous form. He offered a radically different interpretation of existential subjectivity. The problem of knowing others was reduced to

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[1]Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: The Noonday Press, 1960), pp. 53-54.

an impersonal mode of existence shared by all individuals. Thus, to confine oneself to the transcendental ego was to distort one's perceptions and narrow one's scope of activity.

It was on the level of prereflective consciousness that one could observe the transphenomenality of 'etre-en-soi.' The inexhaustibility of 'en-soi' was discovered when the reflective ego found certain modes of 'en-soi' could not be assimilated into the meaning structures at the reflective level of existence, i.e. the subjective meanings of the transcendental ego. Thus, Sartre grounded his ontological argument between 'en-soi' and 'pour-soi' as opposed to the traditional method of subjective thought (idea) and objective data. This point was crucial for his ontology. It was here that the question of dualism versus solipsism could be legitimately raised. It was also the pivotal point between a type of agnosticism and the Sartrean claim of phenomenological ontology. By emphasizing the transcendental quality of the subjective ego Sartre was able to demonstrate the narrowing qualifications it superimposed on perception. He felt the arguments for Idealism and solipsism were only valid in connection with the subjectivism of the transcendental ego. Insofar as man had access to the prereflective level of

consciousness he could exhaust the meanings of the reflective level of consciousness. It was precisely at the point where the phenomenal merged with the transphenomenal that Sartre turned from the cognitive meaning structures to the emotive feeling structures. He felt that reflection on the emotional experiences could yield an indirect type of understanding of prereflective participation in 'en-soi.'

The most basic emotional experience of Sartre was characterized as "nausea" (psychoanalytically associated with rejection and revulsion). This was a visceral experience of disgust which recognized the ultimate absurdity of existents. It was an experience in which all the various reflective meanings were seen in their contingent absurdness. Nothing could be reduced to anything else. The world and its meanings were seen to be the creation of consciousness. "Man could find no external justification for his projections."[1] However, like Heidegger, Sartre offered nothing to substantiate the ontological generalization inferred from such an experience. He also assumed that the contingent meant the unintelligible.

Sartre invisioned 'pour-soi' as a "hole" or lacking. It was the nature of this lacking to seek a type of self-sufficiency. He saw consciousness as being-for-itself

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[1]Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 629.

('être-pour-soi'), i.e. ever seeking and becoming for-itself. On the other hand, he saw Being-in-itself ('Être-en-soi') as self-sufficient and complete within itself. Thus, man was seen as a striving to become 'en-soi' while remaining 'pour-soi.' It was actually an attempt to become God. For Sartre God would be a self-sufficient conscious being ('en-soi-pour-soi'). (Contemporary theology would undoubtedly question Sartre's unwarranted assumption that God was a conscious self-sufficient Being.) Yet, Sartre insisted that such a being would be a contradiction and could not be both "for-itself" and "in-itself." A being could not be both self-sufficient and lacking at the same time. However, it should be pointed out that a further assumption is involved. He pushed both notions of self-sufficiency and lacking to absolute ultimacy. Some contemporary theologians, e.g. Charles Hartshorne, would insist that God could be self-sufficient in some categories while lacking in others. Thus, Sartre accepted Neitzsche's postulate "God is dead."

Sartre, like Heidegger, gave a very positive role to the "naughting" process of consciousness. When a lacking appeared within the phenomenological structure as a result of transphenomenality the reflective transcendental ego was motivated to pro-ject sufficient meanings into the otherwise incomprehensible nothingness. Sartre allowed for the conscious projection of meaning and light into an

otherwise dark and unintelligible genitive source, i.e. 'en-soi.' Consciousness thus created the world through subjective naughting of the "in-itself." As Collins stated it,

> Consciousness and substance, negativity and stolid self-identity are pitted against each other in an unequal struggle. Sartre's viewpoint marks a return to the pre-Socratic feeling that our human cosmos, born of conflict, is always on the verge of being engulfed in the primal abyss of dark night.[1]

Because man's projections determine meaning, he finds himself faced with the prospect that his existence is prior to his essence. Like Heidegger, Sartre felt that man is what man becomes. Man creates his own essence. Because essence belonged to the reflective structuring process, it was always past and never present. However, man could never totally identify with his essence because his existence belonged to the prereflective consciousness of the present. Thus, man was seen as a "being-which-is-not-what-it-is and which is-what-it-is-not and chooses as the ideal of being, being-what-it-is-not and not-being-what-it-is."[2]

Sartre saw value arising from those objects which the 'pour-soi' found desirable in its attempt to project

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[1]James Collins, The Existentialists, A Critical Study (Chicago: A Gateway edition; Henry Regnery Company, 1952), p. 63.

[2]Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 575-576.

meanings into an otherwise alien world. A world in which man found no support or justification for his precarious existence. Man projected his meanings in order to overcome the lack of 'pour-soi' and move toward the impossible possibility (en-soi-pour-soi) in the future. It was this desire to achieve this self-contradictory self-sufficiency which allowed Sartre to state the often quoted definition of man as "a useless passion." Man attempted to reduce alien 'en-soi' to a set of meanings in order to find support and justification for existence. It was in this respect that it could be said that man nihilates contingent existents. Thus, for Sartre man received values from desire and possibilities from freedom.

Sartre viewed human existence as absolutely free. Desan outlined what he felt were the basic elements in Sartre's concept of freedom:

1. "To be," for human reality, is "to act." Here according to Sartre, the behaviorists were right to insist on the analysis of human conduct in concrete situations.
2. The act is autonomous, however, and no substantial support backs it.
3. The act goes in a certain direction toward a certain end, which does not yet exist but to which the For-itself tends.
4. Intention is the choice of an end, and reveals at the same time the world under such and such an aspect.
5. An end, however, does not exist as such unless the For-itself chooses.
6. This "breaking off" with the object is one and the same thing as so-called internal negation (nihilation).

7. Free choice is inevitable. I cannot not choose, otherwise I could fall into the category of massive being.[1]

Sartre did not see freedom as totally arbitrary or as operating in a vacuum. All of human existence was carried on within certain limitations. Sartre felt that there were five such limiting conditions: (1) the individual's place, i.e. geographically and historically; (2) his past; (3) his surroundings; (4) his fellowmen; and (5) his death. Outside of these five areas man was considered completely free. Whereas Heidegger took his cue from death, Sartre tended to place a greater emphasis on the notion of the Other. As was shown later on, Sartre assumed that the feeling of shame, which was encountered when one was reduced to an object by another subject, substantiated the objectivity of the stimulus, i.e. the realness of the Other. It was here that he reasserted his realism as opposed to any form of solipsism. Where Heidegger viewed the 'fall' as "being-thrown-into-the-world" Sartre saw it as being among other men, i.e. "Hell is other people."[2]

In summary it might be said that Sartre saw Being (Être) split into Being-in-itself (Être-en-soi) and contingent being-for itself (etre-pour-soi). 'En-soi' was Being

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[1]Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), pp. 105-106.

[2]Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. Lionel Abel (New York: A Vintage Book, 1955), p. 47.

in its primordial and chaotic 'is-ness' while as 'pour-soi' it was conscious of itself as lack and spontaneously creative. The lack gave rise to desire and the search for meanings which would bring completeness to the lacking without destroying the lackingness. This lacking was a nothingness which naughted into Being and brought to light meanings and values which were alien and absurd. This absurdity was apprehended by consciousness as nausea and disgust for having accepted nonsense as meaningful and contradiction as possible.

By way of criticism, it should be noted that Sartre's own phenomenological analysis was nothing more than an extended projection to achieve the impossible, i.e. make sense out of what was ultimately nonsensical.

The human condition as lack and desire. Like Heidegger, Sartre turned to the emotions as a reliable source of knowledge about the fundamental structure of Being (Être). In his analysis of 'pour-soi,' i.e. being-for-itself, he found both a prereflective and a reflective mode. The ego or self is a phenomenon of the reflective level of consciousness. Thus, he felt that man does not possess certain emotions such as anguish, forlornness, or nausea but is these emotions. It was Sartre's notion that the "transcendental ego" acted as a unifying focal point

for such phenomena at the reflective level of consciousness. Thus, for Sartre anguish, forlornness, disgust, dread, nausea, shame, and despair were prereflectively 'être-pour-soi.' Because of this, he could not really be accused of extreme subjectivism, Idealism, or solipsism as these were traditionally understood.

It must also be remembered that Sartre saw 'pour-soi' as a lack of being which motivated the desire "to be." He never gave any justification for the lackness but indicated that Being and Nothingness were inseparable notions. For Sartre the desire "to be" was the desire to create a justification for existence, which was the same as creating an essence. However, such an essence could not contain the spontaneous present moment which was reaching toward the future. In Sartre's thought 'pour-soi' was constantly striving "to be" without losing consciousness, i.e. 'en-soi-pour-soi.' Thus, Sartre stated that, "Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state."[1]

Because man had to live beyond essence, he also lived beyond the causes and motives of his actions. For Sartre man was condemned to be free and no factual state could

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[1]Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 90.

determine what is not. There are limits and conditioners in which freedom operates but there are no determiners of any kind. Sartre argued that when man attempted to let his consciousness be externally motivated that to the extent to which he succeeded his actions ceased to be conscious. It was his assumption that either man was conscious and free or else he was not conscious at all. Sartre saw 'mob psychology' as a form of externalized motivation where man tried to ignore his personal responsibility and hide behind the dictates of the mob. For Sartre freedom was synonymous with action and desire. Where there was a lack, there was freedom, i.e. lack of determiners. Freedom, like emotions was not something man had but, rather, what man was.

It was Sartre's thought that motives could not operate without projection toward various possibilities. Sartre saw man as the sole source of projection and felt that man could look to no external form of assistance. Man was completely responsible for his actions. Because man had no outside assurance, he had a feeling of "forlornness." The notion of "forlornness" in Sartre was akin to the feeling of "thrownness" in Heidegger's thought. The individual found himself thrown into existence without justification. It was the sense of being alone (solitude) and without assistance, i.e. no essence or God. All of 'en-soi' turned out to be meaningless. At this point Sartre saw the 'en-soi'

in its separateness as meaningless and alien to 'pour-soi.'

For Sartre "forlornness" implied "anguish.' This was derived from his notion of responsibility. He felt that man was not only responsible for himself but everyone else as well. This seemed to stem from the fact that man's projected meanings included everyone else. It included them not only as objects but also as subjects. All humanity was included when man made a decision and carried out the subsequent actions. It was this deep sense of responsibility toward others that included the sense of "anguish.' It was also based on the knowledge that such projections were unjustified.

In one sense Sartre saw forlornness as personal responsibility while anguish included the generalized and social implications of that responsibility. However, he noted a more comprehensive feeling of "despair." When man fully recognized that he was abandoned to responsibly project meanings into a meaningless and alien world, he was filled with a sense of despair, i.e. no hope. Thus, like Heidegger, Sartre saw human existence faced with the dread of Nothingness but, unlike Heidegger, he left no other source for meaning. Man could not go beyond his own projections to find meaning and essence. For Sartre this meant that life was absurd and man was "a useless passion."

Similar to Heidegger, Sartre saw the everyday lives of people as dehumanized and blurred by the various forms

of "bad faith." He felt that most people tend to hide from responsibility by trying to find transcendent norms which will justify their actions or else lose consciousness by identifying with various external motivations. Man tended to fall into endless trivialities and petty concerns which were generally carried out as repetitious habit patterns. Man often assumed a "spirit of seriousness" in which he failed to recognize that many of his values were the unjustifiable inventions of his own projections. Man found it too difficult to admit that everything was arbitrary and just happened and that ultimately nothing mattered. Thus, for Sartre unauthentic man attempted to renounce his freedom in order to be what he is not and avoid being what he is. All of man's actions could be boiled down to two alternatives. Either man could use his freedom against freedom or he could use his freedom for freedom. In either case, as Sartre saw it, man was condemned to remain free.

Sartre devoted a great amount of time to the analysis of interpersonal relationships, most outstanding of which was his concern for the Other. When a person looked at another person, it was different from observing an object. All objects could be placed within a projected meaning structure of one's own choosing. However, at the point of another subject one's own self as subject was threatened by being made into an object within the meaning structures

of the other subject. Sartre especially noted the feeling of shame when a person was caught by another peeping through a keyhole. At that point the person was trapped within the perspective of the other person and reduced to an object. The other person had the power to break down one's egotistical pattern and challenge his personal perspective.

As was pointed out earlier this notion of the Other tended to overcome any sense of solipsism. As Blackham noted,

> . . .my transcendence is transcended, I experience concrete proof of another's transcendence, a beyond the world. In this experience, solipsism is not merely refuted, but shattered: under the regard of another, I experience my own objectivity and in that I experience the subjectivity of another--in the destruction of my own--as I never can whilst I remain a subject and he an object to me.[1]

At the point of being-for-another a person was neither 'en-soi' nor 'pour-soi' for he felt himself as an object for the Other while knowing himself to be a subject. The only alternative the person had when being threatened by the look of another was to return the look. This was seen by Sartre as a battle to the end. Either the other person, as subject, transcends and objectifies me or I transcend and objectify him. Sartre saw only two possible attitudes that a person could adopt in the face of the Other. One could either try

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[1]H. J. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1956), p. 118.

to allow the Other his freedom while trying to possess him without destroying it, i.e. love, masochism, etc., or one could objectify him, i.e. hatred and sadism. As Garcin said at the close of "No Exit," "Hell is--other people!".[1]

Thus, for Sartre 'pour-soi' was a lack which was marked by an active and desiring freedom "to be." Man sought to be and not to be at the same time. The human condition was one of ever seeking to find acceptable rationalizations for man's projections while constantly fighting off the threatening and objectifying glances of others. It was filled with forlornness, anguish, shame, and utter despair. Its values were relative and its meanings were arbitrary.

The solution to the human condition as dignity and engagement. Sartre saw man as the free creator of all values. Man could not turn to any transcendent source of values for the purpose of gaining guidance in his life. All morals and values were self-made and originated in freedom and moved toward freedom. Any attempt on the part of man to ground values anywhere outside of himself was viewed as unauthentic and in "bad faith." Even in the case of "bad faith," man had to make a free decision to ignore

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[1]Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. Lionel Abel (New York: A Vintage Book, 1955), p. 47.

his personal responsibility for the consequences of his actions. Sartre, like Heidegger, assumed that "bad faith" was negative and that man was capable of a more adequate and authentic form of existence. However, unlike Heidegger, he did not attempt to center the conversion experience in the mystical "call of Being."

Sartre recognized that occasionally man had those moments which cut into his daily routine which introduced a type of boredom. In such moments man saw himself existing in a world which was basically alien to the meanings which he seriously endeavored to project into it. This was dramatically portrayed by Roquentin in La Nausee. While sitting in the park Roquentin suddenly encountered the raw phenomenon of Being (Être). It was analogous to removing layer after layer of bark from a tree. He stripped away layer after layer of projected meaning until he encountered the naked Nothingness of existents. The only visceral response accompanying the revelation of No-thingness was nausea. For Sartre such a revelation constituted an "illumination" of the nakedness and meaninglessness of 'en-soi.' Roquentin felt a genuine "disgust" for the absurdity of existence. It should be noted that Sartre never offered any reason for why someone else could not face a similar situation without feeling the same nausea that Roquentin felt. Like Heidegger, he offered no reason as to

why the feeling of nausea within such a phenomenon should be accepted as ontological. However, Sartre was trying to convey the notion that something was quite repulsive to man when he had such a direct encounter with Being and Nothingness. Obviously, man was rejecting such meaninglessness.

Similar to Heidegger, Sartre indicated that man sought to avoid the dread and nausea of Nothingness by using one form or another of "bad faith," i.e. self-deception. Unauthentic man tried with various excuses and escape mechanisms to avoid accepting personal responsibility for his actions. For Sartre it was freedom itself which was rebelling against those situations which sought to negate freedom by creating a sense of boredom and disgust. It was the sense of inner contradiction which drove man to recognize his own self-deception. Once man had examined the situation he found himself confronted with the meaninglessness of his condition and the visceral feeling of nausea came over him. Man then recognized that his desire for 'en-soi-pour-soi' could only be comprehended as "absurdity."

At this crucial juncture of existence man had to choose whether he would spin a new and exotic garment of self-delusion or face with stoic sobriety the Nothingness of 'pour-soi' and its absurd desire to fill its lacking with

a content which would not remove the lacking, i.e. become 'en-soi' while remaining 'pour-soi.' When man could accept full responsibility for his projections and actions he was, for Sartre, acting in "good faith." Since man was what man became and he became what he did, man was the sum total of all his actions. When man could will freely that the consequence of his acts would perpetuate the cause of freedom, both for himself and others, he was living authentically. Sartre's ethics centered on whether or not man attempted to face his actions in the light of freedom or whether he tried to deny and escape the responsibility of his freedom. Because Sartre saw 'pour-soi' in terms of action he saw man acting in "good faith" when he was engaged or absorbed (engagé) responsibly for the cause of freedom.

It should be noted that for both Sartre and Heidegger the honesty involved in man's actions was a means as opposed to an end in itself. For both it meant that through honesty man could accept the responsibility of his freedom and act in such a manner that his freedom would be enhanced and the consequences of his acts accepted without unauthentic rationalizations, which dehumanize and reduce man to an automaton.

While Heidegger centered the feeling of guilt in the sense of 'Dasein' accepting the projections of 'das Man' as opposed to creating his own, Sartre saw guilt arising

in the presence of the Other. He stated in Being and Nothingness,

> It is from this singular situation (seen by another) that the notion of guilt and of sin seems to be derived. It is before the Other that I am guilty. I am guilty first when beneath the Other's look I experience my alienation and my nakedness as a fall from grace which I must assume. This is the meaning of the famous line from Scripture: "They knew that they were naked." Again I am guilty when in turn I look at the Other, because by the very fact of my own self-assertion I constitute him as an object and as an instrument, and I cause him to experience that same alienation which he must now assume. Thus original sin is my upsurge in a world where there are others; and whatever may be my further relations with others, these relations will be only variations on the original theme of my guilt.[1]

The situation of being-for-another forced the 'pour-soi' to the realization that another 'pour-soi' was viewing it as 'en-soi.' However, because 'pour-soi' cannot be 'en-soi,' it must either seek to reduce the Other to 'en-soi' (hatred and sadism) or seek to possess the Other while attempting to remain 'pour-soi' (love). However, for Sartre love was actually a delusion. Instead of remaining 'pour-soi' it allowed itself to become an object, i.e. 'en-soi,' for the Other (masochism). Thus, shame and guilt as well as nausea were indications of his absurd existence.

It would be this author's contention that Sartre over-simplified the notions of shame and guilt. Certainly, his notion that self-consciousness in part arises from the

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[1]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 410.

realization of being reduced to 'en-soi' in the glance of the Other. However, there is nothing inherently shameful or guilt producing in such a realization. Guilt and shame are the result of a projected judgment of oneself inferred from the Other's glance or the acceptance, at least in part, of some implied judgment from the Other in the glance.

Through Nothingness and despair, Sartre felt that man was confronted with the unauthenticity of his daily life. However, once this confrontation had been made, man had a new alternative, namely, authentic existence, i.e. "good faith." "Good faith" consisted of freely creating and committing oneself to values and meanings within an absurd world and taking full responsibility. However, included within man's world was the Other which was also freely creating its own responsible values. Sartre thus concluded that the man who acts out of "good faith" will always seek his own as well as everyone else's freedom. Like Heidegger, he created an elite who are both honest and free, who stand against the common mass enemy of those who have become the dishonest slaves of a dehumanized illusion.

Sartre called to man to awaken from his egotistical slumber and face a world stripped of any transcendent values. As Roberts stated it, "His (Sartre) substitute for religious commitment is what he calls 'total engagement'--

e.g. in action which gives a man solidarity with lovers of freedom against its enemies."[1] Sartre asked man to recognize that he desires to attain an impossible contradiction (en-soi-pour-soi') and to go on in the face of that knowledge accepting full responsibility for his absurd existence.

Criticism and evaluation of Sartre's position. Sartre's atheism, as was pointed out earlier, was a presupposition accepted from Nietzsche. He defined God as an impossible contradiction, i.e. 'en-soi-pour-soi.' He felt that even if there were a god, he would only tend to destroy freedom and rob man of his rightful dignity. He also felt that man was striving to be god and was thus a "useless passion." At that point Sartre failed to really understand the difference between man's attempt to be like god as opposed to actually becoming god. Yet, Sartre merely attributed God's creative forces to man and in one sense deified him. Just as the theologians have never offered any suitable answer as to why God created the world, Sartre offered no satisfactory answer as to why 'pour-soi' appeared in 'en-soi.' As to why there should be a lacking ('pour-soi') in Being-in-itself ('être-en-soi'), he ventured no guesses.

Insofar as the first criterion was concerned (see page 10 above) innocence was indirectly asserted in the

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[1]David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief, ed. Roger Hazelton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 222.

notion of guilt and shame. For Sartre dread and nausea aroused man's awareness of his pseudo-existence. When man's freedom was limited by values and meanings as well as the objectifying look of the Other, it motivated man to examine closely his meaning and value structures. Because man could transcend any created essence the lacking encountered in existence goaded man to search for more adequate meanings. Sartre assumed that freedom, i.e. the lackingness of 'pour-soi,' was inseparably interwoven into the fabric of 'en-soi.' Yet, why should a lacking or Nothingness seek to create an existence-for-itself, i.e. essence? Why was it not content to remain Nothing? Whether this dynamic element or creative thrust was the essence of 'en-soi' or 'pour-soi' was of little difference since each implied the other. Sartre seemed to be implying that there was a dynamic structure within freedom (possibly the structural limitations of 'pour-soi' within 'Être-in-soi') which operated against pure caprice and arbitrariness. It would appear to this author that such an assumption contradicted Sartre's axiom that existence preceded essence. In this sense he was using two different interpretations for the notion of essence. The one type of essence was created within and from existence while the essential dynamic or structure of freedom itself transcended existence. Thus, freedom was the dynamic structure involved in Being-for-and-in-itself.

Certainly, like the traditional viewpoint, Sartre accepted man's freedom as well as his responsibility for his unauthenticity. Like Heidegger, he felt that man recognized his unauthenticity through anxiety and guilt. The anxiety resulted from his realization of his absurd striving and the guilt from his attempt to scapegoat responsibility. The most inconsistent point in his position was at the point of the priority of existence over essence. He recognized that such a position was essential for rejecting the theistic point of view. Undoubtedly, that was the very reason he persistently argued for the priority of existence. Yet, it was difficult to understand how any real criterion for evaluating the authentic could be established in a world of totally arbitrary values. With or without such a criterion he agreed that such a separation did exist between the authentic and unauthentic. However, he maintained that such a separation was not complete nor final. Even though he offered the possibility of a more authentic life, he did not offer any real hope to its converts. He merely took pride in the fact that he was valueless, i.e. meaningless, and knew it, while others were valueless and did not know it and, therefore, were living lies, i.e. unauthentic. Thus, because men could never transcend the objectification of the Other's glance nor cease struggling toward an impossible contradiction Sartre could only accept a stoic kind of salvation from unauthenticity.

Sartre and Heidegger both felt that honesty and freedom were to be central themes of authentic existence. Yet, their plea left man with a vision of dread and despair. The orthodox viewpoint has always made a case for the very same values while offering life a deeper sense of hope and meaning. One might easily raise the question as to whether or not it is better to maintain all the integrity, honesty, and freedom which Sartre and Heidegger argued for while eliminating the final pessimism which came as a result of assuming the priority of meaninglessness over meaning. It should be asked as to whether or not all transcendent value systems are defence and escape mechanisms. It would appear that their affirmative answer to such a question presupposed a knowledge beyond the phenomenological method which they claimed to employ.

III. AN ANALYSIS OF ATHEISTIC EXISTENTIALISM

Professor Charles Hartshorne stated at a research seminar in Melbourne, Australia in June of 1952,

> When we are told by Existentialists that life is essentially absurd, it is a bit startling to recall that this is just what every theologian said life was, <u>except</u> from the theistic standpoint. Augustine, for example, argues to this very conclusion. Man has no reasonable end except in relation to God. From this point of view, the case for theology is in a way strengthened by the Existentialists' insistence

> upon the irrationality of life as they see it. Just so <u>ought</u> life to appear to an atheist, if the theological arguments are sound.[1]

Hartshorne was pointing to something which seems to be quite basic to the whole concept of philosophizing. Metaphysically speaking, the philosopher or theologian determines the outcome of his thought by the initial starting point he accepts. It was not without significance, as Hartshorne pointed out, that those philosophies which elected to ignore (Heidegger) or deny (Sartre) God concluded that life was meaningless and absurd. Yet, there was really no alternative if you either placed Being-in-itself ('Das Sein') beyond human comprehension as Heidegger did or assume that Being-in-itself ('Être-en-soi') was contradictory and, hence, irrational and meaningless like Sartre. Obviously, in Heidegger's thought 'Dasein' was absurd for trying to pro-ject meanings into a world of existents (das Seiende) when that world was contingent and its essential "is-ness" was a derivative of 'Das Sein.' 'Das Sein' was encountered as No-thingness because it was beyond the subject/object meaning structures of 'das Man.' Likewise for Sartre, 'pour-soi' either sought unauthenticity or accepted a useless quest to do the impossible.

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[1]Charles Hartshorne, "Outlines of Existentialism" (Melbourne, Australia: Department of Germanic Languages, Research Seminar, June, 1952). (Mimeographed.)

In the case of Sartre there was really no solution to the human condition. Man was either aware of the condition, in which case he lived authentically, or else he remained unaware of it, i.e. lived unauthentically. For Sartre even though man desired and sought to transcend himself as 'pour-soi' there was no possibility of doing so. Heidegger on the other hand, left the door partially open. 'Dasein' was not confined to one form of existence. For Heidegger Being-in-itself was not meaningless in the negative sense but was beyond the usual subject/object meaning categories employed by 'Dasein' in its ordinary orientation toward 'das Seiende.' While Sartre found dread and disgust mixed with nausea, Heidegger found dread mingled with awe (Scheu). It was here more than anywhere else that the real divergence occurred between them. Perhaps it was the best illustration of the problem which arises when one attempted to glean knowledge from the conative as opposed to the cognitive. In the encounter with Being-in-itself Heidegger was lifted to esthetic rapture as well as a sense of dread in the face of Nothingness which threatened to reduce all pro-jected meanings to absurdity. Sartre failed to capture any positive side to the encounter and related a visceral response of nausea.

At the point of a threatening Nothingness both men sensed dread, despair, forlornness and meaninglessness.

Both seemed to be saying that when man encountered such a threat he immediately attempted to defend himself through various types of mechanisms. It was interesting to note that with the loss of meaning there was a corresponding loss of self-esteem and sense of self-worth. With the loss of self-esteem came a type of melancholia and despair. It would appear that both Sartre and Heidegger contended that with the loss of freedom there was a loss of self worth which led to guilt because the person had failed to assume the responsibility for his own projected meanings. Both men also felt that both honesty and integrity were essential to the authentic life. Sartre seemed to be saying that man had to mature to the point where he could accept the fact that the world offered no outside help for man's perpetual task of creating absurd meanings. Heidegger, on the other hand, hinted in the direction of a type of experience which when analyzed phenomenologically offered a more rationalistic method for interpreting the mystical and religious experience. Insofar as he was willing to offer the dimension of awe in the experience he was pointing toward some type of content toward which man could respond. Thus, No-thingness could not be said to be a negation of Being nor entirely devoid of content. Even though it was incomprehensible it could initiate the response of awe in man. However, there was still no assurance that the feeling was any more than illusory.

It would appear that one would still have to ask the question as to whether or not something could be ultimately meaningless if it served the ends of honesty and authenticity. If the irrational were elevated to the ultimate it would be difficult to understand how any distinctions could be drawn between honest and dishonest, meaning and meaninglessness or authenticity and unauthenticity. Both seemed to agree that the everyday meanings of mass society were transitory and absurd if accepted as final and absolute. In both cases a transcendent element was introduced in order to judge the unauthentic and give rise to dread and guilt, i.e. No-thingness. Why does the threat of No-thingness appear to man to be so catastrophic? Perhaps the basic question of this study focuses on the type of content that would be essential for man in order for him to transcend the feelings of dread and despair. Is it possible for man to live while not without absolutizing the finite meaning structures and not suffer a genuine sense of emptiness? Can man live in a perpetual world of striving and lack without gratification? If the answer is negative as the theists would insist then they must offer a gratification which is both honest and leads to authenticity.

CHAPTER III

TRANSITIONAL EXISTENTIALISM

In this chapter the inquiry centered on the thought of Albert Camus and Karl Jaspers. Neither Camus nor Jaspers were interested in constructing an ontology. Both focused their thinking on the everyday experiences of men and sought to find those values and meanings which could offer man a more authentic way of living. Few critics questioned the transitional quality of Jaspers' thought. Due to his tentativism his thought possessed an agnostic flavor. He could neither accept atheism nor fully embrace theism. His thought transcended the utter despair of Sartre and was more positive in content than Heidegger's. While Camus started his early explorations with an absurd stranger in an alien land, he moved to a defective type John the Baptist in his later works. It was this experimental movement within Camus' thought which characterized his transitional quality.

Camus differed from the practical atheism of Heidegger and the asserted atheism of Sartre by encountering certain irreducible values in the absurd experience. Camus, like both Sartre and Heidegger, derived his atheism from a rejection of the traditional god of the Roman

Catholic and Reformed Churches. There was little doubt that Camus was moving in the direction of finding an essential structure within human existence which would allow a common ground for human solidarity. However, his untimely death interrupted his quest short of such a structure. Camus must always be seen as one who was willing to explore and experiment with a wide variety of possibilities. It was because of these various currents in his thought that this inquiry did not attempt to sterilize his thought by giving it a label which would limit its scope.

Jaspers' thought in many ways was reminiscent of Heidegger. It also had many points which appear in the theism of Paul Tillich. In many ways it could be said that Jaspers best characterizes the transition from Heidegger's atheism to Tillich's theism. While he entertained points common to both he could not share the attitudes of either. In many ways he transcended Heidegger and fell short of the assertions of Tillich. Perhaps of all the existentialists included in this study Jaspers could be said to best characterize the movement. Nearly all of the basic themes within the movement were echoed or hinted at in his thought. Both Camus and Jaspers said "no" to utter despair, but neither could offer an unqualified "yes" to the hope within theism.

I. ALBERT CAMUS AND THE PROBLEM OF ABSURDITY

Biographical introduction. Albert Camus was born on November 7, 1913, in Mondovi, Algeria. Mondovi is west of the port of Oran where he visited in 1939 and lived for a few months in 1941 and 1942. Camus' father was killed in the Battle of the Marne in 1914. Between the years of 1918 to 1923 he attended the grade school at Belcourt in Algiers. Camus was raised in the primitive mores and elementary moral code of the Algerian working class. It was much later in his life before he was introduced to the middle-class inhibitions and codes of conduct.

From 1923 until 1930 he was a scholarship student at the Lycée of Algiers. It was in 1930, while studying philosophy, that he had his first attack of tuberculosis, which interrupted his preparation for college teaching. Because his professors had warned him that he could not expect to pass the medical examination required of candidates to the 'Agrégation,' he had to give up any hopes of teaching as a profession.

In 1933 he was married and divorced the following year. In 1934, even though politics seemed to have held little interest for him at the time, he joined the Communist Party. At that time his thought reflected the typical student "left" attitudes. It was not very long

until he was disenchanted from the goals and ideals of Communism. He volunteered for the Army but was rejected because of his poor health.

In 1935 he became an actor-director-playwright in the 'Théâtre du Travail.' He received his 'diplôme d'études supérieures' in philosophy in 1936. In 1937 he published Betwixt and Between and in 1938, as a reporter for the 'Alget Republicain,' he published Nuptials. Camus married a second time in 1940. In 1942 he published the widely acclaimed The Stranger after having left Algeria toward the close of 1942 to join the French Resistance movement. He also became the editor of the newspaper 'Combat.' From 1942 until 1944 he had recurrent attacks of tuberculosis. The Myth of Sisyphus was published in 1943, and he received the editorship of the Fallimard Publishing House in Paris, a job he held until his death.

After the Liberation, Camus continued as the editor of 'Combat' and in 1944 he published The Misunderstanding. Twins were born to Albert and Francine in 1945 and he produced Caligula in the same year. Between 1946 and 1947 he lectured in the United States and published The Plague in 1947. He was ill with fresh attacks of tuberculosis between 1949 and 1951 and managed to publish The Rebel in 1951. Nineteen fifty-one brought the famous break between Camus and Sartre. In 1956 he published The Fall and his

Requiem for a Nun was produced.

In 1957 Camus was honored by being awarded the Nobel Prize for "his important literary production, which with clearsighted earnestness illuminates the problem of the human conscience of our time."[1] In the same year he published Exile and the Kingdom. In 1959 André Malraux appointed Camus minister of the cultural affairs for the French government. It was his duty to direct the new state-supported experimental theater. On January 4, 1960 the world was shocked by the tragic news of Camus' untimely death in an automobile accident. His own death seemed to share in the absurdity which his novels had sought to express.

Camus' basic presuppositions. The basic themes which Camus pursued were in general the same as those of his contemporaries. He, like Sartre and Heidegger, accepted an ambiguous and absurd existence for man. Yet, for Camus this absurdness was not a necessary link in a systematic construction of existence. For Sartre the absurd was characterized in man's "useless passion" to become God, which was seen as an impossible contradiction. In

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[1]Germaine Brée (ed.), Camus (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: A Spectrum Book, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 178.

Heidegger's thought absurdness was characteristic of man's projected meanings into Nothingness. For both Sartre and Heidegger the absurd was absolute and necessary in understanding human existence. In both instances it attained ontological dimensions.

Camus acknowledged absurdness but did not immortalize it by giving it the status of necessity. Absurdity was always viewed as a relational concept which existed between man and nature. It existed but it did not necessarily exist. He also emphasized the feeling of absurdity and was less concerned with the rationale, which presupposed the feeling.

Unlike Sartre and Heidegger, Camus was not primarily a metaphysician or systematic philosopher. He was first and foremost an artist. Like many other Frenchmen he was able to express himself through literature and drama rather than categorical propositions. Camus' writings, like all great literature and drama, have lent themselves to countless interpretations by a whole host of critics. Yet, all would agree that he, perhaps better than any other contemporary author, had captured the pulse-beat of modern man.

Even though Camus recognized that man had to come to grips with absurdity, there seemed to be something far more basic to human existence. There was a type of nature mysticism which ran through his works and invincibly pierced

the darkness of the otherwise absurd and ambiguous world. His two most popular symbols seemed to be the sun and the sea. Both of these were characteristic of his Algerian youth. Their invincibility seems to have been a type of transcendent and eternal structure which permeated all of his thought. In certain ways Camus' thought resembles the mysticism of Plotinus. In his own way he sought to find a means whereby man could somehow gain a deeper participation into nature and somehow break through the walls of absurdity. As Meursault stated at the close of his life,

> With death so near, Mother must have felt like someone on the brink of freedom, ready to start life all over again. No one, no one in the world had any right to weep for her. And I, too, felt ready to start life all over again. It was as if that great anger had washed me clean, emptied me of hope, and, gazing up at the dark sky spangled with its signs and stars, for the first time, the first, I laid my heart open to the benign indifference of the universe. To feel it so like myself, indeed, so brotherly, made me realize that I'd been happy, and that I was happy still.[1]

His writings appear to have been his way of experimenting with various alternatives while eliminating those directions which were worn and threadbare. He was relentlessly and honestly pursuing the lucidity of human experience. For some critics it appeared as if he were returning to a sensual and hedonistic realism. There is little question that it was a type of sensualism, but it was far from being

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[1]Albert Camus, The Stranger, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: A Vintage Book, 1957), p. 154.

hedonistic. In spite of their experimental framework his novels indicated a certain movement which sought to answer the single question: "What value abides in the eyes of the man condemned to death who refuses the consolation of the supernatural?".[1]

Camus tried to push the question as to whether or not all things are permissible if God were dead. His investigation was treated by most critics as divisible into two distinct parts. The first was the problem of the absurd, both as an emotion and as an idea. His novel, The Stranger, attempted to indicate the feelings of the absurd while his philosophical essay, The Myth of Sisyphus, attempted to offer the rationale for the emotional experience. Both Meursault and the mythical Sisyphus had to face the inevitable without hope. Camus was impressed with the Greek symbolization of hope being the last and worst of the evils to be released from Pandora's box. Camus like Marcel recognized the importance of hope to any transcendent notion of value and meaning.

In The Plague and The Rebel he developed his second major theme, namely, revolt. Just as he had started with the experience of absurdity before analyzing the meaning of the absurd, he started his analysis of revolt from the

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[1]Breé, op. cit., p. 92.

question as to what is happening when man is revolting. Camus noted that when man is saying "no" to one thing, he is saying "yes" to something else. Thus, every negation implied some type of affirmation. Every revolt was made possible by the feeling that something was "wrong" while something else was "right." He concluded that that something was an irreducible value for the one who was revolting. Furthermore, he concluded that this was some type of primal truth which was capable of generating great emotional passion. He, also, insisted that revolt should not be confused with revolution, which implied a clear-cut idea and a complete turnover in society.

Camus, thus, concluded that man must either seek to escape the absurd by committing one of several types of suicide or revolt in the name of something else. He stated in the opening of The Myth of Sisyphus,

> There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest. . .comes afterwards. These are games; one must first answer.[1]

In one sense if a man chose suicide, he did not deny the absurd but gave in to it. Instead of suicide, Camus posed the question as to whether or not one might find life

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[1]Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 3.

meaningless and yet continue to live as if it were meaningful. He concluded that hope was the intervening structure between absurdity and death. Thus, these three themes occupied the center of his analysis.

Camus saw the absurd arising out of the ordinary. Like Sartre and Heidegger, he saw it cutting across everyday experiences. "At any streetcorner the feeling of absurdity can strike any man in the face."[1] It seems to appear out of nowhere for nothing, i.e. no reason.

> It happens that the stage sets collapse. Rising, streetcar, four hours in the office or the factory, meal, streetcar, four hours of work, meal, sleep, and Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday and Saturday according to the same rhythm--this path is easily followed most of the time. But one day the "why" arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement. . . .What follows is the gradual return into the chain or it is the definitive awakening. At the end of the awakening comes, in time, the consequence: suicide or recovery.[2]

This experience brought with it the feeling of the absurd. Nature was momentarily transformed and reduced to itself. Life suddenly became a series of disconnected events. It was similar to observing a phone conversation from the outside of the booth. The glass allowed one to visualize muted lips combined with spontaneous gestures. One stood for a moment outside of the usual meaning sequence. When this

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[1] Ibid., pp. 10-11. [2] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

experience was combined with the inevitability of death, the absurd was fully revealed. If the absurd was accepted, there usually seemed to be only two possible alternatives. Man could seek escape through suicide, either physical or delusional, e.g. hope, or honestly and lucidly accept it.

Camus felt that hope usually offered man a type of unity and consistency for a meaningful interpretation of his experience. Through hope, man tended to act and conduct himself on the basis of knowledge which he thought was true. However, when the absurd was revealed, man found himself confronted with a lucid knowledge which was derived from what he really knew. Thus, Camus sought to indicate the discontinuity between man's desire for coherent clarity and the world's irrational fragmentation. Camus viewed the absurd as the relation between man and the world. He reasoned that if the absurd was a fact that it should be faced and accepted in complete honesty.

In The Stranger Camus attempted to explore the absurd way of experiencing in the person of Meursault. Throughout the novel, one was faced with the problem of fragmentary events minus the unity of coherent meanings. Even the sentence structure served only to convey facts and not meaning. "Mother died today. Or, maybe, yesterday; I can't be sure. The telegram from the Home says: YOUR MOTHER PASSED AWAY. FUNERAL TOMORROW. DEEP SYMPATHY.

Which leaves the matter doubtful; it could have been yesterday."[1] Later in the novel when Meursault was on trial for his life the jury was faced with the task of somehow connecting the events into some type of causal relationship. Camus implied a strong possibility that Meursault may have been innocent of any crime save self-defense. Yet, because Meursault failed to respond emotionally to what others accepted as respectable, he was found guilty.

It took little stretch of the imagination to see how such projected meanings governed the whole of human existence. Yet, it was obviously absurd to prefer one ordering of the facts and events to any one of a dozen others. It was ultimately the impersonal common denominator which determined life and death for Meursault. Camus, as well as most other existentialists, insisted on a radical distinction between facts and their perceived meanings. There was always a gap between possibilities and human intentions. Thus, as Hanna pointed out,

> . . .through the Absurd we know three things with certainty: (1) what man desires, (2) what the world offers, (3) what unites man and the world. This is the triadic notion of the Absurd, and from this point of clarity we may ask what the consequences are.[2]

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[1]Camus, The Stranger, op. cit., p. 1.

[2]Thomas Hanna, The Thought and Art of Albert Camus (Chicago: A Gateway Edition, Henry Regnery Company, 1958), p. 23.

The absurd was not purely human any more than purely of the world. It was always a relational encounter between the two.

Camus recognized that when a man accepted something as true, he fell prey to that truth. There was a price to be paid for every belief. His thoughts, hopes, aspirations, and motivations would fall under the sway of what was felt to be true. Camus was primarily interested in seeing whether or not he could live within the confines of his knowledge and nothing more. Because knowledge was confined mainly to the present, he had to sacrifice the future, which was so vital to the notion of hope. Camus wanted to keep his thoughts clear and lucid and, thus, tried to maintain a "middle road" approach. Such an approach recognized the limits of reason and the pitfalls of passion.

Camus maintained that once man came to grips with the absurd he could never again be quite the same. If he chose to live the absurd, he would recognize that he was a stranger and in exile in a foreign and indifferent world. This exile left man in a world which possessed neither a remembrance of a paradise lost nor a promised land to come. Man perpetually wandered like the Israelite children in a desert without a cloud by day nor a pillar of fire by night.

For Camus, one experience was as good as another. As Sartre suggested in "An Explication of The Stranger," "Since God does not exist and man dies, everything is permissible. One experience is as good as another; the important thing is simply to acquire as many as possible."[1] Thus, Camus offered an ethic of quantity as opposed to quality.

Camus saw that when God and immortality were denied that one had to honestly evaluate man's possibilities within the confines of worldly existence. He was accused by many at this point of becoming sensual. Yet, he must be understood as one who was consistently operating within the confines of his knowledge. Camus was seeking to understand himself and others without introducing ideas which were inconsistent with his emotions or the lucidity of his thought. When one operated too much out of hope, there was a tendency to seek certain types of experience while avoiding others. Experience became distorted by expectation and anticipation.

However, it was soon apparent that Camus was not entirely pleased with the logical outcome of his absurd reasoning. There was still a burning passion for something better which could strike out against the forces of evil which destroyed the innocent. Nowhere was this more obvious

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[1]Brée, op. cit., p. 111.

than in both Meursault and Sisyphus. As both of these absurd characters faced honestly and squarely their lot, they gained a certain stability and inner integrity which granted them a superiority over the jury and gods who had respectively condemned them to their fate. Thus, through honest resolve and acceptance, Meursault could say,

> . . .for the first time, the first, I laid my heart open to the benign indifference of the universe. To feel it so like myself, indeed, so brotherly, made me realize that I'd been happy, and that I was happy still.[1]

Likewise, Camus stated at the close of The Myth of Sisyphus, "One must imagine Sisyphus happy."[2] Through a lucid understanding of the situation, both characters could fully and completely experience their condition. The experience was unmarred by fear, resentment, or revenge, which are the result of nonacceptance. As opposed to anxiety, which implied a thwarted meaning pattern, they found a type of ecstasy and serenity which came through the uninhibited structures of experience.

Camus concluded that an honest and persistent examination of the absurd could help modern man understand his plight and possibly disclose a new direction in the pursuit of meaning. This was also essential in the process of

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[1]Camus, The Stranger, op. cit., p. 154.

[2]Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, op. cit., p. 123.

becoming free. As long as man insisted on maintaining his irrational hopes and fears, he could never hope to conquer the façade of everyday mass man. Camus felt truth must speak for itself. Clear and lucid reason required the pure unadulterated facts, i.e. the raw data of the world. Yet, man possessed desires and passions. Those must not be sacrificed at the altar of impersonal and calculated reason. It was out of the feeling and logic of the absurd that Camus encountered the feeling and the idea of revolt. Man was not to accept the absurd as ultimate, which would mean a justification for suicide, but sense the human dignity and its desire for meaning, and revolt against those forces which threaten to reduce man to absurdity. However, man must first recognize the absurd before he can effectively revolt against it.

Once man had grasped the meaning of the absurd, he had real freedom. For both Meursault and Sisyphus knew their destiny and fate. They no longer deluded themselves in artificial hopes which would imaginatively remove the torment of their absurd condition. Man had to act in the midst of ambiguity. Once this was understood, man could become the master as opposed to the slave of absurdity. The moment of truth was the moment of triumph. As Cruickshank put it,

> Happiness will follow from a relationship in which the individual accepts the eternal antagonism between

his desire for life and the inevitability of his death.[1]

When the condition of lucidity is prevalent, Camus felt that man could see to what extent his finite meanings had distorted and perverted the immediate content of experience. Thus, out of negation, the mind could arrive at a condition which was essentially positive.

It was stated earlier that whenever man rebelled or was negative about one thing, he was positive toward something else. The pursuit of the negative upturned the positive in human experience. It was this positive element which offered the motivation for man's revolt. For Camus, the groundwork had been sufficiently laid to launch headlong into the notion of revolt. The negative, once stated, allowed him to turn his thoughts more fully to the positive. This second basic notion was explored primarily in The Plague and The Rebel.

Because there was no transcendent criteria for determining what was absolutely "wrong" or absolutely "right," Camus concluded that man was essentially "innocent." Camus wanted nothing to do with the orthodox Christian notion of sin and innocence. Yet, he maintained that the concept of sin was not totally devoid of meaning. For him man sinned

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[1]John Cruickshank, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (New York: A Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 39.

when he refused to view the world in a lucid manner. He saw both suicide and the "leap of faith" as an escape from innocence since they failed to lucidly view the absurd. Thus, revolt was a rebellion against any type of escapism. It was the refusal to introduce any forms of delusion and hope which would lay claim to more than one actually knew. Camus argued that to give up innocence was to sin and, therefore, find oneself in a state of "guilt."

The active negation of all attempts to find a solution which could remove the torment of the absurd constituted the principal force in Camus' ethic. Since death is the negation of freedom, as is escape, he felt that one of the main modes of revolt was freedom. Included with freedom was intensity (la passion), which was also an inevitable part of revolt. This intensity turned his ethics once more toward the quantitative as opposed to the qualitative.

> The fact of innocence, the necessity of lucidity, the possibility of freedom and the promise of intensity come to form an ethic of revolt which is consistent with wagering in favour of the absurd. The argument that began as an invitation to commit suicide finally becomes an imperative to live life with passion. . . .Courage is required if one is to live without the possibility of spiritual comfort. Intelligence is needed so that one has no illusions about the ultimately limited and hopeless life that such an ethic offers.[1]

However, Camus was well aware of the pitfalls of rebellion. Historically, more often than not a revolt in

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[1] Ibid., p. 73.

the name of humanitarian rights ended in terrorism. That which had sought to preserve life ended by destroying it. The oppressed who sought freedom ended by restricting the freedom of those who had been their oppressors. Thus, he chose to steer a middle course which would maintain the freedom and human dignity that was being sought.

> The logic of the rebel is to want to serve justice so as not to add to the injustice of the human condition, to insist on plain language so as not to increase the universal falsehood, and to wager, in spite of human misery, for happiness.[1]

Camus felt that rebellion was basically against death and violence, and it could not possibly legitimize murder. Yet, the rebel could not afford to say that he would never kill or lie. For him to do so, in Camus' estimation, would be for him to give in to the inevitability of evil. Yet, if he did use them he would be destroying the meaning and significance of rebellion. Thus, the rebel was always caught within a dynamic tension.

At this point Camus was struggling with the fundamental issue of the orthodox position concerning man's attitude toward evil and suffering. Many Christians have held that one cannot fight violence and coercion with violence and coercion. Others have held that ideals had to be sacrificed in the presence of evil in order to preserve the future.

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[1]Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: A Vintage Book, 1956), p. 285.

However, for Camus, evil planted and nurtured the seeds of his most basic convictions. His revulsion for evil caused him to rebel against those indifferent forces which sought the destruction of the innocent. In a speech made at the Dominican Monastery of Latour-Maubourg in 1948 he stated,

> Hence I shall not, as far as I am concerned, try to pass myself off as a Christian in your presence. I share with you the same revulsion from evil. But I do not share your hope, and I continue to struggle against this universe in which children suffer and die.[1]

He went on to urge Christians to be Christian, to be willing to make a stand and be heard against all forces of evil. He finished by saying,

> And what I know--which sometimes creates a deep longing in me--is that if Christians made up their minds to it, millions of voices--millions, I say--throughout the world would be added to the appeal of a handful of isolated individuals who, without any sort of affiliation, today intercede almost everywhere and ceaselessly for children and for men.[2]

This rebelling spirit in Camus was based on a deep-seated optimism concerning man. Even though he was pessimistic as to God, he was optimistic as to man and his efforts to lucidly and honestly revolt against evil.

Evil also brought out one other basic notion which lay at the heart of Camus' thought. It was obvious

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[1]Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 70-71.

[2]Ibid., p. 74.

throughout his writings that he saw rebellion in terms of human solidarity and the value of human life. For those who fought against death and murder, there was a positive value in the worth of human life. As he so often pointed out, in every negation there was an affirmation. It was not just the perpetuation of physical existence but of the intensity of that existence. To say "no" to suicide, death, and torture was to say "yes" to life, not just his own life, but to all human life. He put it in the Cartesian formula when he said, "I rebel, therefore we exist."[1]

This sense of man's common fight against evil was symbolized by Camus as the plague in the book by the same name. In this stirring novel he painted a picture of innocent suffering. The plague was not only symbolic of disease and the German occupation of France but in a deeper sense all of the irrational forces which destroyed and tortured human existence. The seaport city of Oran became the symbol of man while its closed gates were indicative of finiteness and the sense of being cut off from any outside help. Man had to pit his abilities against the ravages of the plague without consolation or hope. Even though the plague left as mysteriously as it appeared, there

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[1]Camus, The Rebel, op. cit., p. 252.

was no assurance against its return. Yet, in spite of the irrationality of evil, Camus felt that man must use his intelligence and technology against it. One must do all he can within the confines of his knowledge to help eliminate the causes of suffering.

As many critics have pointed out Camus' notion of revolt was deeply rooted in the "Mediterranean tradition." It seemed to be heading toward a type of human nature or human essence. It was this essence that lay at the heart of his notion of human solidarity. This he implied in The Rebel when he said,

> Logically, one should reply that murder and rebellion are contradictory. If a single master should, in fact, be killed, the rebel, in a certain way, is no longer justified in using the term 'community of men' from which he derived his justification. If this world has no higher meaning, if man is only responsible to man, it suffices for a man to remove one single human being from the society of the living to automatically exclude himself from it.[1]

He went on to contrast the "Mediterranean mind" with the "German mind." While the "German mind" reasoned in terms of the State, the absolutist society, rational tyranny, and colonization of the masses, the "Mediterranean mind" reasoned in terms of the commune, concrete society, deliberate freedom, and altruistic individualism.[2] At the close of The Rebel one found again the mystical symbols of sun and sea. They carried a connotation of unity and participation.

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[1] Ibid., p. 281. [2] Ibid., p. 299.

They were like magnetic fields which drew men together in a common concern for life, freedom, and happiness. However, it was an undiluted and undefiled happiness which arose out of the lucid intensity of the present moment.

The human condition as hypocrisy and absurdity. Most of this section was concerned above in the examination of Camus' basic presuppositions. Because he was unsystematic in his thought, it was difficult to extract a structure without disclosing a major portion of the content.

Basically, Camus saw the human condition in much the same light as Heidegger and Sartre. He saw mass man continually deluding himself with rationalizations and escape mechanisms. Everyday life was marked by perpetual repetition and habitual inhibitions. Chatter and verbosity served to fill in the abysmal silences which threatened the make-believe security which was cherished to the exclusion of freedom and individuality. This façade could be maintained indefinitely with the help of moral platitudes and divine enchantations. Through various forms of hope, man could twist and distort his experiences past those unanticipated moments when he was faced with the apparent indifference of the world.

> As the humdrum daily routine, with its habits and techniques, weaves about us a soft cocoon, we sink into

> a lethargy blindly leading us to death, and the objective responsiveness to our own existence becomes abolished.[1]

Like Sartre and Heidegger, Camus felt that realization of the façade was possible through an honest encounter with what is. Camus held that man was a being-in-the-world who was possessed with an imagination which could use the world for his own ends. Yet, there were those moments when its own stubborn factuality refused to be made in the image of human desire. Such instances brought man face to face with the realization of the absurdity of his meanings in relationship to that revealed world.

Camus saw man as guilty when he deliberately refused to face the absurdity and ambiguity of his existence. Sin consisted of trying to escape, either by suicide or the "leap of faith," and by failing to take the responsibility for one's condition. When man out of cowardice was afraid to deal honestly with the absurd, he was no longer innocent. Man had to recognize that his aspiration for the eternal was always subordinate to duration. Man was not to seek to eradicate the factual feeling of absurdity by deluding himself with false hopes.

The solution to the human condition as honesty and revolt. As was stated above, man was capable of those

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[1]Albert Maquet, Albert Camus: The Invincible Summer, trans. Herma Briffault (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1958), p. 31.

experiences which undercut the ordinary and everyday illusions of organized life. This experience was one of detachment which introduced a gap between man's meanings and the world's facticity. Yet, man had to go on living in the world. As Maquet stated it,

> However, one must live. A man must consciously resume "the chain of daily gestures" but with a new disposition, a new virtue. This consciousness which, before the absurd experience, allowed itself to be sunk in a comfortable lethargy, will henceforth sustain its vigilance and exercise the freedom recognized in its definitive awakening. Since nothing of what can be thought or done has any meaning, my life is no longer inclined towards one thought rather than another or to accomplish this thing rather than that. Without aim, without plan for the future, shut against all those hopes which would have compelled a constant choice, that is to say, a renouncement, a discipline of action, . . .the absurd man sees opening to him a total liberty, which the perspective of death increases and exalts still more.[1]

This, also, offered man a new concept of responsibility. Instead of being bound in one's decisions by some predetermined set of values, the absurd man was freed of such responsibility. The absurd man was freed to center his attention totally on life itself.

The process of detachment meant a situation in which man could not cling to any absolute. Man could only measure life in terms of freedom and justice. Like Sartre, Camus would not let man turn to God for help, but, unlike him, he allowed man to turn to man. There was a solidarity among

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[1] Ibid., p. 46.

men which allowed them to help and mutually support one another in their common plight and war against evil. Man had to be willing to sacrifice for other men for no other reason than the fact that they were men who, like himself, suffered and died. The absurd hero became a type of humanistic Christ who found himself a stranger in a fallen and alien world. Like Christ, the absurd hero was willing to die rather than forsake the virtues of justice and honesty. Yet, he was a defective Christ. He was not able to give out the final affirmation, "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit!"[1]

In his novel, The Fall, Camus reaffirmed his notion of innocence and guilt as well as honesty and human solidarity. These constituted his distinction between authentic and unauthentic human existence. In The Fall, as the title implied, Camus seemed to be exploring the religious problem of sin and innocence. Even the principal character, the "judge-penitent," Jean-Baptiste Clamence was symbolic of John the Baptist and his message of judgment and repentance. Even the Zuider Zee was symbolic of the Dead Sea and the absurd because its origin and destination are unknown. Hanna, as well as many other critics, have

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[1]Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1952), p. 100. (New Testament)

called The Fall ". . .a confessional narrative."[1] Undoubtedly, The Fall was a psychological study which indicated his (Camus') own desire to confess his own unauthenticity as well as leading others to do the same.

The narrative commenced in an Amsterdam bar with Clamence engaged in self-judgment with an unidentified listener. Clamence recognized that only through confession and self-judgment could he avoid the condemning and mocking laughter of others and be justified in his own judgment of them. Clamence had several years prior been a well-to-do Parisian lawyer who was well steeped in the habitual behavior patterns of sophisticated European culture. One evening while standing on the 'Pont des Arts' he heard laughter which startled him. It was the hysterical laughter of a woman who had jumped or fallen into the Seine. Clamence had stood motionless as the cries faded downstream into silence. He had made no attempt to help her. From that moment on the woman's laughter stood between Clamence and his superficial morality. All of his virtues seemed to take on a type of foreignness. There seemed to be a gap between himself and virtue. This gap was obviously his own freedom.

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[1]Thomas Hanna, The Thought and Art of Albert Camus (Chicago: A Gateway Edition, Henry Regnery Company, 1958), p. 215.

This freedom brought with it a judgment over the wholeness of his existence. His failure to help made a sham of his virtue while forcing him to face squarely his own responsibility. This experience had brought Clamence from innocence to guilt. For the first time in his life, he had felt the burden of freedom and this proved to be his fall. Yet, it was a fall which brought him to a higher state of consciousness and life. He was no longer enmeshed in his rationalized and self-deluding lies. He had lost his simplicity. However, with this vision of himself came the realization that it was also a vision of his age. All men were seeking some sort of "paradise" which would assure them of some haven of rest from the inevitable burden of freedom and responsibility.

Clamence was a modern day prophet who was crying with dry tears for men to repent. He could offer no other messiah than that of honesty and integrity. His only hope was one of clarity and a unifying spirit between all men in their common fight against those forces which make human existence absurd. He was calling men to rebellion. He wanted them to revolt against their unconscious middle-class morality, which offered them a deadly opiate and an excuse for their artificial superimposed virtues. That type of life he saw as fictional and perverted.

Camus' recognition of human duplicity was far from being original in any sense of the term. As was already pointed out, both Heidegger and Sartre made the same distinction. However, Camus gave his own unique slant to this human condition. For him unauthentic living was characterized by a dishonest duplicity which sought through various forms of escape, i.e. suicide both physical and intellectual, and hope to give human existence some semblance of permanence and order. When one had come to grips with the absurd, he could reevaluate himself and seek to live authentically. Authentic living required a revolt against the absurd by recognizing that one must never absolutize any set of values. Life was to be seen as ambiguous and free. Man was not to sacrifice his freedom by becoming a slave to some absolutized ideal which was characterized by hope for some future state of bliss.

Thus, for Camus, lucid and honest experiences in the present, which were analyzed purely within the confines of one's present knowledge, were to replace those hopes, which sought to relieve man of the burden of his freedom. It was from the intensity and quantity of raw experience that Camus wanted man to glean the motives for his revolt against the absurd. He felt such experience was not only man's only source of direction but the only authentic one. He did not want man to distort and twist his sensitivity to

experience by filtering it through some preconceived set of values. Camus' drive for happiness was centered in life's experiences. All experiences were to be seen as valuable. None were to be elevated to the point of being absolute.

Clamence's movement from the "I" to the "we" seemed to be the only point which kept Camus' philosophy from falling into complete relativism. As Clamence put it,

> Covered with ashes, tearing my hair, my face scored by clawing, but with piercing eyes, I stand before all humanity recapitulating my shames without losing sight of the effect I am producing, and saying: "I was the lowest of the low." Then imperceptibly I pass from the 'I" to the "we." When I get to "This is what we are," the trick has been played and I can tell them off. I am like them, to be sure; we are in the soup together. However, I have a superiority in that I know it and this gives me the right to speak. You see the advantage, I am sure. The more I accuse myself, the more I have a right to judge you. Even better, I provoke you into judging yourself, and this relieves me of that much of the burden.[1]

Thus, Camus moved from the innocent rebel, who revolted against those artificial values which introduced guilt, to the "judge-penitent" who recognized himself as one of those who propagated the evil against which the rebel was revolting. The evil was no longer an ambiguous plague whose origin and departure always remained unpredicted. It had now become something whose origin lies within the "I" and "we." It was no longer impersonal. It was a notion

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[1]Albert Camus, The Fall, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1957), p. 140.

which approached the doctrine of "original sin."

Clamence's confession gave one the inside perspective of freedom in all its emptiness. Yet, such emptiness did not seem to be enough for Camus. There was an inner urge to tell others so that they too could become aware of their own duplicity. It was a type of demonic evangelism which prompted Clamence to corner his listeners and make them judge both him and themselves. Camus was not content with the solitary and always pushed on toward solidarity. He was not satisfied with either solitude or guilt. Like the Christians, he wanted to push beyond both solitude and guilt and find solidarity (community) and innocence (redemption).

Criticism and evaluation of Camus' position. There is much in the writing of Albert Camus to stimulate the thinking of anyone who is concerned with man and his condition. Camus offered a penetrating analysis of the post war psychological makeup of the European mind. One often has the feeling that the characters who unfold in his novels could very well be oneself. Perhaps none lived so vividly as a testimony of contemporary duplicity as Jean-Baptiste Clamence. However, the orthodox Christian would be more susceptible to Clamence if he did not preach in such a conceited style. The true sense of humility, which a

religious person might have expected from one who has squarely faced his hypocrisy was conspicuously absent.

Because of the experimental flavor of his works, it was difficult to give any final structure to Camus' thought. Yet, it could be noted that while he often used the terms absurdity and revolt he never gave any concrete definition to them. One was merely told that absurdity was not final and revolt was not absolute. He was much better at demonstrating and conveying the emotions than in offering any concise logic for them. However, like Heidegger and Sartre, he was willing to give more weight to the experience which introduced the feeling of absurdity than to the many experiences to the contrary. Such preference had no grounds from the criteria established in his thought.

Like the nature mystics, Camus often resorted to the experiences of the sea and the sun. At some points one felt that the experiences which elevated man's spirit in the sense of participation may have been the same experience which was used to sense the absurdity of the everyday experiences. This type of distinction seemed to be quite similar to the mystics when they spoke of the ordinary and finite as contingent. In any case the experience of the unenchanted world was given special attention along with the experience of absurdity. His notion of the irreducible

values which lay at the heart of revolt also implied that special consideration over ordinary experience. Camus apparently wanted to give the feelings of participation, absurdity, and revolt the same origin. However, he failed to give any logical or explicit relationship between them. From his ethic of quantity such preferences would be impossible. Yet, this would have overlooked his notion of human solidarity. These experiences seemed to have gained a type of transcendence by virtue of their universality. He seemed to be saying that such experiences were not only fundamental to himself but to all others as well. It was not only his individual experience which confirmed the priority but the combined experience of others who have been just as lucid and as honest in their own analysis of human existence. He seemed to be implying that when man cleared his perceptions of unauthenticity he had similar feelings and experiences.

Even though he argued that no set of experiences or values could be absolutized, he was careful not to commit the philosophical error of "mutual exclusion," i.e. making a statement absolute after denying absolutes. Had he in turn absolutized the virtue of never absolutizing, he would have been guilty of the crime with which he was prosecuting others. His notion that absolutized experiences led to neurotic behavior have often been verified by psychologists.

Yet, his indication that "normal" behavior was also determined in the same neurotic manner needs further consideration by psychologists and sociologists. Like many of the existentialists he was questioning a mere adjustment within one's environment. His idea that unauthentic living was based on distorted experiences indicated that lucid and honest appraisal of one's experiences could lead to authentic living, i.e. unneurotic or natural existence.

Camus seemed to be closer to Heidegger and the Christian position when he observed that authentic life was based on concrete experience and not pure pro-jections. He implied that there were definite meaning structures which could be apprehended through experience. Authentic life was not characterized as arbitrary. It was ambiguous, certainly, but man could use his knowledge to promote the values he experienced when encountering existence. In his own way he implied a type of experience which might well have been related to the religious experience.

From the orthodox position it was obvious that Camus did not center man's innocence in any transcendent primordial world. However, he felt that without such a realm of transcendent values man was innocent until such values could be established which could judge him guilty. He also agreed with the orthodox position that it was out of freedom that man found himself in the "fallen" condition of unauthentic

existence. By denying any God or transcendent set of values, he found no "rift" between God and man. However, through lucidity he encountered a separateness within himself as well as between himself and nature. Like the orthodox position, Camus accepted the notion that man was capable, through certain types of experience, to realize one's authenticity and seek to live more authentically. However, man could turn to no one save himself. Each man became his own defective Christ.

Camus recognized that freedom was not structureless and anarchical. It was a dynamic force which was capable of motivating man toward suicide or revolt. Thus, he gave priority to essence over existence. Such a change from unauthentic to authentic living implied that guilt and the sin of escape did not permanently alienate man from his essential nature. Through revolt man could strike out against those forces which sought to reduce him to absurdity. While man encountered absurdity in his relationships with his fellowman and nature he felt a deeper participation within nature which gave rise to a sense of solidarity.

Unlike the orthodox position, Camus had no type of eschatology. For him redemption was totally immanent and present. The future always eluded what could be known for certain. For Camus it was dishonest to presume that one had any degree of certainty about the future. At best it

was a calculated guess or a projected hope. Such hopes often deluded man into thinking that he could draw security bonds on eternity. It allowed man to use the future as the present and a hope as a fact.

Like the orthodox position, Camus agreed that the authentic life was both individual and communal in structure. The Fall demonstrated that redemption may start as individual but it will not remain as such. The imperceptible movement, which was never really made clear or lucid, from the "I" to the "we" held the key to Camus' notion of human solidarity. Undoubtedly, he would have claimed that the imperceptible change, which issued in evangelism was deeply rooted in one's experience of the unauthentic.

In his own way Camus sounded very much like a Christian who had given up the old wine skins but had not yet found a place to store the new wine. His brand of humanism was quite familiar to certain segments of liberal Protestantism. His projected plans for the future, which never were realized, included a book entitled The First Adam. Many have postulated that he was gradually moving toward Christianity. It appeared to this author that there was a definite movement away from any implicit atheism toward some type of transcendent value scale, i.e. theism. This transitional movement toward theism was more apparent in the thought of Karl Jaspers.

II. KARL JASPERS AND THE MEANING OF THE COMPREHENSIVE

Biographical introduction. Karl Jaspers was born in Oldenburg, Germany, February 23, 1883, the son of a bank manager. His first academic efforts were in the field of law which he studied both at Heidelberg and Munich. He soon turned to the field of medicine for the next five years at Berlin, Göttingen, and Heidelberg. In 1908 he received his M.D. degree and was appointed scientific assistant at the psychiatric clinic in Heidelberg. It was from this experience that he wrote General Psychopathology in 1913. This book soon became the standard textbook in its field. It was during this same period that he became a Lecturer in Philosophy at Heidelberg and was appointed Professor in 1920.

In 1919 he published his Psychology of World Outlooks (Psychologie der Weltanschauungen), which broadened and synthesized his psychological studies of various philosophers and their particular philosophical orientations. In 1930 he finished the manuscript for his Man in the Modern Age but put it aside until he finished his three-volume work entitled Philosophie which was published in 1932. It was followed in several weeks by the former manuscript. In 1937 Jaspers was forced by the National-Socialist government to give up his teaching because of his criticisms of

racism and because of his Jewish wife. However, he was still able to deliver two sets of lectures during this period, published as Reason and Existence and Philosophy and Existence.

Unfortunately, most of his major works have not as yet been translated into English. Yet, he might well be sighted as one of the foremost contemporary philosophers in Germany today. He is certainly one of the most respected of all the existentialists, both here and abroad.

Jaspers' basic presuppositions. Like the preceding existentialists in this inquiry, Jaspers started with human existence. In many respects his thought was a summation and systematization of all the basic themes of existentialism. Perhaps of all those extentialists included in this study he came the closest to characterizing his particular type of existentialism. Certainly, there was wide agreement between his critics that his thought seemed to lay somewhere between atheistic and theistic types.

Jaspers saw everyday empirical being as being-in-a-situation, i.e. 'Dasein.' Unlike Heidegger and Sartre, Jaspers was not interested in ontology. He felt that philosophy always presupposed a situation out of which one asked and sought answers to questions. He denied that it was possible for anyone to stand outside of all situations in order to comprehend the universal, which was necessary

in the case of ontology. Jaspers felt that what one experiences as real owes its reality to the fact of one's own individual existence. Thus, philosophy was to be seen as an "illumination" (Existenzerhellung) of one's personality.

Like Heidegger he saw man as a metaphysical animal who presupposed its own existence when asking philosophical questions. Yet, both the questions and the answers presupposed certain limitations or boundaries which prevented any absolute universality. Man's being or 'Dasein' was always historical and caught within "limit-situations" (Grenzsituationen). Man was moving in the midst of known as well as unknown facts. He was always involved with an unfathomable past and an impenetrable future. It was out of such a background that man had to quest for the answers to his questions. Thus, man's first task was to gain some form of orientation in the world in which he found himself. Jaspers felt that through science, i.e. objective knowledge, and philosophy, i.e. understanding the limits of objective knowledge, man could gain such an orientation.

Jaspers relied a great deal on the thought of Kant. He felt that man's "understanding" (Verstehen) referred to man's ability to deal with the objective world. Such understanding was based on phenomenal knowledge. In contrast to 'Verstehen' was reason (Vernunft). Jaspers saw reason as constantly pushing beyond phenomenal knowledge in a search

for authentic truth which was not satisfied with understanding the objective world. Thus, reason always called all accepted truths into question. Science could be content with empirical facts but the philosopher sought to pierce the veil of flux and transitoriness. Reason, therefore, acted as a type of nihilism which purged man of his absolutes.

The nihilating process of reason forced man, in Jaspers' opinion, back to himself. No scientific or philosophic constructs could be accepted as final. Objective knowledge presupposes the subject-object structure of experience. Jaspers felt such a structure could not confront "authentic being," i.e. the nonobjective. Metaphysical thinking moved beyond this structure toward the "Comprehensive" (Das Umgreifende). Every subject-object structure was seen within a wider context which transcended and was more comprehensive. Thus, authentic Being could never be totally grasped within logical or psychological knowledge. Man had to recognize that his thinking started with himself and was carried out within his own limit-situation. For Jaspers man had to seek the concrete from within. It was there alone that he had any possibility of finding answers in his search for Being.

Jaspers recognized that metaphysics could never command the empirical evidence of science nor the abstract

certainty of logic. Kurt Reinhardt stated,

> What, then, is this personal, concrete "existence" in a given situation? It is, says Jaspers, the hidden ground of my self, that which never becomes an object and which therefore can neither be rationally known nor conceptually defined. It is the origin ("Ursprung") out of which I think and act and of which in rare moments of insight I am indubitably certain.[1]

Thus the 'Ursprung' was a type of primal ground out of which human existence and freedom proceeded. When this awareness was contrasted with 'Dasein,' existence was further "illuminated." As was pointed out above, for Jaspers 'Dasein' referred to the empirical objectness of the world. It presupposed the subject-object structure of experience. For Jaspers this was the world that was observed via the scientific method. Man, insofar as he was empirical, was 'Dasein.'

Jaspers did not see human 'Dasein' as existence but as a possible existence (mögliche Existenz). Like the other existentialists Jaspers saw human 'Existenz' in terms of possibility. Man had to choose his own existence. For Jaspers the "existential consciousness" was the awareness of one's free choices. Man was free when he began to act in an original and spontaneous manner from the depths of his own 'Existenz.' Man was only truly himself when he acted out of his own freedom. He felt that only in action and commitment does man gain any certainty of Being. He saw such action transcending any kind of abstract absolute or sentimental emotion. By actualizing a certain possibility

man was capable of breaking the limits of 'Dasein.' Thus, existence created itself out of spontaneous freedom and infused Being with personality, i.e. projected value. Jaspers was then able to replace the "Cogito, ergo sum" with "Eligo, ergo sum" (I choose, therefore I am).

Like Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus, Jaspers recognized that the "I" was always in process or movement. This meant that the "self" was always unfinished and could not be viewed in its totality. Likewise, no objective criteria could be used to give any clear-cut understanding of the self. Even though he agreed with Sartre that freedom was without objective proof he did not see it as dreadful. It, of course, involved a "risk" but not inevitable despair. Rather, it opened man to a type of reasonable faith or philosophical faith. Man's continual doubting was used to clarify his decisions. Jaspers recognized that as 'Dasein' man has many determinants in his actions. Yet, because of his freedom he was responsible for his actions. Like many other existential psychologists, Jaspers made responsibility the basic category for psychotherapy.

Even though he saw man moving from one limit-situation to another, he felt that man could not pass beyond all limit-situations to the "Comprehensive" or "Encompassing." Empirically, man was 'Dasein' and potentially, 'Existenz.'

Thus, the self was both "there" in the world, i.e. empirically, and not "there," i.e. potential being. It was in man's flight from 'Dasein' toward 'Existenz' that the Transcendent or Comprehensive was discovered. As man realized that Being was never exhausted in any limit-situation he became aware of the Comprehensive. Each situation or condition could only announce or point to Being but never exhaust it. Thus, every mode could become what Jaspers called a "cypher," i.e. sign or symbol. This meant to Jaspers that philosophy was essentially a process of opening up the mind toward the Transcendent. One's awareness of finiteness made one aware of one's movement toward transcending those limits.

Jaspers felt that once man recognized the Comprehensive, which was revealed through the limitations of the subject-object dichotomy, that philosophy was endowed with its necessary freedom. Through reason's nihilation of rationalism's absolutes man was freed, i.e. opened, to encounter "authentic Being." Man became aware of the true values of all finite modes of existence by encountering their transparency. Jaspers realized that each limit-situation lead through and beyond itself toward the Comprehensive. As he put it,

> The fall from absolutes which were after all illusory becomes an ability to soar; what seemed an abyss becomes space for freedom; apparent

> Nothingness is transformed into that from which authentic being speaks to us.[1]

Through such limit-situations such as death, man became aware of his finitude and his desire to transcend his mode of particularity. Man, thus, became aware of his situation as grounded in Being. He became conscious of the fact that Being encompassed and enveloped all other modes of existence.

However, Jaspers did not mistake man's awareness of Being for knowledge about Being. The Comprehensive was a type of negative complement to the positive awareness of limits. Because such experiences were purely personal, they could never be reduced to universals. There was never any universal verification possible. Likewise, it should not be confused with the positive modes of mystical experience. It was primarily a spontaneous synthetic projection out of one's own free actions. It was above all never apprehended as an object. It was more of a matter of realizing the objectness of one's self and the world within the nonobjectness of the Comprehensive. Thus, through a type of "philosophical faith" one could affirm his own truth of the Transcendent.

The feeling which accompanied the experience of

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[1]Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale Paperback, Yale University Press, 1960), p. 38.

limits was an abiding uneasiness and anxiety. There was a sense of no longer being at home in the world of objectness. There was a sense of estrangement and brokenness. The brokenness goaded a searching process. The search, which could be characterized as the search for the Other, i.e. that which transcended the empirical, constituted Jaspers' definition of metaphysics. The pursuit of metaphysics was carried on in the context of philosophical faith, which was characterized by rationalistic and systematic doubt. Through reason and doubt man encountered limit-situations, which were transparent and pointed beyond themselves, i.e. cyphers or symbols, revealing the Encompassing. In one sense the Comprehensive could have been called a type of philosophical god. Thus, as Cochrane pointed out,

> Jaspers' philosophical faith is a religious faith. God, as being itself, is "situated in an entirely different dimension from empirical sensible objects." Consequently, Jaspers contends that even when we think of God or the comprehensive in philosophical terms we are making an object of what is essentially not an object. Philosophy and metaphysics cannot provide us with any objective knowledge about God. Metaphysics yields its content only when it understands itself as a symbol.[1]

Thus, Jaspers tried to overcome the criticism of the irrationality of metaphysics by recognizing that it was expressed in "sign language." While empirical propositions could be empirically verified, metaphysical propositions

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[1]Arthur C. Cochrane, The Existentialists and God (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 49-50.

were verified from 'Existenz' through "philosophical faith." Existential encounter tended to act as an awakener in man's quest for self-realization.

There was nothing in the cyphers which impelled man to seek their meaning. "Cypher-reading" was based on a free decision on the part of man. Out of human 'Existenz' each individual had to decide whether or not he would pursue the transparent symbolism of the limit-situation. Cyphers were not at all obvious to 'Dasein.' They required a transformation on the part of the individual. They were only discernible when man totally and comprehensively understood any given situation. Thus, cypher-reading was to be seen as a prerequisite for authentic being. Jaspers recognized that the cypher often included an interweaving of what was logically separate. Therefore, it was always somewhat mysterious and confusing. In his studies he had discovered that all great philosophies have their points of ambiguity and blurred borderlines. Yet, he felt that their presence was a perfect indication of the force of their truth for the particular philosopher. They could not be cast away on the simple grounds of ambiguity or lack of rational clarity.

Jaspers saw philosophizing occurring at the point where one became aware or conscious of Being. It often occurred in spurts or leaps as a notion gained clarity. Such ideas had the effect of having always been present

somewhere in one's peripheral consciousness. He saw philosophy arising out of astonishment which, in turn, turned into questioning. He saw the answer coming in four distinct ways.

> An answer is given by research, by illumination, by reflection, or by affirmation.
> (a) Research: In the sciences the methods of experiencing the empirically real are developed, and definite knowledge of objects if found.
> (b) Illumination: What we are and can be as Existenz and what is present to us as a mode of the Encompassing, is illuminated by thoughts which. . .are not actually knowledge but are that which addresses itself to us in the form of wisdom and maxims, thoughts which do not put a world of objectivity at our disposal but which call to us (as Potentialities).
> (c) Reflection: I seek fundamental knowledge in the totality of the sciences, in the illuminations and affirmations, and in the categories and methods of which thinking in all these directions makes use.
> (d) Affirmation: Authentic being becomes realized in the cypher. All the modes of objectivity, every form of thinking, of research, of illumination, of reflection are in the service of the deepening of the perceptible cypher-script.[1]

Jaspers also pointed out that through the cypher-script Transcendence has spoken out historically to man, yet there has been a tendency on the part of man to confuse the cyphers with Being-itself. Thus, man objectified his experience and attempted to reduce the Comprehensive to 'Dasein.'

In his Perennial Scope of Philosophy he indicated that true "philosophical faith" cannot yield any universal content. Everything must be seen as historically relative

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[1]Karl Jaspers, Truth and Symbol, trans. Jean T. Wilde, William Kluback and William Kimmel (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1959), pp. 70-71.

and limited in its scope.

> The world as a whole is not an object, but an idea. What we know is in the world, but is never the world. . . .Transcendence is the being that never becomes world but that speaks as it were through the being that is in the world.[1]

Thus, philosophical faith was not an experience of anything given but a type of awareness which could give way to a different attitude in any given situation. When man adopted such an attitude based on a free decision rooted in his own 'Existenz,' he was capable of deciphering the transparent meanings of each limit-situation, i.e. encountering the Comprehensive. Faith, thus, became the consciousness of existence in reference to transcendence, i.e. openness (Aufgeschloseen).

Jaspers was aware of the fact that such an interpretation of faith and its meanings meant that any one faith had to take into consideration the fact that its interpretation was one among others. One was forced to recognize that when his faith was only capable of yielding interpretations rather than absolute truths that ultimate reality somehow transcended and escaped any one perspective. Man, thus, lived between the possibility of giving himself to the world of sense or of viewing the world as illusory, i.e. as Maya.

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[1]Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: New York Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 12.

One's attitude involved a tension (Spannung) between the two extremes. Such an attitude also involved a type of humility which was possible in tentative situations as well as a desire for communication.

Jaspers felt that true selfhood was not possible without some form of genuine communication. The very presence of others pointed beyond one's own faith and interpretations. As one moved toward isolation and solitude, one was cut off from the deeper meanings of 'Existenz' in oneself as well as others. Jaspers felt that if one stressed the relationship of the ego and the nonego that they were forced to the edge of an abyss, i.e. the limits of 'Dasein.' Such limits pointed toward a complete estrangement and a fundamental splitting of Being. "It was out of man's desire for the unity of Being that he discovered his urge to bridge the abyss in a union of 'being-with-the-other."[1] In genuine communication, i.e. existential encounter, one opened himself to the other and vice versa. One had to break from all knowledge and values which could interfere with a free exchange of selves. In such communication one did not lose one's self but gained a fuller uniqueness and personality. The true nature of communication remained, for Jaspers, as mysterious as the 'Existenz' from which it originated.

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[1]Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 186.

It is now possible to see more fully the role that reason played in the philosophy of Jaspers. Like Kant he had divided his epistemology into phenomenon (appearances) and noumenon (thing-in-itself). Thus, through 'Verstehen' man could understand 'Dasein' while 'Vernunft' opened the way for the encounter with 'Das Umgreifende.' Though the Encompassing never offered structural knowledge, it was necessary for any comprehensive understanding of authentic being. Through the Comprehensive, man felt the crisis of each limit-situation. The crisis was characterized by the feeling of anguish.

Jaspers accepted the notion that there could be no real freedom minus the possibility of despair. Human life could always be characterized by antinomies which denied resolve. He illustrated them by what he called "the law of the day and the passion of the night."[1] The former was characterized by balance, order, clarity, reasonability, and harmony while the latter offered discontinuity, nothingness, death, and limitation. However, they were for Jaspers dipolar notions. Day could only be understood in terms of night and night in terms of day.

Sartre, Heidegger, and Camus characterized life's ambiguities and contradictions under the category of "absurdness." Jaspers chose to label the anguish of the irration as "ship-wreck" (Das Scheitern). While man sought

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[1] Ibid., p. 197.

to bring unity to the world, he constantly discovered himself inadequate for the task. This tended to fill man with despair. Yet, Jaspers felt that man was capable of giving a meaning to "shipwreck." It not only brought him face to face with his own finitude but face to face with his own inner strivings. While Sartre was willing to call such strivings "a useless passion," Jaspers found a code which needed deciphering. When man discovered that all perspectives and interpretations were doomed to shipwreck, he was faced with the translucence of Transcendence. From such an experience man could totally break the bonds of 'Dasein.' Reinhardt stated,

> In shipwreck, consciously experienced, affirmed, and surmounted by my forward thrust toward Being, my existential freedom reaches its vital sphere. The bonds which tied it to 'Dasein' are cut, and with its newly released energy it takes hold of Transcendence. "The non-being of all being that is accessible to us," concludes Jaspers, "that non-being which reveals itself in shipwreck, is the Being of Transcendence."[1]

One could easily raise the question as to whether or not it makes any difference as to what one believed. It would appear that man dwelt in a transparent world which revealed a cryptogram for which he had no key. It appeared that authenticity resided purely in one's commitment. Jaspers was quite willing to state that man would never be able to decipher enough to gain complete assuredness. He

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[1] Ibid., p. 198.

felt that when one became absolutely sure of any truth that they were lead to fanaticism. Ultimately, Jaspers felt that man should elect to accept the polarity of existence and not seek its unity in some sort of absolute. He maintained that if man became absolutized that he cut off any possibility of genuine existential communication. He felt that there was a definite type of communication for the survivors of shipwreck. This communication could only be carried on in an atmosphere of love, one in which both persons, i.e. survivors, were willing to freely give of themselves and willing to freely accept the other.

By way of summary it could be stated that Jaspers divided the world into 'Dasein,' i.e. being-there or empirically structured existence, and the Comprehensive, i.e. that which included, encompassed, and transcended 'Dasein.' Through understanding (Verstehen), man could discern the patterns and structures of the objective world, i.e. the empirical sciences. Through reason (Vernunft), he could question all the limits which were presupposed in any perspective of 'Dasein' as well as the assumed subject-object dichotomy of experience. Thus, reason brought man face to face with the Transcendent. Each limit-situation became a transparent cypher which pointed beyond its limits toward the Encompassing and comprehensive Transcendent. Man was, therefore, both 'Dasein' and 'Existenz.' He was both

empirical as well as potentiality and possibility. By combining the empirical truths of science with the unverifiable imperatives to action, which emulated from 'Existenz,' man could freely commit himself to action from "illuminated" philosophical faith. Through such faith, man could transcend the despair of shipwreck and seek greater dimensions of self-realization in the community of the survivors.

Just as Camus could not resign himself to accept the absurd as final and found refuge in revolt, so Jaspers found a life-preserver from shipwreck in philosophical faith and commitment. While Camus urged men to unite in the name of human dignity against the forces of evil, Jaspers realized that men needed one another in order to become their true selves. In both was seen that human solidarity was to be preferred to individual solitude.

The human condition as limitation and depersonalization. In Man in the Modern Age Jaspers very vividly analyzed the condition of modern man. He saw the origin of the modern situation in rationalism, subjectivity, and the western conviction of the world as a tangible reality in time.[1] With the thrust of Christianity, Jaspers felt another type of skepticism was possible. By claiming that

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[1]Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, 1951), p. 17.

God had created a world out of chaos the world was reduced to creature. All of the evil spirits of paganism could now be replaced by a godless conception of the world. As Jaspers pointed out,

> The despiritualisation of the world is not the outcome of the unfaith of individuals, but is one of the possible consequences of a mental development which here has actually led to Nothingness. We feel the unprecedented vacancy of existence, a sense of vacancy against which even the keenest scepticism of classical times was safeguarded by the richy-peopled fullness of an undecayed mythical reality, with which 'De rerum natura' of Lucretius the Epicurean is instinct.[1]

Jaspers felt that those who attempted to compare the modern period with the collapse of the classical society of the third century overlook one very basic point, namely, their technology was at a standstill while ours is steadily advancing at full force.

Jaspers felt definite concern over those situations in which human beings carried out certain unconscious automatic functions. He primarily was interested in man as a conscious being who could to a certain extent enter consciously into the causal chain of events in order to exercise freedom and responsibility. He recognized that man's existence operated within economic, sociological, and political situations. Also, man's conscious life was confined to historically cognizable knowledge. He was also

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[1] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

aware of the fact that man existed in the midst of others. Jaspers felt that in spite of such limits man could become conscious of them and seek to freely choose between various possibilities which might exist within the limits. He felt that man needed to somehow gain a vision from outside his situation in order to give it its proper perspective. Yet, man has not moved in that direction.

Jaspers saw man as always faced with the alternative of loosing himself in 'Dasein' by making it absolute or by attempting to escape the responsibilities of the world by emphasizing the illusoriness of 'Dasein.' For Jaspers man constantly lived in a world beyond his comprehension and understanding. Man was like a "voyager upon an uncharted sea." Yet, he was to seek his knowledge under such circumstances, minus any concrete assurance.

Like Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus, Jaspers saw unauthentic life emerging from "mass-life." Because of the vastness of modern society, people became mere cogs in a giant technological enterprise. Jaspers felt that even though each individual task had a purpose there was still no over-all purpose. Life for modern man was characterized by its compartmentalization and lack of unity and purpose. It was also ruled and governed by the masses. Yet, while each might have their own political views, there seemed to be no real underlying set of values which could

coordinate and implement the will of the masses.

> What the 'mass-man' on the average is, is disclosed in what most people do; in what is usually bought and consumed; in what one can generally expect when one has to deal with people 'in the mass'--as apart from the 'fads' of individuals. . . .If we know how much money an individual has to spend, we can infer his peculiarities when he tells us 'I cannot afford this, but I can afford that.'[1]

Jaspers felt that 'mass-man' was guided primarily by the pleasure principle and viewed work purely as a means toward that end. Thus, much of mass-life was externally coordinated as opposed to freely chosen. Jaspers did not reduce all human society into one mass. He saw it rather as diverse masses with varying interests and structures. These also were seen as fluid and often dissolved or changed into one another as the prevailing circumstances dictated. Man in the mass found himself no longer the same as when he stood alone. However, by the same token he often became a solitary unit or cell in the mass itself. Jaspers' major criticism of 'mass-man' was leveled against the universalization process which threatened to reduce man to a mere function.

He felt that as an individual man refused to be molded and absorbed by the universalization process. It was when his inner freedom asserted itself toward uniqueness that he

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[1] Ibid., p. 38.

felt the tension between what Jaspers called the "self-preservative impulse" and the urge for real selfhood. Philosophically speaking, it was the question as to whether or not man would allow himself to become purely 'Dasein' or live more creatively from his own 'Existenz.'

Jaspers felt that the attitude of mind which characterized contemporary man was positivism. He stated,

> The positivist does not want phrase-making, but knowledge; not ponderings about meaning, but dextrous action; not feelings, but objectivity; not a study of mysterious influences, but a clear ascertainment of facts. Reports of what has been observed must be given concisely, plastically, without sentimentalism. An aggregate of disjointed data, even sound ones, producing the effect of being the relics of earlier education, are worth nothing. . . .Control and organisation are supreme. . . .Daily affairs are carried on in conformity with fixed rules. The desire to act in accordance with general conventions, to avoid startling any one by the unusual, results in the establishment of a typical behavior which reconstructs upon a new plane something akin to the rule of taboos in primitive times.[1]

The nonindividual and impersonal seemed to be the basic earmarks of such a society. The basic category of "we" replaced the "I." The many tended to dominate the one. When the individual did do something it was done quickly and just as quickly forgotten. Jaspers saw everyone attempting to behave as if they were all the same age. The young tried to be grown up as soon as possible while the old received little respect by trying to appear young. He felt that because of

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[1] Ibid., p. 47.

positivism there was a constant effort put forth to conform in language, fashion, and all other forms of social intercourse and exchange.

In such a mass-man situation everyone was replaceable and no one was indispensable. People tended to view only the immediate ends of their jobs and failed to grasp any notion of an over-all direction in humanity. Those individuals who tended to excel in such a society were those who could capture the imaginations of others and who could organize and efficiently manage. They were the ones who could make themselves be liked by others. They had a great advantage if they could find themselves in a position where they could assume an attitude which was seemingly indifferent toward promotion. Everyone seemed to accept a type of duplicity and double-tonguedness. Thus, unauthentic living lacked integrity and straightforwardness. It was characterized by external controls and the desire to conform. Often, the greatest men were ignored for the sake of those who were efficient.

In such a society neither the masses nor the individuals really controlled anything. The system itself seemed to take over everyone's life and conform it toward its own ends. "Each individual is a tiny wheel with a fractional share in the decision, but no one effectively

decides."[1] Even the home, which was once a bulwark against disintegration, had allowed public education and outside organizations to take over the direction of its activities. It was no longer the center of man's communal life. As Jaspers pointed out, people were no longer shocked by divorce, polygamous inclinations, abortion, homosexuality, or suicide. "In many instances marriage is at best a contract, a breach of which on the part of the husband will entail only the conventional punishment of alimony."[2]

The more man became dependent on what Jaspers called apparatus the closer he came to dread. The greater the success the greater was the threat and dread of failure and collapse. Thus, man was gradually forced to depend more and more on the very thing that was destroying his individuality. The more integrated he became into the impersonal the more he was threatened by the dread of isolation and solitude. Man came to recognize that silence and emptiness were his greatest threat. The end result of this type of life robbed man of the real joy of work. He lost the sense of enjoyment that came from original and creative work. His work was reduced to a mere means of security which proved in the end to leave man without any real lasting comfort.

In the process of depersonalization the real channels

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[1] Ibid., p. 57. [2] Ibid., p. 60.

of communication were also closed. Man's language no longer was expressive of his 'Existenz' but of socially acceptable forms of diversion, such as sports, cars, jobs, movies, having babies, and the latest recipes. As Jaspers pointed out, communication was essential to selfhood. It had to be constantly carried on at the level of mutual enrichment and not merely as a time-killer to bridge the leisure period between work and sleep. It became obvious that for Jaspers unauthentic life was based on some form of escape. By allowing himself to become a tool and a means, "mass-man" lost contact with that which was vital to his 'Existenz.' He ceased to live in authentic free selfhood. He adopted the attitude of conformity and denied the value of the Transcendent. By accepting the limit-situation as absolute and final, he judged the Comprehensive irrelevant. He sought to lose himself in 'Dasein' and thereby failed to achieve 'Existenz.'

The solution to the human condition as shipwreck and philosophical faith. Jaspers saw unauthentic existence basically as failing to become oneself, i.e. accepting the limit-situations as final rather than transparent. Because man accepted the limit-situation, i.e. the finality of 'Dasein,' he tried to live by facts alone. He failed to take into consideration the limitations of perspective and

factuality. He lived the illusion of seeking to mold 'Existenz' within the confines of 'Dasein.' He sought to objectify that which was ultimately unobjectifiable, i.e. beyond the subject-object dichotomy of 'Dasein.' Man's failure to recognize that his 'Existenz' transcended 'Dasein' was the delusion of unauthentic existence.

Jaspers hinted that unauthentic faith lacked the integrated force of philosophical faith which stemmed from 'Existenz.' Philosophical faith incorporated the power of belief which could issue in free and creative activity. It stimulated an internal imperative to action as opposed to coercive external pressure. It introduced a power and force which were only possible when duplicity and hypocrisy had been overcome. As long as man was torn and estranged, he lacked the initiative and drive to act uniquely and spontaneously. However, such faith required the prior experience of shipwreck and finitude.

Jaspers felt that when man encountered limit-situations that he was confronted with two alternatives. Either he could accept them as final and absolute, i.e. unauthentic faith, or he could invision them as transparent, pointing beyond themselves to that which encompassed them, i.e. that which was more comprehensive and thus transcended any particular set of limits. When man confronted the Comprehensive, he had the possibility of being endowed with a new attitude

toward himself, others, and the world. He gained a new sense of freedom. When man felt obligated to objective and uncompromising truths, he was led into fanaticism, i.e. rigid and stereotyped circular thinking. When one felt that he had achieved the truth, he was no longer free to question or search beyond it. Such an idolatrous attitude bound man to his truth and robbed him of the virtue of humility. It also cut him off from others who could not accept his truth. Thus, instead of communication and love one ended with chatter and harsh feelings toward those who could not share one's own convictions.

Unauthentic faith was fanatical and uncompromising while philosophical faith remained open. Jaspers felt that by making doubt a part or quality of faith that he could avoid philosophical and skeptical tentativism. He felt that neither firmness of conviction nor trust in one's calculations presupposed any form of dogmatism. Thus, as Roberts stated it,

> Faith is always both absolute and relative. It is absolute in the sense of being unconditional; it is relative because it is individual and historical. The only way to meet this situation is to strive ceaselessly for communication. Having no faith at all is not openness, but emptiness. Readiness for communication means that in some hitherto alien outlook I may find a manifestation of God to which I have been blind.[1]

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[1]Roberts, op. cit., pp. 259-260.

It was Jaspers' contention that action presupposes conviction and a willingness to accept something as at least tentatively true. Action did not require absolute assuredness. He felt that man should use all the available knowledge at his disposal in order to act out of enlightened faith. Man was to maintain humility because he recognized that freedom presupposed faith rather than certitude. That which was inevitable was causally determined while that which proceeded out of 'Existenz' required faith in its validity because it could not be verified by any objective criterion.

Jaspers felt that reason would always probe on to new and higher levels of understanding. When man fully realized that all his efforts to attain absolute knowledge were doomed to shipwreck, he was goaded to the affirmation that the inexhaustibility of the Comprehensive offered a never ending quest and adventure into meaning and understanding. The Nothingness of the incomprehensible proved to be positive and not negative. Man was saved from despair by finding the transparency of shipwreck. Indeed, despair presupposed the inability to transcend absurdity. Jaspers discovered that non-being was the Being of Transcendence. Just as Camus refused to absolutize the absurd, so Jaspers recognized the logical impossibility of such an assertion. Just as one could not find a universal objective principle for affirmation, they could not find one for negation. That which

transcended man's comprehension could neither be characterized as positive nor negative. Thus, Nothingness (no-thingness) was the essence of the Comprehensive. While it was nihilistic in terms of 'Dasein,' it was positive in terms of man's 'Existenz.'

The only content which was possible from man's encounter with the Comprehensive was a changed attitude which brought integrity, honesty, humility, love, and the desire for communication. Thus, while one could not gain knowledge of God, i.e. the Transcendent, one could analyze his affects on those who encountered Him. Man could not be truly himself until he recognized his responsibility in choosing what he was to be. He could never be entirely himself at any one moment. He could only truly be free when he recognized that his being was not synonymous with his faith and convictions at any given historical point.

With such ambiguity in human action, man had to gain confidence and trust in himself and Being. He had to be willing to take the risk of action. He had to be willing to accept the inner proddings of the spirit. If he constantly doubted, he would never be able to move beyond consideration to decision. Faith was a strange mixture of doubt and trust, tentativeness and conviction, spontaneity and enlightened self discipline.

In one sense, as Collins pointed out, Jaspers

actually substituted philosophizing for prayer.[1] However, it lacked the religious bond between man and a personal God. Religion assumed that prayers were conversational and that both God and man were mutually responsive. In the case of Jaspers it appeared that the philosophical prayers were a monologue. Once again the dualism of Jaspers became quite obvious. The Transcendent always remained the "wholly other." There was a radical split between 'Dasein' and 'Existenz' on the one hand and the Comprehensive on the other. The Comprehensive never became immanent but remained eternally transcendent.

Having once discovered that all limit-situations are transparent, man could begin to read the cypher-script. He could enter into the activities of everyday life without being a slave to the masses. A whole new set of meanings were available to the man who could read the Comprehensive between the lines of 'Dasein.' Man was no longer confined to the meaning structures of everyday existence. He was freed from the slavery of conformity and could indulge in all the joys of 'Existenz.'

Philosophical faith was essentially rationalistic. Like religious faith, it sought fellowship and communication

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[1]Collins, op. cit., p. 126.

among those who had encountered a similar experience. There was a sense of witnessing for what one felt was of primal importance. However, unlike religious faith it was not primarily interested in conversion to a common faith. There was always a concern to help others see the transparency of the limit-situations but it would not incorporate any universal pattern for its converts. Similar to the "saved" in religion, the "survivors" of shipwreck had a common bond of mutuality. Perhaps superior to certain religious fellowships, it was not so much exclusive as inclusive of others. One detected the same type of thing in Camus' Jean-Baptiste Clamence. His conversion to honesty led him to convert others to the same type of honesty. All seemed to share in a community of cross-criticism. For Jaspers it was a community of those who witnessed for and shared with others his particular limit-situation.

Criticism and evaluation of Jaspers' position. Jaspers, like many theologians, placed a great deal of emphasis on the crisis of limit-situations. Yet, because he failed to offer any content for such an encounter, one could readily ask how he knew that one has genuinely encountered anything transcendent or comprehensive at all. Like Sartre and Heidegger, Jaspers was very hazy when it came to describing that to which all human existence was to be

contrasted. One is told that without it human life would be inconceivable. Yet, this presupposition, which assumed a knowledge about that which was incomprehensible, was never given any real justification.

Jaspers, like many other existentialists, felt that in such limit-situations man somehow encountered what was ultimate and essential for authentic existence. In fact he warned against man's failure to listen. Once again one must ask upon what grounds can this assertion be held. Undoubtedly, it was rooted in certain feelings, such as anxiety, which were given ontological and ultimate significance. Yet, one must ask why these and not others.

Many critics have raised the question as to why Jaspers preferred to use the term Transcendent as opposed to God. It was certainly not because he felt, as Heidegger, that philosophy was incapable of dealing with such matters. Primarily, it was based on the fact that he assumed that what ought to be encountered as a cypher or symbol was objectified. However, it remains questionable as to whether or not it was necessary to avoid such terminology. Certainly, not all segments of religion have objectified God. It appeared, as Cochrane pointed out, that he was trying to say something different by using the term Transcendent. Yet, to merely imply that one could experience God and recognize

that all propositions were tentative and nonexhaustive was not a new idea to theology.

Some critics were willing to say that Jaspers belonged with the theists while others flatly denied this. E. L. Allen was willing to call him a theist and felt that Jaspers' unwillingness to become Christian was inconsistent with his philosophy.

> (a) The sharp distinction he draws between religious and philosophical faith seems to me to be a reflection of his Continental environment. He knows of Christianity in the form of three great churches, Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed, each with its claim to authority as against the other two and all with a long tradition of intolerance and even of persecution.
> (b) In refusing to go beyond theism to the specifically Christian faith Jaspers seems to me untrue to his own insights. God, he would say, communicates with men by his reticence rather than his revelation. Precisely because he cares so much for us, he abstains from any degree of interference with our freedom. He works always by placing responsibility on us; he keeps himself in the background so that we may discover truth by our own efforts. . . .[1]

Yet, it would appear that Allen has failed to recognize that there was nothing in Jaspers' philosophy which allowed one to make the assertion that God deliberately holds off so that man could seek truth uncoerced.

Perhaps the biggest question arose as to whether or not when a person was confronted with the crisis of a limit-situation he would notice its transparency. Jaspers

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[1]E. L. Allen, Existentialism from Within (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1953), pp. 139-140.

somehow did not want to give into the utter despair which Sartre noted in Nothingness nor did he want to escape into the esthetic mysticism of Heidegger. Likewise, he did not allow himself to be deluded by the affirmation which stemmed from hope in the more religious approaches to man's encounter with finitude and contingency. While the encounter became the grounds for convictional action, it never yielded to the optimism of religious belief. He virtually placed himself in judgment of both theism and atheism or else left himself open to a greater arbitrariness than Sartre. Hawton has well stated,

> He (Jaspers) is not a Christian, not an atheist, not an agnostic, not a pantheist, not a Hegelian, and not a Kantian; and yet all these ingredients are to be found in his eclectic thought. The result is so utterly bewildering that the texture is naturally admired for its profundity and richness--often, I am afraid, as the courtiers once praised the emperor's clothes in the fairy tale.[1]

Similar to the orthodox position, Jaspers noted a primal condition prior to man's fall into unauthenticity. Man's innocence existed in the 'Ursprunng' of 'Existenz.' Likewise, man could choose to limit himself within the confines of 'Dasein.' In one sense Jaspers, like Heidegger, hinted at the eastern notion of man's ability to transcend all empirical boundaries. Man found himself in the midst

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[1]Hector Hawton, The Feast of Unreason (London: Watts & Company, 1952), p. 204.

of 'Dasein' and had to become aware of his choice to remain oriented toward it or forsake it for the Comprehensive, i.e. Heidegger's 'Das Sein.' Yet, both remained loyal to the western tradition by insisting that man must recognize the reality of 'Dasein' and remain within it.

Insofar as 'Dasein' was being-in-the-world and man awakened to find himself already in the world, it appeared that the "fall" occurred prior to existence. Mythologically, the orthodox position has maintained that paradise was prior to "fallen existence" which included death. True to the orthodox position, Jaspers was willing to say that man freely chooses to fall into the unauthentic existence of 'Mass-man.' Likewise, he agreed that world orientation involved a 'rift' or type of estrangement between man as 'Dasein' and the Comprehensive. Like the orthodox position, this included sin, i.e. man's free choice to ignore the transparency of limit-situations, and guilt, i.e. the responsibility for such decisions.

Jaspers also agreed that man could, through crisis, experience the beyondness of a limit-situation. Thus, it was possible for man to extend his vision beyond the barriers of 'Dasein.' While for Heidegger man retreated from 'Das Sein,' for Jaspers he refused to see beyond. The vision of the Comprehensive allowed man to recognize his condition and resolve to survive shipwreck by having faith in his own

'Existenz.' 'Existenz' presupposed a prior essence over the contingent existence of 'Dasein.' Even though 'Dasein' was prior to what man could become there was a prior urge within 'Existenz' which goaded man to go beyond himself at any given moment. Thus, like the orthodox sin did not permanently mar the possible vision of the Transcendent.

Certainly, Jaspers allowed for temporary hopes which in turn allowed man to act on the best available truth. However, he would not agree to any abiding faith which had the semblance of becoming universally valid for all men. No historically relevant revelation could transcend its historical conditioning in order to attain the absolute. Certainty was always provisional and historically structured. Yet, he would agree that it was both communal and individual. While for Heidegger individuals never met, for Jaspers they only met outside of 'Mass-man' society. While the survivors of shipwreck could speak of a common rescue, they could neither determine the cause of the mishap or be sure that their rescue was permanent. They could only feel certain that their immediate condition seemed superior to their original voyage.

III. AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSITIONAL EXISTENTIALISM

Perhaps the most obvious difference between atheistic and transitional existentialism centers on the final feelings

and directions which each offers. Both Sartre and Heidegger offered absurdity and despair as ultimate and final. For both men despair, anxiety, and dread indicated the most authentic encounter with Being. While Camus and Jaspers recognized these feelings, neither was willing to give them ultimate priority. The absurd reached logical necessity as far as Sartre and Heidegger were concerned. However, Camus recognized that the absurd was relational and issued in the experience of revolt. Jaspers, likewise, noted that the absurd had no logical necessity and led on to philosophical faith.

Neither Camus nor Jaspers were willing to grant the absurd necessity or despair permanency. They did not see these within the ontological framework. Both Camus and Jaspers were more interested in a philosophy of becoming. There was an 'élan' which offered a dynamism to their thought. They saw that that which becomes was more perfect than that which was permanent and static. While the Nothingness of Being overshadowed man for both Sartre and Heidegger, it tended to condition and stimulate for Camus and Jaspers. Its presence and nihilating affects pushed toward unity and solidarity. In Camus and Jaspers one did not find the morbid paranoiac tendencies which one detected in Sartre's interpretation of the "Other." Thus, Camus and Jaspers preferred revolt, happiness, communication, and faith to

despair and forlornness.

Perhaps of all the existentialists, the transitional ones have the best right to be concerned about anxiety. Insofar as anxiety is a fear which seemingly offers no adequate solution, Sartre must either offer content to Nothingness or give up the notion of anxiety. No one is afraid if there is nothing which is threatening. One only needs an adequate solution when there is either a real or an imagined threat which must be resolved. Nor could the theists argue for anxiety in the dreadful sense if they really had a solution which could resolve the problem. It would appear to this author that only those who encounter something to fear for which they can see no solution have any real grounds for anxiety. Camus refused to accept help while Jaspers denied its value. Jaspers and Camus preferred anxiety as a type of stimulus to commitment and revolt.

Both the atheistic and transitional existentialists presupposed two definite meanings for the term essence. The one which Sartre popularized by saying, "Existence precedes essence," i.e. that human existence was characterized by potentiality, possibility, and becomingness. The second meaning was indicated by the structural relationship of Being-in-itself to being-in-particular. It was this latter which allowed the possibility of evaluating and differentiating authentic from unauthentic existence. It was the

refusal on the part of man to recognize the presence of or the possible presence of existing relationships between human existence within the contingent world and Being-in-itself, i.e. the immanence of the Transcendent.

Accordingly, when human existence sought to ignore or hide from its relationships to Being it was existing dishonestly, inconsistently, and unauthentically. Because man was attempting to live his life as if the structural relationships to Being did not exist, he encountered anxiety and guilt, i.e. the pangs of an ontologically oriented conscience. This conscience was far beyond the socially and parentally conditioned one discussed in the more deterministic and behavioristic psychologies. It involved a fundamental 'rift' or estrangement within Being-itself. The pangs of the 'ontological conscience' appeared when man attempted to absolutize the structural content of contingent reality and when he sought to create a meaningful existence without considering his relationships with Being. In the attempt to do so man encountered meaninglessness which was characterized as the absurd. Man could not give meaning to his total 'Existenz' when he attempted to confine himself within the finite structures of 'Dasein.'

When his meaning structure was challenged, he encountered anxiety and dread. He found an inner emptiness. Looking inward, man could find only a 'longing Nothingness,'

i.e. a passionate freedom. It was motivated by a "will to meaning," a will which sought to integrate the totality of one's experiences. These existentialists were attempting to show that there were definitely certain experiences of man which could not be distorted and twisted to the degree that they could be confined within the meaning structures of empirical and logical verification methods.

It would stand to reason that if man could not find some answer with content in his search for comprehensive meaning that he would end in despair. True to this pattern, the atheism of Heidegger and Sartre ended in despair. Heidegger placed the answer to man's need for Transcendent meaning beyond his comprehension. Thus, man had to accept the Nothingness which he encountered as indicative of his urge for eternity while imprisoned in finitude and death. Sartre took it a step further by denying the possibility of such an answer. Because he felt that only God could have such an answer, he saw man striving to become God. But from his point of view, God was an impossible contradiction. Thus, for both atheists man had to remain forever torn between the urge for meaning and the impossibility of attaining it. Their final word could only be one of absurdity and despair.

The transitional existentialists offered a slightly modified version of the situation. Primarily, both denied

the possibility of making a final judgment. Ultimately, if the final statement could be made then one could resolve the condition by transcending it through knowledge. Camus demonstrated this with the mythical Sisyphus. He (Sisyphus) was no longer torn by indecision, hope, and the possibility that the situation was different than it appeared. With full knowledge of his condition Camus tells us that we should imagine Sisyphus happy. This was a far cry from the despair and nausea of Sartre's Roquentin. In dealing with Camus' work one must never forget that much of it was experimental. It would be presumptuous to impose any logical structure on Camus' works. Yet, there was an atmosphere in all his writings which cried out against the irrationality of suffering, violence, disease, and every other form of evil. It was apparently carried on within the framework of a better type of human existence. His call to repentance seemed to cry out against the everyday hypocrisy and callousness of people. It was not a call to quiet ecstacy or courageous arbitrariness. It was a revolt which enlisted everyone to join in the fight against the plague.

Camus' notions of the "Mediterranean mind" and human solidarity seemed to be pointing toward a transcendent value which would bind men together. However, his death prevented him from completing his explorations in that direction. Because the absurd was closely related to the

problem of evil, it was obvious that he felt that suffering and death brought man face to face with meaninglessness. Thus, like the other existentialists Camus saw revolt as a rebellion of man against those forces which threatened the meaningful. For Camus the meaningful involved that which was integrative between man and nature. Through the symbols of the sun and the sea, he saw man and nature reaching out toward one another. Violence, suffering, and death seemed to uncercut this notion of participation and turn the world into an alien and indifferent place of exile.

In his early works Camus attempted to take the contentions of the atheists seriously. He sought to understand what values and meanings are possible for a stranger in exile. However, he discovered that many of man's meanings caused him to be alienated. In The Fall he called man to repentance. He felt that when men opened themselves completely to experience they could transcend the everyday meaning structures which lead them into exile. Thus, he fought against the notion that all meanings are relative and arbitrary. Indeed, he felt all men would strike out against evil if they transcended those prejudices which justified violence and murder. It could be said that Camus argued for a hierarchy of meanings and values.

Jaspers carried the search further when he suggested that all limit-situations had a transparency about them

which allowed man to transcend all his experiences and meanings. Those meanings and values which remained open to the Transcendent were to be preferred to those which chose to ignore or remain blind to the Transcendent. Thus, Jaspers concluded that authentic existence on the part of man was possible only when he was open to the Transcendent. Despair becomes unavoidable when the solution for anxiety becomes impossible. If the Transcendent became unavailable for man (in the case of Heidegger through incomprehensibility and for Sartre contradiction) he found only despair.

While Jaspers was willing to allow the Transcendent to become apparent, he would not allow it any particular content. Thus, man was saved from despair, i.e. the unavailability of the Transcendent, but left only with anxiety, i.e. the possibility of a solution with no definite answer. The urge for meaning in Sartre was useless while in Jaspers it was frustrated. Because all questions presupposed a set of meanings and values, they indirectly determined the types of answers which were possible. While the atheists denied the possibility of an answer to man's "will to meaning," the transitionalists failed to offer anything definite. Certainly, they were all in agreement as to the results which accompanied man's failure to receive adequate answers to his questions, i.e. anxiety and despair. It remained to be

seen as to whether or not the theists could offer any concrete answers which could transcend anxiety and find a peace or calmness which was advocated by many of the world's great theistic religions.

All of the existentialists thus far examined assumed a problem of communication. They felt that the common language of the masses definitely propagated man's fallen condition. When man encountered the absurdity of the everyday situation, he was forced to reevaluate his meanings as well as the modes of communicating them. When one was confronted with meanings which transcended the ordinary modes of communication, it was necessary to seek different modes which could convey the content of those experiences which were beyond the subject/object awareness communicated through ordinary language. Like all communication it was necessary to somehow convey meanings which presupposed similar experiences on the part of those seeking to understand. This, of course, presupposed a type of community of individuals who had similar encounters with ultimate reality.

In the case of Sartre people never really encountered one another primarily because they were mutual threats to each other. The only thing that they shared in common was their revulsion of the "Other's stare" which could reduce one to an object. Both Sartre and Heidegger offered no condition of communication whereby a community of people could

share a common set of values and meanings. Camus, on the other hand, offered a community of those who had a common value of revolt. Yet, this revolt was temporary as well as diverse in its goals. Sartre and Heidegger, shared the same revulsion for the meanings and communications of the masses. Jaspers also shared the same criticisms of modern man. However, he allowed his community of survivors the common experience of the Transcendent, but he was unable to allow them to share any common content.

Jaspers implied that the various expressions of the Transcendent were multiple because of the structures of the limit-situations and the inexhaustibility of the Transcendent. If the Transcendent and Being-in-itself were synonymous, then the variations of content were due to the structures of experience through which the content was derived. The orthodox position always assumed the integrity of Being-in-itself, i.e. the consistent identity and will of God. Thus, the contrary experiences and expressions of the encounter with God occurred within the apprehending processes themselves. Theoretically, assuming the identity of God, he could be encountered the same by all men if their structures of perception were identical, i.e. without unauthentic distortions.

Because man's attitudes presupposed his meaning and value system, his expectations and anticipations determined

the frame of reference through which he could perceive, i.e. encounter, Being-in-itself. In the case of unauthentic existence man confined such perceptions within finite meaning structures. In authentic 'Existenz' these meanings remained open to the Transcendent, i.e. God. The communication which was possible when the attitudes were the same allowed an opportunity for fellowship. It became possible for man to share common experiences and sense common concerns. When this common feeling was one of freedom, it allowed for a wide variety of expressions for the common experience of an inexhaustible God. While people were definitely different in their respective expressions there would still be certain universal attitudes which would be indicative of their common experience of the same God, i.e. the structures of authentic perception in relation to the identity of being-in-itself.

Both Camus and Jaspers accepted death as the inevitable limit-situation in the face of which man had to carry on his quest for meaning and the actualization of value. However, they did not share the same morbid dread of it. Death was viewed as the authentic end of finite existence. Man was in no position to postulate any existence beyond the one he knew. Camus accepted it with lucidity and undeluded with hope. Jaspers saw it as an event within the Comprehensive. Because they refused to elevate non-being and absurdity to the ultimate death lost much of its dreadfulness. The

morbid fear of death has often been related to various neurotic and psychotic attitudes. Such attitudes often accompany feelings of inadequacy and self-devaluation. Such attitudes could well be expected when one was left with what appeared to be a helpless and useless task, i.e. pro-ject absurd meanings into an indifferent world (Sartre). Neither Camus nor Jaspers felt that man was incapable of living authentically and in a worthwhile manner. They were willing to accept death rather than seek some escape which often over evaluated human worth, i.e. that his personal self should persist into infinity.

CHAPTER IV

THEISTIC EXISTENTIALISM

The three men covered in this chapter varied from the preceding ones in that they declared the divinity of the Transcendent and related the content to established religions. Martin Buber, who was discussed first, related the content of revelation within the context of the Jewish faith. Also, he was viewed as the transitional writer between theistic existentialism and the Orthodox Christian form of theistic existentialism. Buber varied primarily at the point of the historical incarnation of the divine Transcendence. While he was willing to admit the value of Christ's life, he was not willing to see in it, as the Orthodox Christians, the ultimate historical revelation of God. Yet, Buber did offer some of the logical steps needed between the "tentativism" of Jaspers and the convictional faith of the Christians.

Basically, all of the theistic writers agreed that essence was prior to existence. Unlike the atheists and the transitionalists who offered 'radical discontinuity' between man's powers of apprehension and the content of the Transcendent, the theists agreed that man could not

only become aware of the Transcendent but derive necessary knowledge about the Transcendent. It was essential, therefore, for the theists to demonstrate how such knowledge could come about as well as some indication as to its verification. While Buber sought the answer in mysticism, Tillich used a neo-thomistic form of epistemology, i.e. "correlation," and Marcel spun a metaphysic of "hope."

Marcel and Tillich agreed that Jesus Christ was the historical incarnation of God's message to man. In his life man could encounter the divine purpose which could give full meaning to human existence. Because man was made in the "image of God," he required knowledge as to what constituted that image. Without such knowledge man was incomplete. Acquiring that knowledge required an encounter with God. Thus, the purpose and meaning of man's existence presupposed knowledge of God and the knowledge of God presupposed an understandable encounter between man and God. However, there still remained the problem of verifying the content derived from the encounter. How could one be sure that the encounter was genuine and not delusional in character? How could one account for the obvious discrepancies which appeared in the various expressions of different persons? If anxiety were the product of thwarted meanings, as well as self-actualization, could its absence be an indication of the validity of a meaning and actualization? Could Jesus as the Christ be the

answer to all people under all historical conditions? These questions and many more had to be faced by the Orthodox Christian existentialists.

I. MARTIN BUBER AND THE MEANING OF THE "THOU"

Biographical introduction. Martin Buber was born in Vienna in February of 1878. Until age fourteen he was raised by his grandfather, Solomon Buber, a distinguished scholar. During those years, he received a thorough Jewish education as well as his earliest contacts with Hasidism, which proved to be of great formative value. He spent many of his summer months during those early years in many Hasidic communities of Galicia. In 1896 he entered the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Vienna for study. He also spent some time at the University of Berlin. In 1901 he became the editor of the Zionist periodical "Die Welt."

In 1904 he received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Berlin. In the same year he discovered the literature of Hasidism and began a rigorous study of its origins and worked on its reconstruction. He founded "Der Jude" and edited it between 1916 and 1924. He published the now monumental I and Thou in 1923. From 1923 to 1933 he taught philosophy of religion at the University of Frankfurt am Main. While at the university he published jointly

with Joseph Wittig, a Catholic, and Viktor von Weizsäcker, a Protestant physician and psychotherapist, the journal "Die Kreatur" from 1926 until 1930.

In 1938 at the age of sixty he left Germany and went to Palistine where he became Professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem until his retirement in 1951. Following his retirement, he came to the United States for an extended lecture tour. In 1952 the University of Hamberg presented him with the Goethe Prize and in 1953 he received the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade at Frankfurt am Main. In 1957 he returned to the United States to deliver the William Alanson White Lectures at the Washington School of Psychiatry and to conduct seminars at several other schools.

Buber's basic presuppositions. It could be said of the atheistic existentialists that they no longer felt any direct activity on the part of God. Thus, they concluded that God was for all practical purposes dead. God was no longer active in human affairs. Man could not expect any outside help in his moments of decision. There seemed to be no verifiable avenue through which God could be apprehended. It was, therefore, assumed that God did not exist. Martin Buber agreed that God's activities were not available for empirical and logical examination. However, this was not

due to God's death, i.e. inactivity, but man's inability to pierce the veil. God was not dead but eclipsed. It was not that God had ceased to move toward man but that man had refused to move toward God.

While not all the existentialists thus far examined concerned themselves directly with ontology per se, they all dealt with the relationship of Being and non-being. However, they did not use the same meanings for non-being. In traditional Greek philosophy there were two basic conceptions of non-being. One was 'ouk on' which was viewed as that which was totally opposed to Being. It was the negation of Being and was best characterized by emptiness. Sartre seemed closest to this type of understanding when he stated that "consciousness was a hole in Being." He saw consciousness, i.e. Nothingness, as a lack of Being (Être-pour-soi). Yet, he proceeded to give this "lack of Being" the qualities of the 'meonic' conception of non-being, i.e. unstructured Being (Eckhart's not-being or godhead). Meonic freedom was characterized by striving and creative becomingness. It was seen in terms of potentiality and dialectic.

Martin Buber felt that essential Being only emerged in the encounter, i.e. "dialogue," of man-with-man (das Zwischenmenschiliche). This relationship he called the 'I-Thou." This relationship was contrasted to the "I-It." While the I-Thou relationship could give man access to

reality, I-It could only give man knowledge of the world of appearances, i.e. the objective world. Thus, similar to Jaspers, Buber allowed an epistemological dualism. As Friedman stated it, "From Buber's basic premise, 'As I become I, I say Thou' it follows that our belief in the reality of the external world comes from our relation to other selves."[1] This also reflected his strong mystical tendencies. He was very much interested in Western mystics and speculative cosmologists in his early movement from Zionism toward the Hasidic vision.

Buber stated at the outset of I and Thou,

> To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude.
> The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks.
> . . .The primary word is the combination I-Thou.
> The other primary word is the combination I-It; wherein, without a change in the primary word, one of the words He and She can replace It.
> Hence the I of man is also twofold.
> For the I of the primary word I-Thou is a different I from that of the primary word I-It.[2]

In one sense it could be said that the I-It relationship was an epistemological one while the I-Thou was existential. The I-It attitude included the experiencing, knowing, and using relationships. The I-Thou was the attitude of meeting,

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[1]Maurice S. Friedman, Martin Buber, A Life of Dialogue (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 164.

[2]Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 3.

living, presence and encountering. In the I-Thou attitude the 'Other' was apprehended as equal or of greater status than oneself. However, it never carried the threatening characteristics attributed to it by Sartre.

He continued by noting,

> Primary words do not signify things, but they intimate relations.
> Primary words do not describe something that might exist independently of them, but being spoken they bring about existence.
> Primary words are spoken from the being.
> If Thou is said, the I of the combination I-Thou is said along with it.
> If it is said, the I of the combination I-It is said along with it.
> The primary word I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole being.
> The primary word I-It can never be spoken with the whole being.[1]

Obviously, the key word for Buber was relation. In the I-Thou relationship there was a mutuality and reciprocity between the I and the Thou. In the I-It relationship there was no such exchange or encounter. In the subject-object situation things received definite structures and boundaries. They were given spatio-temporal relations with causal and logical links between them. In such a relationship the subject could manipulate or dispose of them according to its own meanings and values. Everything was viewed from the perspective of the subject.

Buber was critical of the objective use of the term experience in which the world became passive. As he pointed out,

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[1] Ibid.

> The man who experiences has not part in the world. For it is "in him" and not between him and the world that the experience arises.
>
> The world has no part in the experience. It permits itself to be experienced, but has no concern in the matter. For it does nothing to the experience, and the experience does nothing to it.[1]

Experience, for Buber, was always dipolar in nature. Both the object and the subject were affected in their relations with one another. Hence, he concluded that these 'others,' including the inanimate, could be conceived of as I's, i.e. Thou's. At this point Buber was noting the force of another's subjectivity. However, he went far beyond Sartre by suggesting that such a relationship could be had with any object and not merely another human. Because they affected man and helped determine his own subjectiveness, they were no longer threatening nor were they to be dreaded.

Buber felt that the existential I-Thou was both logically as well as historically prior to the I-It. He was willing to go so far as to suggest that the subject-object relation constituted a "fall" from the paradisiacal and primitive relationship of I-Thou. In the I-Thou man was blessed, without knowing it, by being together with his source and origin. After eating of the tree of knowledge, which gave birth to the I-It consciousness, man was forced to continually renew and always lose the I-Thou consciousness. Thus, knowledge was possibl only in estrangement and

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[1] Ibid., p. 5.

alienation. It was a knowledge of evil and a sickness of the soul.

Like the other existentialists in this inquiry Buber felt the distortion was inherent in "objective speech." Buber saw that the I was not a thing nor an object with definite boundaries. It made itself and was made by its objects, by that which was other than itself, which centered into its own existence. Thus, Buber, like Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, and Jaspers saw that the phenomenological analysis of human 'Existenz' was wider than thought. He also agreed that the subject participated in making itself. However, he was much clearer on the role which was played by the object on making the subject. Even though Buber had characterized the two fundamental relationships in terms of attitude, he certainly did not intend for it to be a one way projection on the part of man. He felt that it was a genuine feature of the 'nature' of subjects and objects. Buber saw "objective speech" grounded in the I-It form of consciousness. Such language was not capable of meaningfully communicating the I-Thou relationships.

As pointed out above, he saw evil in the I-It attitude. In fact the problem of evil was virtually the central theme of his works. The I-It form of consciousness gave rise to several varieties of evil. Modern man was certainly

recognized by his awareness of loneliness in the midst of an indifferent and unfriendly universe. It also gave rise to the problems of a rapidly increasing technology provided by science on the one hand and man's inability to integrate those technics into any meaningful and constructive life on the other. Man had also become aware of his own dual consciousness. Through psychoanalysis, he had discovered the contradictions between his inner motivations and his externally imposed codes of behavior. Buber also noted the tendency on the part of governments to expand and manipulate human life through centralization and collectivism.

Buber felt that the realization of these evils had lead men toward a variety of alternatives. Some individuals returned to a more outspoken dualism with an emphasis on 'original sin.' Others sought refuge in mysticism. On the part of many there was a loss of confidence in the dignity of man. Perhaps of most significance there was the rise of atheistic existentialism with its emphasis on dread and despair. For Buber all of these evils were the result of the I-It structure of consciousness. When the atheistic existentialists tried to turn God into an object He proved to be no longer visible. It was Buber's contention that God was the "eternal Thou." He could never become an object. Thus, He always transcended the I-It awareness. Because atheistic existentialism operated within the categories of

I-It in terms of God, they were unable to discover His active presence. Likewise, they were unable to offer any concrete content to the experience of non-being, i.e. Eckhart's not-being.

While Buber maintained that God could never become an object, he was convinced of His immanence. The Hasiditic tradition placed a strong emphasis on the present moment. While it preserved the Messianic expectation, it turned toward the present as opposed to the eschatological future. The Hasidic tradition taught that redemption was a matter of the present and lead in turn to the ultimate and final consummation. It was interested primarily in the purification and transformation of the individual. Friedman stated that the Hasidic emphasis on the immanence of God was not to be regarded as pantheism, but as panentheism.[1] It was the task of men to bring one another to greater depths of brotherhood and purer states of perfection. Man, in one sense, helped God bring about the eschatological conditions of His Kingdom.

The Hasidic tradition was best characterized in the three virtues of love, joy, and humility. It was grounded in the belief that the world was created out of love and was to be brought to redemption and perfection by the same

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[1]Friedman, Martin Buber, A Life of Dialogue, op. cit., p. 20.

love. Indeed, God was love. The human capacity for love was man's capacity for participation in God. Man felt the joy of life when he recognized, through knowledge, the presence of God in and through all things. It was a joy which reflected both the character of the external world as well as the inexhaustible hidden fullness of the world's participation in God. Hasidism saw humility in the realization of one's relationship to God. It was felt that in separateness man encountered pride and the desire to be self-sufficient. Because the I-It awareness brought separateness, it also brought sin and alienation.

While Buber's thought indicated definite development through the years, it never lost its mystical quality. Hinduism and Buddhism were an intricate part of his early period. However, they did not persist to the same degree as Taoism in his later writings. He also showed a great interest in the German mystics from Meister Eckhart to Angelus Silesius. Perhaps the two most influential mystics in Buber's thought were Meister Eckhart and Jacob Boehme. The notions of the Godhead (Eckhart) and the Ungrund (Boehme) helped Buber bridge the gap between his philosophy of dialogue and Jewish mysticism. The Godhead and the Ungrund were very similar to the mystical notion of the birth of God in man. In his later work Buber changed to the idea of God meeting man.

Buber's teacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, played an important role in his philosophical position. Dilthey had noted a radical difference between the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) and the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). In the former one could not be a detached observer but had to personally participate. The humanities offered the unique while the scientific desired uniformity and universality.

Buber also drew a distinction between religion and religiousness. Religiousness was characterized as an experience of astonishment and worshipfulness. It was, in Tillich's sense, the feeling of the universe as "Holy." It carried with it the imperative to action and the desire to share through ritual and communication the content of the experience. It was religiousness which prompted religion. Religion was the totality of customs and teachings through which a certain group expressed their religiousness. It was usually characterized by its crystallized creeds and dogmas. Buber felt that religion was valuable only when it allowed religiousness to be meaningfully expressed through the existing forms and symbols. It was valid only when it could speak to the needs of any given generation. All forms were the products of the human spirit in its attempts to give intelligible structure to its religious experience. He expressed his encounter with the "eternal Thou" through

symbols, signs, and speech. However, with the passage of time the symbols outlived their respective usefulness and tended to hinder any further confrontation between God and man. For Buber religion was always the product of religious experience on the one side and culture on the other.

Buber believed that God was in all things. However, it was up to man to make an effort to discover his presence. It was, thus, necessary for man to become open to His presence. It was through the open encounter between individuals that God was revealed and could be apprehended. Thus, community was primary in perceiving the "Holy." Buber saw Jesus attempting to create such a community. However, he felt that the following generations failed to understand Him. As Friedman pointed out,

> In the place of the Jewish knowledge of the single world, fallen through confusion but capable of redemption through the struggling human will, came the postulation of a fundamental and unbridgeable duality of human will and God's grace. The will is now regarded as unconditionally bad and elevation through its power is impossible.[1]

Buber maintained that the world with its creatures, nature, and sufferings had to be embraced by man because they were the only way through which man could encounter God. In Arthur A. Cohen's book Martin Buber it was stated,

> It is the binding up of man and the eternal Thou which makes possible the reconstruction of the world.

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[1] Ibid., p. 44.

> Man cannot bind God to the ploughshare of history nor can God force man to be his Thou--both must be companions and helpers. God is as near his creatures as his creatures will allow, but he withdraws at precisely the moment when man, in his thirst to hold fast to God, seeks to tie him to liturgical continuity.[1]

Thus, Buber held that man both created and was created by the world. Man participated in both Being and not-being. Man was free to maintain certain attitudes toward the world. These attitudes in turn could determine whether or not he would exist unauthentically, i.e. within the confines of objective reality or thingness, or authentically, i.e. in the presence of the "eternal Thou." When man maintained an attitude of I-Thou toward the world, then he was able to apprehend God and gain meaningful content which was expressed through symbols and 'existential speech.' There was also a fellowship between those who could understand the meanings being communicated. Thus, God was encountered when man remained open to the I-Thou relationship. However, man's failure to do so led to an "eclipse of God" or a clouding of His presence. Such a condition could easily be interpreted as the death of God.

The human condition as 'individuality' and I-It. One of Buber's main concerns was the manner in which knowledge and the method of obtaining it affected man. His basic

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[1]Arthur A. Cohen, Martin Buber (New York: Hillary House, Inc., 1957), p. 56.

question centered on how man's knowledge influenced his attitude (Haltung) toward the world. He felt that in the I-It consciousness that man was separated from his world. Buber was concerned to find man in his wholeness prior to the moment when he alienated himself through objectification. The world, as well as man, was enmeshed in myriades of relations. Everything was interwoven in a continuous fabric of existence. Yet, when man sought to give an object special love and attention, he found that he could not in reality do so. Every form of objectification, for Buber, involved estrangement and alienation.

Man was constantly faced with the question as to whether or not he would trust the universe. Unfortunately, as Buber understood it, man usually chose not to trust it. He found instead a world which was persistently threatening his well being. He found alienation and violence. Thus, Buber maintained that creation fell as a result of free human decisions. However, he never saw the metaphysical rupture as one which could only be mended by an apocalyptic redemption on the part of God. Buber saw God as always within the reach of those who were willing to trust and love Him. While Buber contended that it was possible for man to live securely in the world of the "It," he believed that he was not really a human-being. For Buber all authentic living required man-meeting-man.

It was his feeling that 'individuality,' which was the 'I' of the I-It, found itself as an experiencing and using subject. It appeared in the world through differentiation and was aware of itself as a particular type of being. It was primarily characterized by the concept of "my." It centered primarily around the concern for identity and possession. For Buber it had no reality because it failed to share and acknowledge relations. Thus, he drew a dichotomy between 'individuality' and personality. While individuality belonged to the I-It relationship, personality belonged to the I-Thou relationship. As a person, man shared himself and the more he did so, the fuller he became.

In the I-It relationship man had to set things at a distance. In such a situation man became independent, i.e. separated. This quality of setting at a distance was felt to be uniquely human. For Buber this relationship was prior to the process of entering into relation. Buber maintained that through the synthesizing process of relating man could give rise to the idea of the world as a whole or a unity. Thus, after man had set things or objects at a distance, he could then enter into relations with them. However, in their separateness the objects were alienated as well as man himself. In such a situation man was confronted with the I-It form of experience. It was also a 'fallen' state in which man and his world were cut-off from one another.

Under such circumstances man felt lonely and ill at ease. He was filled with a sense of estrangement. He was no longer at home in the world. Man tended to lose any sense of real security. He could no longer trust the universe. In the I-It relationship the world was transformed into an empirical object. Also, the person was reduced to an individual who attempted to conform to some preconceived image. These types of men were called 'image men' (Bildmensch) and were characterized by their concern with other people's opinions about them. Buber also implied that the 'image men' were in actuality living on the basis of appearances while others tended to be 'essence men' (Wesen mensch) and lived out of 'Existenz.' The 'image men' tried to live according to how they thought they were expected to live while the 'essence men' lived openly and spontaneously without any concern to fit a stereotype. The former, for Buber, lived unauthentically while the latter ('essence men') lived authentically. However, he recognized that no one lived entirely one way or the other. Everyone was a mixture or blend of both types of existence. Yet, some people could definitely be said to be more consistently one or the other.

It was Buber's contention that modern man was sick to the very depths of his soul. He, likewise, believed that the sickness was due primarily to a distortion within the relations between persons. Because they had lost their

ties with others, they could only be brought together externally. Totalitarian states and collectivisms seemed to be the only way of introducing any outward semblance of unanimity. Because of the breakdown in the organic relationships of personalities, communication and conversation had gradually disintegrated. Buber saw the same difficulty involved in modern man's relations with God. Man had learned to set things at a distance, i.e. alienation, but he had failed in his attempt to establish relationships which could bridge the abyss between the subject and object in the I-It consciousness. As Friedman well stated,

> Thus the real meaning of the proclamation that God is 'dead' is 'that man has become incapable of apprehending a reality absolutely independent of himself and of having a relation with it.'[1]

Thus, for Buber the human condition was characterized as a group of 'individuals' who were unable to establish meaningful relations between themselves. They were alienated because of their I-It form of consciousness. Because they could not communicate they could not truly "meet," i.e. relate to, one another.

The solution of the human condition as 'dialogue' and the I-Thou. It was Buber's contention that man did not merely turn from evil and darkness toward good and light.

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[1]Friedman, op. cit., p. 131.

He believed that this was a misunderstanding of the biblical faith. This tended to divide the world into two separate segments, the one good and the other evil. Buber felt it was more a matter of whether or not man freely chose to illuminate the world, i.e. redeem it, or remain isolated, withdrawn, and alienated from it. Illumination was only possible when man took the attitude of the I-Thou. If he persisted only in the I-It, he offered no light. He also reduced himself to the 'individuality' of unauthentic existence.

Buber believed that authentic human existence was possible only through human interaction, i.e. between man and man. However, it was essential for each man to overcome the temptation of 'individuality' and open himself to 'others.' Persons had to cease trying to deal with others on the basis of appearance. He believed that appearances tended to distort conversation and cut man off from any real ontological communication. Thus, he concluded that only through dialogue could men have an authentic encounter of one another. Authentic conversation did not necessarily mean everyone had to be speaking but they had to be more than observers. Buber did not see speech as confined to sound, "Speech can renounce all the media of sense, and it is still speech."[1]

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[1]Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Boston: Beacon Press, June, 1959), p. 3.

True communication was one in which each participant was willing to accept others as they were and share fully their own selves. It was based on the conscientious desire to be mutually related in the living present. Buber pointed out three different ways in which a man might view another who was living before one's eyes, namely, the observer, the onlooker, and becoming aware.

> The observer is wholly intent on fixing the observed man in his mind, on "noting" him. He probes him and writes him up. That is, he is diligent to write up as many "traits" as possible. He lies in wait for them, that none may escape him.
> . . .The onlooker is not at all intent. He takes up the position which lets him see the object freely, and undisturbed awaits what will be presented to him. Only at the beginning may he be ruled by purpose, everything beyond that is involuntary.[1]

Buber pointed out that these types of orientation both involve the desire to perceive the other who was living before one's eyes. However, he contended that there was still a third way of relating to others which far surpassed the other two. As he stated it,

> It is a different matter when in a receptive hour of my personal life a man meets me about whom there is something, which I cannot grasp in any objective way at all, that "says something" to me. That does not mean, says to me what manner of man this is, what is going on in him, and the like. But it means, says something to me, addresses something to me, speaks something that enters my own life.
> . . .The effect of having this said to me is completely different from that of looking on and observing. I cannot depict or denote or describe the man in whom, through whom, something has been said to me.[2]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 8-9. [2] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

Buber maintained that such dialogue brought forth a question which required an answer. He called this type of perception "becoming aware." It was also his feeling that such perception was possible with animals, plants, and stones. Ultimately, everything was capable of becoming a vessel for the "Word." In the traditional sense it was the belief that everything can convey the content of God, i.e. general revelation.

Buber was of the opinion that man could not know "wholeness" outside of relations. They were essential to personality. Minus relations man was cut off without direction for his life. To view man as an individual or as a part of a collective was not to see him at all. He was very critical of both extremes when analyzing man. "The individual is a fact of existence," said Buber, "in so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals." ". . .The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man."[1]

It was Buber's notion that man 'sinned' at that point where he failed to take up the dialogue with God. Sin was based primarily on isolation, i.e. broken relations, and solitude, i.e. the individual without dialogue. When man failed at any given point to meet another with the fullness and wholeness of his life, then he was guilty. Through isolation and solitude, man was guilty of the evil of

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[1]Ibid., p. 203.

preferring darkness, i.e. failure to cast one's unique personal relationships into a dialogue with God. Buber saw each person as unique with certain unrepeatable characteristics. He felt that each person, likewise, had a unique purpose and task in life. A person was not fulfilling that purpose when he tried to pattern his life after others.

Buber saw true community as the key to the biblical theocracy, i.e. the Kingdom of God. The only way through which it could come to a reality was through a genuine transformation of human relations. All social changes were temporary unless they were based on transformed individuals. In order to establish such community Buber held that men would have to rebel against the collectivistic tendencies of modern society. It was a rebellion which would have to crush out the modern illusion that there are two alternatives, namely, individualism or collectivism. For Buber it was to be based on a dialogue between man with man.

Man could only live authentically for Buber when he was willing to assume the attitude of I-Thou. Buber saw this as a difficult task in contemporary society with its emphasis on the scientific method. Between the positivists and the scientists man had come to feel that the subject-object I-It consciousness was the only valid one for gaining knowledge. Modern man had become convinced that there was no

other way of knowing. Many sophisticated thinkers had rebelled against any notion of intuition. Yet, Buber insisted that intuition was a valid form of knowledge. He contended that intuition did not do away with the duality between the knower and the known. In the experience of intuition the person places himself in the position of the perceived and feels life from within. This was primarily accomplished through deep community. Thus, through intuition and feeling man could gain nonobjective knowledge about himself, others, and God. By definition it was not the same type of knowledge which was possible through the I-It form of awareness.

When man became authentically related, i.e. the I-Thou attitude toward the world and others, he encountered God. In such an experience Buber noted a passion which sought expression and demanded action. It was felt as joy and expressed to others as love. In such situations man felt whole and complete. The feelings of guilt arose when the relations were broken. This experience gave rise to conscience and the sense that one had failed to achieve one's purpose. When man was whole, for Buber, there was a sense of fullness and peace. When man was cut off, there was a sense of brokenness, despair, emptiness, and anxiety. Life ceased to be meaningful when man failed to address the world and others as Thou. While he could accumulate facts

and knowledge through the I-It relationship, he could not achieve any degree of integration, unification, and meaning. Man's life required unique and creative expression and communication in order to be whole and meaningful. Anything less proved to be fragmented and inhibitive.

Buber placed a great deal of emphasis on education. It was primary in helping people responsibly acquire the I-Thou attitude. For Buber the old authoritarian method of teaching had to be replaced by a method which encouraged freedom and spontaneity. The educator was to lead the individual into an encounter with God by indicating the spiritual resources for making decisions as opposed to impressing the student with external norms for behavior. The student had to realize that he was neither an island unto himself or an automaton within a collective.

For Buber the divine-human encounter was always to be seen as a meeting as opposed to a merging. He was well aware of the problems inherent in Eastern and Western mysticism. The mystical experience was not only something which occurred within the person as a subjective experience. It also occurred "between" persons where the I and the Thou met. Others were always to be seen as persons to mutually encounter and not as individuals to be objectified. In one sense it could be said that, "The Kingdom of God is between us. . . .

There is ontological participation."[1] Buber never ceased arguing for the notion that God came to man in order to meet him and not to absorb him. He (God) could be met at any point in creation, in events, or in persons. Buber held that God's love and man's love were interpenetrating realities.[2]

Buber saw the modern predicament as the breakdown of authentic dialogue and community. He saw the solution for that condition in the reestablishment of dialogue and community. He saw man hungering in modern times for authentic forms of communication and community. It was especially alarming at the international level where countries had lost vital contact with one another. The worst consequence of broken relations was the lack of trust. Within the modern world of technological warfare it was to be seen as extremely dangerous. He maintained that there must be a decentralization of governments with a corresponding increase in communication between persons. The modern conditions could only be altered at the person-to-person level. Failure to do this could only lead to disaster.

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[1] Jacob Trapp (ed.), To Hallow This Life, An Anthology (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958), p. 16.

[2] Ibid., p. 66.

Criticism and evaluation of Buber's position. For anyone who is theistically and mystically inclined Buber's works offered a good deal of food for thought. There is no question that Martin Buber had become one of the most influential theistic philosophers in modern times. His monumental I and Thou has been the basis for a contemporary revolution in religious thinking. For many it offered what appeared to be the first real answer for intelligible mysticism. Buber had apparently solved the age old contention within mysticism of God either being born in the soul of man or man being absorbed into God. It was not purely subjective because it presupposed a relationship which was dipolar in structure. Likewise, it was not purely objective.

James Brown raised the question, "Is the ultimate which Martin Buber designates 'the eternal Thou' in the end 'the world as religiously experienced?"[1] He went on to ask in what way the religion of I and Thou really differed from Pantheism. While God and the world were not identical for Buber, it would appear that God was the world speaking to man, i.e. saying something to him. Thus Buber, unlike Jaspers, was willing to say that the non-objective could give man intelligible knowledge through mystical intuition.

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[1]James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), p. 136.

Certainly, Buber would have insisted that the dialogue between man and God transcended traditional pantheism. For Buber man was more than a mere attribute or mode of the absolute. Both man and God were affected in the dialogue.

The validity of the intuition was based on the I-Thou attitude, which opened personality to its possible relationships with God. It was characterized by joy as opposed to dread and despair. Thus, he maintained his primary affirmation that God was not dead but eclipsed by man's attitude which failed to remain open to those avenues which could bring a meaningful encounter with God. In such an experience man brought the totality of his being into relationship with the totality of the world. The religious experience was one of apprehending the world as "Holy" as opposed to a world to be objectified and structured. While the latter yielded to inquisitiveness and curiosity, the former sought religious expression and ethical action.

Buber certainly agreed with the orthodox position concerning a primordial condition in which man was judged 'good.' He, likewise, agreed that man possessed the necessary freedom to adopt the I-It consciousness which lead to man's 'fallen' condition. Such an attitude cut man off, i.e. alienated him, from his fundamental relationships with others, the world, and God. He saw the present fallen condition of

man as a result of that type of attitude and awareness. Because man had so chosen, he encountered guilt as a result of falling away from innocence. It was man's conscience, i.e. the realization of guilt, which allowed man to recognize his condition and the role which his own attitude played in causing it. Such feelings were possible because man's essence required relations which were cut off in the I-It consciousness. Thus, like the orthodox he agreed that essence preceded existence.

Buber held that God was always reaching out to man and was willing to open the relationships as soon as man repented, i.e. opened himself to God. Buber felt that redemption was present at each moment when man met God and His grace. It was both present and future insofar as each person sought to work with God in the redemption of the world. While Buber accepted the eschatological assumption of a coming kingdom in which all men would live in the continuous presence of God, he was more interested in the immediate situation and its possibility of using an evil motive for the promotion of good. By so doing, an evil could be taken into the camp of the good and thereby transformed. Finally, he agreed wholeheartedly that redemption was both individual and communal in structure. It was only through community that man could ultimately be redeemed, while true community required redeemed individuals. Thus, redemption was not

purely subjective and psychological in nature.

Buber not only agreed with the orthodox Judeo Mythos but with the assumption that meaning was only possible when man remained open to that which transcended his finite structure. It was Buber's contention that the subject 'I' of the I-It awareness belonged to the objectified world of existence. At that level true meaning and communication were impossible. It was only when man encountered the subject 'I' of the I-Thou consciousness that he was enabled to find meaning and purpose for his life. Thus, only through relations, both objective and non-objective, could man feel the true meanings and values of his 'Existenz.'

Similar to Tillich, Buber felt that God could not become an object. Because God transcended the subject/object consciousness, i.e. I-It, he remained eternally Thou. When man assumed the I-Thou attitude he remained open to the depth dimension of the world, i.e. the divine. His concern was not to structure or understand in terms of factuality but to encounter meaning and value. Thus, Buber assumed that how man approached the universe determined how it presented itself. If it were approached with the attitude of I-It it yielded facts. It also introduced a separateness and alienation. When it was approached from the attitude of I-Thou it revealed meaning and value. As opposed to separation there was a participation which revealed the universe as holy and divine.

The 'I' or self involved in the I-Thou relationship participated in the non-objectifiable. It transcended the morbid feelings of isolation and emptiness which characterized alienated existence. Likewise, it altered one's attitude toward death. Death was viewed as a phenomenon attached to finitude. It could no longer be viewed as ultimate or final. Death belonged to objectification. When man was perceived as an object death took on the quality of finality. When it was viewed in relationship to the eternal Thou it could no longer assume the role of the ultimate. If man's center were within himself then death meant the annihilation of that self. However, if man's essential self were centered in the eternal Thou then death could be viewed as the end of objectification and finitude. Thus, Buber could not accept the finality of death in relation to the 'I' of the I-Thou relationship and its subsequent dread.

II. GABRIEL MARCEL AND THE MYSTERY OF PARTICIPATION

Biographical introduction. Gabriel Marcel was born to a cultivated Paris family in 1889. His father, a member of the French government and one time ambassador in Stockholm, was reared Roman Catholic but became agnostic at an early age. Marcel's mother, of Jewish ancestry, died when Marcel was only four years old. He admitted that though he

had few memories of her she was mysteriously with him throughout his entire life. He felt that her seeming presence always offered him a polarity between the seen and those who had passed to the unseen. He was raised by his aunt as an only child. He commented of his childhood,

> Consciously, I suffered from the exaggerated attention devoted to me as an only child. My illnesses, my successes and failures at school were given an absurd importance. I felt watched, spied upon; I guessed that, after I had gone to bed, the conversation in the drawing-room turned on my inadequacies and on what could be expected of me.[1]

He also commented on the affect of his mother's death.

> But it must be remembered that my whole childhood and probably my whole life have been overshadowed by the death of my mother, a death which was completely sudden and which shook the existence of all of us.[2]

In his youth he was afforded ample time for traveling. While he was a very capable and brilliant student, he was adversely affected by the academic form of study. He felt that his most sensitive and creative impulses were stifled by its rigidity. He was repelled by its emphasis on grades and he felt that more importance was being placed on his output than on himself as a person. When he discovered that he was physically unfit for the first world war, he engaged in Red Cross work. It was his job to trace those missing in action. It was during that job that he renewed his revulsion

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[1]Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence, trans. Manya Harari (London: The Harvill Press, 1948), p. 82.

[2]Ibid., p. 83.

of treating any human person as a file card or a statistic.

Marcel has taught intermittently since 1912. Between 1916 and 1917 he conducted metapsychical experiments in parapsychology and spiritualism. He discussed these experiments a few months later with Henri Bergson. He stated that the results of these experiments thoroughly convinced him of the authenticity of metapsychical phenomena. He said of the metapsychical,

> I must insist on this all the more because I have not mentioned it in any of my writings since my Journal Métaphysique, and it might be thought that on my conversion to Catholicism (in 1929 at the age of 39) I repudiated this conviction. This would not be true. I am as persuaded as ever that the philosopher must take metapsychical facts into consideration, and that he cannot assimilate these facts unless he discards certain speculative prejudices; one of the advantages of such an inquiry is precisely that it makes him conscious of such postulates, which are often implicit in his mind.[1]

In 1949 and 1950 he was invited to the University of Aberdeen to deliver the Gifford Lectures. These were published in two volumes, The Mystery of Being 1, Reflection and Mystery and 2, Faith and Reality. He was not only a profound metaphysician but a dramatist and a musician as well. As a youth he published more than fifteen pieces of dramatic writing.

Marcel's basic presuppositions. There was much in

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[1] Ibid., p. 91.

Marcel's thought that resembled both Heidegger and Jaspers. Like them, he was willing to divide human existence into being-in-the-world and a potential being-beyond-the-world. Man was both in a situation, i.e. limited, and a free potential creature, i.e. capable of becoming. Marcel felt that these two modes of being could not be isolated when analyzing human existence. In dealing with the 'self,' Marcel was not willing to make the traditional distinction between a transcendental self, i.e. subject, and its situation. For him the self could not be abstracted from the situation. Thus, one had to keep in mind that "to be in a situation" and "to be on the move" were inseparable modes of being-in-and-beyond-the-world.

Marcel designated that internal persistence of the self through change "inwardness." The self could be empirically analyzed on the basis of its objectifiable actions much as a plant could be photographed through its various stages of development. However, like a plant, the primary inward changes were never structurable. Those processes which manifested themselves in objectifiable structures consistently eluded observation. Marcel drew a similar distinction between physical collision or intersection and "encounter." Empirically, one could only describe the external relations between two persons meeting, i.e. their simultaneity within temporal duration and spatial vicinity.

Such a description failed to capture the true depths of what Marcel called existential encounter.

Because the self was always in and moving through a situation in the world it had to orient its past and project its future into that situation. Marcel viewed man as trying to correlate a "mental map" of his situation with the concrete conditions of his existence. This process, which Marcel called "reconnoitring," was one of turning one's awareness of the external world inward. Once internalized, it allowed one to say that a particular situation of being-in-the-world was "My situation." Such a notion involved both an aloofness, i.e. 'distanz,' between one's own existence and his situation as well as the recognition that "my situation" does not exhaust my existence. Thus, "reconnoitring" was not carried on between a subject and his objectified situation but between a person and his "incarnation," through his body, into human existence.

Marcel argued that man had an inner need or urge for transcendence. One of the basic characteristics of that need was dissatisfaction. Marcel did not view the transcendent as something that moved beyond experience. He maintained to the contrary that there had to be an experience of the transcendent before one could meaningfully talk about it. To his way of thinking there would be no transcendent if there were no way for man to experience it. It was Marcel's

contention that beyond experience there was nothing that could be thought or felt. Because Marcel basically agreed with the fundamental assumption of Husserl and Heidegger, namely, that ". . .consciousness is above all consciousness of something which is other than itself, . . ."[1] he saw as the urge for transcendence the need for purer modes of experience. He realized that in the attempt of consciousness to gain any direct glimpse of the self that it had to "pass beyond" any given self in order to do so. He felt that this passing beyond indicated that consciousness was more than a reflective mirror. Consciousness was more than a psychical or subjective response to objective data. Indeed, consciousness presupposed transcendence.

Marcel divided consciousness into primary and secondary reflection. While he recognized that all experience could be divided into subjective and objective poles, he felt that some encounters could not be limited to one or the other, e.g. the experience of existence. Marcel emphasized that essence and existence could not be separated by the subject/object dichotomy. Both a subject and an object participated in the same existence. That which they had in common could not be exhausted in either alone. Their shared existence

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[1]Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being -1, Reflection & Mystery, trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago: A Gateway Edition, Henry Regnery Company, 1960), p. 64.

transcended their individuality. Existence, for Marcel, was a type of absolute "presence" which pervaded all sense data. He contended that reflection could be carried on at several levels. As he pointed out,

> Roughly, we can say that where primary reflection tends to dissolve the unity of experience which is first put before it, the function of secondary reflection is essentially recuperative; it reconquers that unity.[1]

Primary reflection for Marcel introduced a radical detachment between the subject and the object. It was especially true when analyzing one's body. Primary reflection severed the body from the notion of "mine." It objectified the body and made it one among the many or one of a certain class of bodies. Like Buber, Marcel saw the attitude of detachment of subject and object at the primary level of consciousness. The body was then observed from the perspectives of anatomy, physiology, neurology, biology, etc., all of which lost the subtle meaning of "My body" as it was encountered at the level of existence.

The secondary reflection did not set out to establish fraud within the propositions laid down by primary reflection. It did, however, refuse to accept the separation of body from self in the analytical observations. Secondary reflection sought to capture the existential center of self and

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[1] Ibid., p. 103.

body. Marcel saw secondary reflection as reflection raised to the second power. Grimsley described the nature of secondary reflection in the following:

> The function of secondary reflection is to 'restore the concrete beyond the disjointed and disarticulated determinations of abstract thought.' This can only be achieved by a sort of 'inner reshaping' which is directly inspired by a direct participation in the reality which is being investigated. The philosopher will reflect upon his inner experience in a way that goes beyond the impersonal abstraction of ordinary reflection. Instead of drawing away from the object of his experience he will return to it and participate in it. In secondary reflection the concrete fullness of experience is restored, for it has passed through an activity which involves, as it were, a reciprocal movement, the interpenetration of the thinker's own being and the reality to which it is related. In other words, secondary reflection leads from thought to active participation.[1]

At this point one can understand more fully the meaning of Martin Buber's notion of illuminating existence. Berdyaev also maintained that "Being was lit from within." Secondary reflection should not be confused with the mystical experience in which the subject was absorbed in an unification process with its 'essence.' It was rather a process of infusing an object with its prereflective wholeness. Marcel saw primary reflection as one of abstraction. In the abstraction process definite boundaries were established whereby reflective consciousness, i.e. consciousness of something (the process of differentiation) could filter out

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[1]Ronald Grimsley, Existentialist Thought (Wales: University of Wales Press, 1955), pp. 192-193.

structural relationships. Like Bergson, Marcel realized that many primitive and non-rational dimensions of experience were lost in the objectification or abstraction process.

Much of traditional mysticism realized a similar phenomenon. However, it sought a type of consciousness which would allow the person to return to that level of consciousness prior to the reflective abstractions of the subject/object dichotomy. Thus, much of traditional mysticism was a sort of "returning to the womb," i.e. an escape into darkness. Because the subject was lost, it proved to be negative rather than positive. Marcel, as well as Buber and Berdyaev, was opposed to that type of 'nihilism.' His notion of secondary reflection was an attempt to maintain both the subject, i.e. self, and the light of reflective consciousness. Because the self was maintained, it was possible to talk about participation as opposed to unification. It attempted to retain those valuable residues of the non-objective and non-rational without sacrificing the knowledge of rationality.

Marcel noted that when one spoke empirically one could always separate the subject from the object. For instance, one could separate the seeing from the object being seen. Through separation and detachment, primary reflection introduced the possibility of an error in

perception. It was also characterized by curiosity and the problem-solving method of knowledge. Thus, primary reflection reduced the world to a set of problems to be solved empirically. However, at the level of human existence it was not possible to formulate questions in terms of problems. Marcel noted that a different type of situation was presented when one was dealing with feelings and the non-rational. Unlike subject/object perception, one could not separate the feeling of pain from the pain itself. Marcel felt that the reason for this was due to the fact that feeling was a mode of participation rather than one of correlation, which would have been the case in the subject/object dichotomy. While one could see one's body and treat it as an object, they could not separate themselves from it. While one could detach one's self at the primary level of reflection, they could not do so at the prereflective level. Thus, at the secondary level the modes of participation, i.e. the prereflective, had to be fused with the correlations of the primary reflective level, i.e. rational differentiation. Marcel concluded that it was not possible to structure such an experience in terms of a problem to be solved. It was his contention that participation involved a "mystery."

Marcel did not conceive of mystery as either a revealed truth or as an unknowable. It was his notion that

it entailed a genuine encounter with Being, but it could not be objectified and rationally structured. On the other hand, it possessed too great an intensity to be merely disregarded. In man's primary reflection mystery was ignored for the sake of clarity. However, its persistence challenged men of integrity to contemplate the emotional impact of the non-objective, i.e. the non-rational as opposed to the irrational. (The non-rational referred to feelings and emotions while the irrational referred to logical inconsistencies and rational absurdities.) While the non-rational remained a mystery at the primary level of reflection, it gained meaning when fused with rational thought at the secondary level of reflection.

Marcel saw the role of the philosopher as one of contemplation. The process of contemplation was one of an inward regrouping of one's resources. In one sense it was a process of infusing the meanings of one's existence with the internalized structures of one's situation. Marcel saw values arising in the encounter between the emerging existence of the self and its incarnation into a situation, i.e. being-in-the-world. Values always involved a process of selectivity on the part of the one appreciating a certain set of encountered values. Unlike Sartre, Marcel did not see the world as devoid of value waiting for man to arbitrarily create them. For Marcel values presupposed both

that which was appreciated and the one who does the appreciating. It was through contemplation that man meaningfully selected what was of value in his situation. In the fusion of the prereflective and the primary level of reflection man encountered the fullness and value of existence. Marcel said of contemplation,

> . . . to contemplate is to ingather oneself in the presence of whatever is being contemplated, and this in such a fashion that the reality, confronting which one ingathers oneself, itself becomes a factor in the ingathering.[1]

In contemplation, i.e. secondary reflection, one ingathered what had been originally abstracted at the level of primary reflection. However, it was more than merely a returning. Ingathering was a process of "drawing nearer" to something. It was a process of gathering in from one's conditions those values which were relevant to one's changing self. Marcel affirmed that man's situation and his movement were inseparable modes of his being. Man could not be merely identified by his situation. Thus, man had to do his "reconnoitring" within a present situation in accordance with certain values and attitudes. To the degree that one's past had influenced one's attitudes toward the present it also

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[1]Marcel, The Mystery of Being -1, Reflection & Mystery, op. cit., p. 156.

acted as part of the situation. Likewise, one's aspirations and expectations also helped determine one's choice of what would enter the ingathering process.

Like Jaspers Marcel recognized that each situation held two dimensions, i.e. objective (empirical) and transparent (existential). For Marcel when one could say "My situation" he was in a position to recognize a beyondness in his situation. He saw this as a type of openness. He felt that a necessary quality of openness was for a person to maintain a certain degree of "aloofness," i.e. "distanz," between one's own situation and other possible situations. In his estimation that attitude allowed for a more critical type of thought. Failure to maintain such an aloofness could quickly degenerate to what Marcel called "fanaticized consciousness."

Because the self was in constant movement and change, Marcel sought to understand more fully those forces which were necessary to maintain any sense of identity or persistence of the self through the changes. If one were constantly changing, how could one make resolutions, plans, promises, and commitments for a future self which would be different from the self making them? Marcel surmised that whatever it was that persisted through the various developments of the self must be other than any particular self. He recognized that at the level of abstraction a person was

merely a succession of images. Yet, there was also present within those changes an inner feeling of identity. While it was possible to disassociate and isolate the various images of the self it was impossible to separate or sever the feeling of identity and existence which persisted through the changing images. It was no wonder that Marcel considered self-consistency a virtue. Yet, he was faced with the problem as to the self with which to remain consistent. Should it be the one who made the promise or the one who was to fulfill it? Marcel had raised the question as to whether or not there was a self to which one could lay the claim for one's fidelity. He concluded that it had to be much deeper than the changing selves. He affirmed that that which persisted through all changes of the self was God. Since fidelity presupposed something permanent, God became the basis for fidelity.

In order for a person to encounter that which persisted, i.e. Being, he had to adopt an open attitude toward the world and others. When two persons could truly respect one another as centers of freedom and responsibility they encountered "intersubjectivity." It was this experience which removed the despair of death and the absurdity of life. The "authentic encounter" was characterized by communication and love. The essential validity of intersubjective existence was beyond proof or disproof, i.e. empirical verification. It held its own authentication as a mode of

participation for the self. Thus, for Marcel fidelity to God was involved in one's fidelity toward himself and others.

The notion of fidelity also tended to transcend time. Just as the present existentially included the past and the future so fidelity transcended and surpassed the future changes of the self. Marcel felt that prior to fidelity one had to commit one's self to something, or rather someone. It had to be a commitment which could engage one's total being and be directed toward the wholeness of Being. Likewise, all commitments involved two sides. There was someone (in the case of fidelity it was God) who had a hold over the self in its commitment. Marcel interpreted that hold over man as his obligation toward, in other words, faith. He held that fidelity, hope, and love were three essential attitudes for those who had found God and responded to Him in faith.

Marcel felt that when men were not looked upon as unique centers of freedom there was a tendency to use them as instruments and machines. As this tendency increased, life was looked upon more and more as a meaningless and worthless phenomenon. This type of judgment involved a 'Weltanschauung' which tended to dehumanize and enslave man. With such a view and a lack of faith man tended to delude himself into seeing those depersonalized conditions as reality. In such a situation a person became objectified and was overcome with despair and the sense of absurdity.

Only when one ceased trying to conform his life to empty objectifications could he gain any inward sense of freedom and commitment. Only then could he feel the power of his total being in confrontation with the wholeness of existence. Only when the limitations of the situation were shattered by an encounter with another, could one adopt an attitude of hope. Hope, for Marcel, was not the same as desire. Desire was always directed toward that which was desired, i.e. a desired object. Hope was an attitude toward life, proceeding out of the mysterious depths of existence, i.e. participation and intersubjectivity. Such a person did not measure life in terms of "having," i.e. possessions, but "Being."

Marcel was unimpressed by the traditional "proofs" for God. As far as he was concerned faith was primary and all so-called proofs were secondary. To the man of faith proofs were unnecessary and to the nonbeliever they were inconsequential and unconvincing. He felt that all knowledge was a derivative of participation. While the meta-problematical could not yield proofs, it still persisted through its emotional intensity. Though Marcel did not explicitly pursue it, he did lay the groundwork for claiming the identity of feeling as the basis for meta-problematic "proofs." Because thought never occurs in isolation and always appears within a context of other thoughts and feelings,

Marcel might have suggested that the same feelings which are involved in the empirical proofs, i.e. those feelings which are associated with such notions as certainty, adequacy, accuracy, and precision, persist at the prereflective and secondary reflective levels as well as at the primary level of reflection. It could be argued that while existence cannot be objectified and, therefore, not susceptible to empirical verification, that it is infused with feelings which carry a greater sense of reality than those which accompany objective validity.

Thus, in summary it might be said that Marcel saw man emerging as a unique center of Being. His innermost depths were characterized by existence and mystery. With the dawn of primary reflection he split himself from the 'darkness' of unconscious prereflection. Yet, it was a 'light' which brought alienation and estrangement as well. In order to break from his situation as a being-in-the-world he had to adopt an attitude of openness and mutual respect toward others. This gave rise to intersubjectivity which allowed man to internalize, from a secondary level of reflection, his own existence. Through encounter man came into contact with the "presence" and persistence of Being. He was then able to overthrow those attitudes which had tended to dehumanize his existence and reduce him to a thing. He was infused with hope, fidelity, and love toward

others and God. While God was beyond verification in the objective sense, he was undeniably real to the faithful believer. This last assertion allowed Marcel the possibility of squaring his philosophy with the Roman Catholic faith. There was nothing in his philosophy which would dictate the necessity of accepting such a faith.

The human condition as abstraction and depersonalization. In his stimulating book, The Decline of Wisdom, Marcel noted that in modern technological societies man was losing what craftsmen called "knack." Knack represented a quality of workmanship which indicated both pride in and personal concern for the finished product. In modern society Marcel saw a growing lack of concern on the part of workers. Workers tended to lose any real sense of craftsmanship. They saw themselves rather as a unit in a large and impersonal assembly line. The notion of "my" work merged into the impersonal collective of "our" work. It also tended to change the person's entire attitude toward his environment and the world as a whole. The individual gradually accepted an objectified conception of the universe in general.

Marcel viewed this transition as a decline of wisdom. There was a gradual tendency to stress more and more the means and less and less the goals and ends. Man began to find himself a slave of the means. As Marcel stated, "It is as if man, overburdened by the weight of technics, knows

less and less where he stands in regard to what matters to him and what doesn't, to what is precious and what is worthless."[1] When the ends were lost there was a corresponding loss of the values they motivated. With the degeneration of values there was a decline of wisdom. Even professional philosophers, who prided themselves on their interests in the fruits of wisdom, had become involved in a similar type of confusion.

> Anyone who has attended international philosophical congresses is aware that, . . .there exist in the modern world two distinct types of philosophy without any living communication between them: there is on the one hand logico-mathematic neo-positivism which predominates in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in parts of Scandinavia, and on the other, there are the doctrines of metaphysical inspiration, whether existentialist or not, current in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and in the countries of South America.[2]

From Marcel's position the "logico-mathematic neo-positivists" were those who felt one could sacrifice the non-rational, with its ambiguities, and devote one's attention totally toward the objectifiable and the empirically verifiable. Those who accepted "metaphysical inspiration" were not willing to let a vital part of existence escape examination merely because it was plagued with incoherence and paradox.

Marcel saw social intercourse replacing genuine

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[1]Gabriel Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, trans. Manya Harari (London: The Harvill Press, 1954), p. 49.

[2]Ibid., p. 50.

communion. People seemed to get in touch with one another without really meeting or encountering one another. They tended to talk, i.e. Heidegger's "chatter," but not really converse. People appeared to be familiar strangers to each other. They were spectators and observers but failed to participate in one another's lives. It was a world of 'I' and 'it,' 'he' and 'she,' 'they' and 'them,' a world of objectification a world of abstraction. It was a world characterized by "having" as opposed to "being." Marcel viewed the substitution of "having" for "being" as tragic. In such a situation people were cut off from one another. Like Buber Marcel saw intersubjectivity as essential to the development of personality. By remaining at the level of primary reflection, i.e. abstraction of the subject/object dichotomy from the prereflective, individuals could never really "meet." They remained less than persons, i.e. they were depersonalized, i.e. unauthentic.

Marcel felt that "sin" was the refusal to enter into the life of contemplation and participation, the unwillingness to open one's self to another. Persistent closedness could only lead to anxiety and ultimately despair. Abstraction was not a "sin" in and of itself. However, when a person persisted in treating the abstractions as if they were concrete realities, then he was sinning. Marcel's notion of sin comes very close to what Whitehead called the

"fallacy of misplaced concreteness." It also resembled the orthodox notion of viewing one's self as a self-sufficient individual, i.e. pride.

The solution to the human condition as participation and hope. While Marcel characterized unauthentic existence by absolutized abstractions, depersonalization, and self-centeredness, he pictured authentic existence in terms of contemplation, mystery, intersubjectivity, participation, and hope. Like Heidegger and Jaspers he felt that Being "called" or urged man to look beyond his limit-situations. Marcel saw man striving to become a person. He saw this as impossible without openness toward other persons. If man remained at the level of primary reflection, he could not transcend the subject/object relationship which alienated as opposed to interrelating the subjects. Only when man changed his attitude and internalized, through "ingatheringness," could he open himself to view the other as a free and creative center of Being. It was a realization of the hold which God had on one which allowed one to commit himself to another. Man's response to God's hold and call was faith. It was also the basis for fidelity and hope. Marcel saw finiteness and closedness leading toward despair while transcendence and openness lead toward hope.

By entering the plane of intersubjectivity man could

transcend primary reflection and participate in Being through communion with others. Through communion and fidelity with another, one moved beyond "having" toward "Being." At this point Marcel went beyond Sartre's class of "We" and Buber's "meeting" between I and Thou. Marcel moved beyond the notion of two subjects relating and meeting one another. It was an actual interpenetration and participation, i.e. an intersubjectivity. It also transcended the time structure. Marcel saw time as a duration of objects. When man refused to invision himself as a thing, he belonged to an entirely different world-dimension which he called the "supra-temporal."

While Marcel agreed that there were no "proofs" for intuitional 'knowledge,' he also agreed with Heidegger and Jaspers in declaring that knowledge should not be confined within the primary reflection dichotomy of subject/object. While the positivists could declare that metaphysics could not be verified, the existentialists could agree if and only if verification implied the empirical only. Because the positivists confined feelings to the subjective, they could argue that they were purely biographical. Thus, the positivists and the scientists tried to rid truth of all forms of subjectivity. Verification was removed to the universal and impersonal. However, such a method

presupposed that subjects always remained objects for other subjects. Marcel indicated that such thinking was inevitable if one failed to move from abstraction to contemplation. Only on the intersubjective level of existence could one subject participate in another. In true community the 'I' could be replaced by the intersubjective "we." As long as the positivists insisted on remaining at the primary level of reflection, there was no way for them to understand the ultimate meanings of existence which presupposed intersubjectivity. In their (positivists) attempt to clarify and become lucid they lost sight of what was vital and permanent to human existence, namely, Being or God.

Like Jaspers and Buber, Marcel recognized that when man opened himself to Being he was enabled to take a different attitude toward the objective world. Man's situations were no longer final. By recognizing God's hold on his life man could encounter God and find the persistent presence which pervaded all of life. With 'knowledge' of that presence man could treat his fellows with fidelity and love and his future with hope, It was only when man treated himself as a thing that he cut himself off from God's presence. Love, fidelity, and hope all presupposed intersubjectivity and God's presence and persistence. Marcel saw love as impossible when people viewed themselves and

others as objects. Because of the changing and potential self, he saw hope and fidelity impossible unless that self were in the presence of someone who did not change, i.e. God. When man was in communion with God, he became "supra-temporal."

Marcel felt that the real problem of evil was not so much a speculative one of making sense of it but the mystery of living through it without seeking to add to it. It was essential to maintain faith through it without totally comprehending its origins. Marcel saw Christ persisting in faith through evil. For Marcel this was all anyone could expect to do. Because evil belonged to contingent reality, it would always remain a mystery.

Thus, men could change their condition by changing their attitudes toward life. This change presupposed a 'knowledge' which was possible only on the secondary level of reflection. Through contemplation, man could regain those lost dimensions of existence that were removed at the level of abstraction. Marcel did not see this as an irrationalist's approach. Abstraction in and of itself was not bad. It was its absolutization which reduced himself and others to things, i.e. depersonalization. By seeking to see things within their real context, i.e. prior to abstraction, man could gain a different perspective on existence. (This

context also included the knowledge from the primary level of reflection.) By adding the 'light' of primary abstraction to the living presence felt at the secondary level of ingatheredness, man could live a fuller life by expanding from the purely subjective to the intersubjective. With this change, man was no longer confined within his limit-situations and could transcend them by relating himself to God who transcended all situations and objectifications to become the eternal Thou.

Criticism and evaluation of Marcel's position. There was certainly no question as to Marcel's theism but one could seriously question as to whether or not Jesus Christ or Christianity played any significant role in his philosophical position. From a strictly philosophical point of view many other religions could equally be used. The direction which one's religious thinking moved was meta-problematical and was self-authenticating for each person. There was no question that Marcel saw his faith within the context of the Roman Catholic Church. It could be said that even though Marcel was a Catholic and a philosopher he was not a Roman Catholic philosopher in the 'apologia' sense of the term. There was much in his thought that while it was sympathetic toward the church was not specifically Roman Catholic.

While Heidegger and more especially Sartre found freedom leading toward isolation, Marcel found it leading

toward fuller and fuller participation. As opposed to finding God as a limitation on human freedom as did Sartre, Marcel saw God goading man into free and responsible decisions. God opened a new horizon of values from which man could choose or reject. He also offered man a fuller existence than would have been possible if he were confined to his own finite alternatives. He agreed with Heidegger, Jaspers, and Buber that man required a 'knowledge' beyond the subject/object dichotomy, i.e. a 'knowledge' of Being. Marcel agreed also that human existence was not confined to the rational and empirical structures of the limit-situations.

He endeavored to sever the epistemological barriers which the subject/object structure of experience placed between subjects as well as objects. While Sartre argued that individuals could never transcend the barrier, Buber felt that a change of attitude could transcend it. However, even Buber's position left the matter doubtful. Marcel's notion of intersubjectivity offered a much different approach to the problem. As the 'I' was transformed into the 'we,' the barrier between subjects was annihilated. It allowed for a 'knowledge' of participation which transcended the possibility of error inherent in the subject/object type of knowledge. When primary reflection divided the world into the subjective and the objective, it introduced a split which could never hope for more than a type of assumed

correspondence, parallelism, or coherence. However, absolute proof was not possible. At best one could hope for significant statistical correlations and highly probable predictions.

The scientists and positivists brought most of their criticism of metaphysics against what Marcel called the "fanaticized consciousness," absolutized subjective motives. This was a consciousness which assumed the universal validity of its own subjective 'Weltanschauung.' Marcel would have been just as critical of such metaphysical systems as the positivists were. He was sceptical of any subjective system of thought. (Including those which insisted that only the primary level of reflection was valid for discerning knowledge) Any subjective form of thought presupposed the fundamental split in reality which meant objective methods of verification, which were impersonal, had to be used. Marcel agreed that none could be established at the subjective level. However, at the intersubjective level such objective methods of verification were unnecessary. One could not apply objective methods, which presupposed a split between the subject and object, where no split existed. Thus, intuitional knowledge was knowledge through participation. It did not approach life as a series of problems to be solved but as a mystery to be contemplated.

At this point Marcel had to adhere to a position not too different from Rudolf Otto when he stated in the

third chapter of The Idea of The Holy,

> The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is requested to read no farther; for it is not easy to discuss questions of religious psychology with one who can recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion, or, say, social feelings, but cannot recall any intrinsically religious feeling.[1]

Certainly, Marcel must make a similar statement to those who have never moved within the realm of the intersubjective. It is interesting to note that the required openness of mind which the scientific method requires in its experiments was also offered as a key to understanding the deeper meanings of life. Likewise, love and faith have been agreed upon by Jaspers, Buber, and Marcel as belonging to authentic existence.

It is also interesting to note that openness, faith, and love were attitudes in and through which men expressed the content of their encounter with God and others. They were also necessary before the encounter could reach its fullest depths. None of the existentialists thus far studied have offered any universal content or knowledge as to the nature of God and man. However, the above attitudes were

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[1]Rudolf Otto, The Idea of The Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 8.

offered as universal dispositions through which men could encounter God and gain spiritual knowledge of His purpose and its meaning for their lives.

It is worthy to note that the content which Marcel offered from his encounter with God was expressed through his conversion and membership in the Roman Catholic Church. There are many Protestants who would question whether or not the Catholic Church has really maintained an atmosphere of openness and love toward humanity. It has often shown the greatest forms of intolerance and closedness. Often in the past, its emphasis on mystery had degenerated into nothing more than superstition for the laity. It would seem quite possible to question whether or not Marcel was motivated from an open intersubjective encounter or a purely emotional and subjective experience.

Certainly, Marcel agreed that man at the prereflective level was in a state of 'innocence,' i.e. prior to sin and guilt, which was in accord with the orthodox tradition. While man was a being-in-the-world, he still possessed the necessary freedom to cling to abstractions as final or move to a secondary level of contemplation. He also agreed with the orthodox that due to the condition of man, it was obvious that he had chosen to cling idolatrously to his abstractions and objectifications. As long as man persisted

at the primary level of reflection, he had introduced a 'rift' or split between man, his world, and God.

Because man possessed an inner urge or need for transcendence, Marcel felt, like the orthodox, that God was calling man from sin and guilt. He saw this especially in Christ. Through Christ's life, man's life was called into question and man could feel the need for transcendence which included the realization that repentance was needed. By heeding the fidelity, faith, love, and hope of Christ's life, man could enter into communion with God and his fellowmen. It was also evident that Marcel accepted the notion that man possessed an essence which was prior to his existence. Through contemplation and the secondary level of reflection, man could transcend the 'rift' which appeared as a result of absolutizing abstractions and objectifications, i.e. sin. Because of this, Marcel could affirm the redeeming grace and forgiveness of God.

Certainly, of all the existentialists in this inquiry Marcel placed a major emphasis on hope. From Marcel's position redemption and its pending hope were never really historical in one sense of the word. Whenever God and man encountered, it was "supra-temporal." Yet, Christ was the "incarnation" of God in the flesh. Just as the self was always an incarnation in the body so the supra-temporal

could be incarnated into the structures of history. However, its presence became manifest in the attitude of hope. He also agreed with the orthodox position that redemption was both personal and communal. For Marcel the personal presupposed the communal and vice versa. In fact, redemption was impossible without both, i.e. intersubjectivity.

III. PAUL TILLICH AND THE PROBLEM OF ESTRANGEMENT

Biographical introduction. Paul Tillich was born in Starzeddel, in the Prussian province of Brandenburg, near the Silesian border in August of 1886. His father was a Lutheran minister for the Prussian Territorial Church in Starzeddel. His mother was from the Rhineland. Tillich saw a great deal of significance in the diversity of his parental background. He implied this when he stated,

> I have never doubted, at any rate, that the union of a father from the Mark and a mother from the Rhineland implanted in me the tension between eastern and western Germany: in the East a meditative bent tinged with melancholy, a heightened consciousness of duty and personal sin, a strong sense for authority, and feudal traditions are still alive; while the West is characterized by zest of living, sensuous concreteness, mobility, rationality, and democracy.[1]

It was to this early childhood environment that Tillich traced his later emphasis on tension and polarity. From

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[1]Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, trans. Part I by N. A. Rasetzke; Parts II, III, and IV by Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Ltd., 1936), p. 4.

this early conditioning he abstracted a more specific set of experiences which he felt gave direction to his later thought.

> Most important, however, was the fact that from my eighth year onward annually I spent some weeks, later even months by the seaside. The experience of the infinite bordering upon the finite, as one has it by the sea, responded to my tendency toward the border and supplied my imagination with a symbol from which feeling could win substance and thinking productivity.[1]

Tillich believed that these early influences led to an "aesthetic-meditative" attitude which has persisted in his thought.

In 1900 he entered the Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium in Berlin and later attended the universities of Berlin, Tübingen, Halle, and received his Ph.D. in Breslau in 1911. He received his theological degree from Halle in 1912 and was ordained to the Evangelical and Reformed Church the same year. He served as the vicar in Moabit until the outbreak of World War I and then as a chaplain from 1914 to 1918. From 1919 until 1924 he was privatdozent of theology at the University of Berlin and professor of systematic theology at Marburg. Tillich was at Marburg during the same period as Rudolf Otto and Martin Heidegger. He then became professor of religion at the 'Hochschule' in Dresden in 1925 and became professor of theology at the University of Leipzig in 1928. Between 1929 and 1933 he was professor

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[1] Ibid., p. 7.

of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt-am-Main. The Religious Situation was published in 1932. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Tillich rejected the new nazism and was quickly dismissed. However, during the summer of 1933, Reinhold Neibuhr was in Germany and made arrangements for Tillich to come to the United States and teach at Union Theological Seminary in New York as professor of philosophical theology, where he stayed until his retirement.

In 1936 he published The Interpretation of History, and in 1940 he became an American citizen. During 1948, he published both The Protestant Era and a series of sermons under the title The Shaking of the Foundations. Systematic Theology, Vol. I, appeared in 1951 and The Courage to Be in 1952. In 1954 he retired from the faculty of Union Theological Seminary and published Love, Power, and Justice. After retirement, he went to Harvard where he was appointed University Professor which allowed him to continue teaching and writing. In 1955 he published Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality and The New Being. He completed and published Systematic Theology, Vol. II and The Dynamics of Faith in 1957.

It is obvious from Tillich's background that he was fully capable of dealing with either philosophy or theology. He was also the only one of the seven authors included in

this study who could be considered as a theologian as well as a philosopher.

Tillich's basic presuppositions. Tillich presented the most systematic approach of any of the writers included in this inquiry. He considered himself both a philosopher and a theologian. In many ways he attempted to take the next logical step beyond Heidegger and Jaspers. He agreed with Heidegger in the notion that the best the philosopher could hope to do was ask questions and attempt to goad 'das Man' to listen to the call of 'Das Sein.' Heidegger as a philosopher was forced to stop at that point. It was also at that point which Jaspers had to abandon his survivors of 'shipwreck.' It was Tillich's contention that the philosopher could only ask the questions, while the answers presupposed a theologian. It was within this framework that he structured the Christian message. Tillich assumed that it was the role of apologetic theology to interpret the 'kerygma' in such a way that it could offer meaningful answers to the philosophical questions. He also assumed that all theological concepts were rooted in what he called a "mystical a priori." This was an awareness which transcended the subject/object consciousness. It was from this "mystical a priori" that both the questions as well as the answers were formulated. He viewed this process as circular

in nature. However, the theologian worked within a narrower framework than the philosopher because he presupposed a given content as a criterion, i.e. the 'kerygma,' or in Tillich's definition the unchanging message of the Christian Faith.

Tillich saw two formal criteria which every theology had to assume; "The object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us."[1] For Tillich this concern was understood as an attitude resulting from an "existential encounter" with that which was felt to be ultimate, i.e. unconditional. That which concerned man ultimately was never to be thought of as an object. The content of such an existential encounter was derived from an analysis of that which concerned man ultimately. This gave rise to the second criterion. "Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or not-being. Only those statements are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of being or not-being for us."[2] In this

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[1]Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology I (fifth impression; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 12.

[2]Ibid., p. 14.

second criterion he interpreted being as the whole of human reality, including its structure, meaning, and aim. Ultimately, man was concerned about his being and meaning.

Tillich saw philosophy attempting to structure reality as a whole. It basically was asking the question as to the structure of being. Theology, on the other hand, was primarily asking the same question of that which concerned man ultimately. While philosophy was concerned to understand the structure of being, theology was concerned to understand the meaning of being for the individual. The philosopher was to be detached from the object of his investigation while the theologian had a basic attitude of commitment to the content of that which he existentially encountered. Thus, for Tillich, every theology was both 'kerygmatic' and existential. In the process of philosophical detachment the philosopher had no place preferable to another to commence his search for the structure of reality while the theologian started from that which concerned him ultimately. The philosopher had no criteria save reason to determine the significance of his quest while the theologian could evaluate on the basis of that in which he was involved and to which he was committed. For Tillich the kerygmatic criterion of the Christian theologian was the unique event of Jesus as the Christ.

Tillich agreed with Heidegger that the philosopher was in no position to identify, symbolically, Being-in-itself with

God. The philosopher had to confine himself to asking existential questions. It was Tillich's contention that the answers to such existential questions would be theological in nature. In his famous method of "correlation" he attempted to translate Jasper's notion of a cypher language by implementing a kergymatic decoding of the content, which was expressed in the theological answers given to the existential questions. For Tillich, there was an interdependence, i.e. correlation, between the symbol and that which was symbolized. There was also a correlation between man's ultimate concern and that about which he was ultimately concerned. The knowledge or content derived from the answers was only meaningful in correlation with the whole of human existence and the questions posed by it. As he aptly stated,

> In using the method of correlation, systematic theology proceeds in the following way: it makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions.[1]

Like Heidegger, he conceived of man as a metaphysical being who was capable of standing outside of his immediate situation and questioning the meaning of existence, i.e. the why.

Tillich hoped to demonstrate in his theology that the unique event of Jesus as the Christ could overcome the brokenness and estrangement which characterized the human

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[1] Ibid., p. 62.

condition. It was through the Christ-symbol that he attempted to move beyond the limit-situations of Jaspers. This symbol had to convey positive content in order for man to pass beyond the arbitrary values projected from his own finite value and meaning structures. While both Heidegger and Jaspers recognized that certain basic changes occurred in man's attitudes following an encounter with that which transcended finite meaning structures (for Heidegger 'Das Sein' and for Jaspers 'Das Umgreifende'), they could offer no content. Heidegger allowed man an incomprehensible awareness veiled in dread while Jaspers allowed each of his voyagers to spin their own unsubstantiated version of a "shipwreck." In the case of Heidegger no one was certain that they had encountered the same Nothingness, while for Jaspers the survivors were not certain that they were talking about the same ship. However, for both men there was an encounter within the familiar and everyday which was not capable of expression or communication within the ordinary language and meaning structures of mass-man. That something was Being-in-itself. Thus, Tillich hoped to show through the Christ-symbol the content of Nothingness and its meaning for man.

Epistemologically, Tillich made a distinction between the knowledge of being and the knowing event. On the basis

of such a distinction he discussed the ontological and technical aspects of reason. The ontological was characterized by the nonrational forces which were essential to the Gestalt structures of meaning and value. It involved the whole man and expressed the depth dimension of his dynamic encounter with that which ultimately concerned him. Technical reason, on the other hand, was characterized by the abstract, logical, and methodological. Because of its abstract qualities, it involved something less than the total man and, thus, tended to dehumanize when taken by itself. For Tillich, ontological reason was the mind's ability to grasp and shape reality. Traditionally, the world was divided into the structure ('logos') of the grasping-shaping-self, i.e. subjective reason, and the structure of the grasped-and-shaped-world, i.e. objective reason.

> Subjective reason is the structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and to shape reality on the basis of a corresponding structure of reality (in whatever way this correspondence may be explained). The description of "grasping" and "shaping" in this definition is based on the fact that subjective reason always is actualized in an individual self which is related to its environment and to its world in terms of reception and reaction. The mind receives and reacts. In receiving reasonably, the mind grasps its world; in reacting reasonably, the mind shapes its world. "Grasping" in this content, has the connotation of penetrating into the depth, into the essential nature of a thing or an event, of understanding and expressing it. "Shaping," in this context, has the connotation of transforming a given material into a Gestalt, a living structure which has the power of being.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 76.

From this Tillich concluded that man transformed reality as he perceived it.

It was Tillich's contention that reason was both dynamic and static as well as existential. He saw reality as changing under a dynamic structure, i.e. objective 'logos,' and grasped by the subjective 'logos.' The subjective 'logos' was also dynamic as it responded creatively by shaping that which has been grasped. However, the correlation could become distorted due to the Gestalt patterns of perception under the conditions of existence. As was pointed out, there was something which was both grasped and shaped. That something was not to be equated with nor considered exhausted by reason. That something or substance which appeared in the rational structure was called by Tillich "being-itself" or the "ground of being." He saw the ground of being as the inexhaustible abyss of potentiality and creative possibility. Every attempt on the part of reason to structure being-itself was limited under the conditions of existence. Because of those conditions, reason resorted to myth and cult in order to express and communicate the richness of its own depth. For Tillich, this was an obvious indication of man's estrangement and "fallenness." He felt there should be no myth or cult, and, indeed, there would not have been if reason were in immediate unity with its depth.

Like Jaspers, Tillich felt that reason was transparent toward its ontological depths. He. therefore, considered

myth and cult as symbolic expressions of being-itself. It was his contention that there could be no genuine separation or interference between knowledge and myth. It was precisely at this point that he drew the distinction between knowledge and revelation. Reason as actual, required finitude and always involved the threat of "Autonomy." Reason became autonomous when it failed, under the conditions of existence, to remain open or transparent toward depth. This type of reason emphasized the grasping element and attempted to avoid subjective shaping of reality. On the other hand, the depth dimension of reason threatened actual reason by attempting to shape reality on the basis of some "outside authority," i.e. heteronomous reason. As Tillich stated,

> The problem of heteronomy is the problem of an authority which claims to represent reason. . . against its autonomous actualization. . . .The basis of a genuine heteronomy is the claim to speak in the name of the ground of being and therefore in an unconditional and ultimate way.[1]

For Tillich, both autonomous and heteronomous reason were rooted in "theonomy." As might be expected, theonomous reason maintained an unbroken unity between depth and actualization. However, unbroken unity or theonomy was not possible under the conditions of existence. Thus, the essential elements of reason were intermingled in a struggle for dominance within the structures of existence. Yet, insofar as reason

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[1] Ibid., p. 84.

could remain transparent, it allowed the ground of being to be revealed. Like Marcel, Tillich felt that the ontological structure of knowledge presupposed a form of union. Somehow, the knower was fused with the known in an act of knowledge. In the act of knowing the knower transcended the subject/object dichotomy. In the process of grasping, the knower adapted the object to itself as well as itself to the object. Tillich contended that such a relationship presupposed a type of detachment or distance between the subject and object which also included an emotional participation. Thus, knowledge was an emotional participation (union) of the subject and object detachment (distance).

When the element of detachment predominated, Tillich called such knowledge "controlling knowledge." Controlling knowledge objectified and was one example of technical reason. Tillich contrasted controlling knowledge with "receiving knowledge" which was emotional and predominated by the element of union. For him, the unity of controlling knowledge (detached analysis) and "receiving knowledge" (emotional participation) meant accurate understanding. Thus, cognitive distortion (neurotic perception) occurred when a person emphasized one element of reason to the exclusion of the other. Such distortions and conflicts were almost unavoidable under the conditions of existence.

This condition immediately raised the question of

truth and verifiability. Tillich felt that truth, like reason, presupposed the subjective and objective. Such truth, he concluded, was based on expectations. The verification of controlling knowledge was the degree of success with which it could control actions and confirm expectations. However, such preciseness was not possible in verifying receiving knowledge. It did not allow the same experimental repeatability as technical reason. Receiving knowledge was experiential and part of the ongoing process of life which was often not repeatable. When one asserted its validity, he had to take a "risk." This knowledge through participation Tillich called "intuition." However, it was not to be viewed as irrational. He stated,

> This situation mirrors a basic conflict in cognitive reason. Knowledge stands in a dilemma; controlling knowledge is safe but not ultimately significant, while receiving knowledge can be ultimately significant, but it cannot give certainty.[1]

Tillich, like Heidegger and Sartre, favored a phenomenological description of reality. However, he felt certain modifications were necessary when one was dealing with the "intuitive-descriptive" elements, i.e. revelation. He maintained that revelation involved a mysterious element which transcended the subject/object consciousness. Such a

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[1] Ibid., p. 105.

dimension always appeared mysterious in relationship to the ordinary meaning structures under the conditions of existence. In the revelatory act the mysterious was experienced, but it was not dissolved into knowledge in the ordinary sense. The mysterious was contrasted from the unknown precisely because it remained a mystery after being revealed. For Tillich, the mysterious included meanings, ideas, values and the prevailing 'gestalten.'

He identified two distinct elements, the negative or abysmal in the ground of being and the positive side, which included the negative element. The negative was the threat of non-being, which was possible in all revelation and the positive was that which ultimately concerned the person because it was the ground of his being. It was Tillich's notion that when man encountered the mystery of revelation he was grasped by it and was called out of the ordinary, i.e. ecstasy. Thus, revelation presupposed ecstasy. In the ecstatic experience man transcended the purely psychological conditions of existence. Through the threat of non-being, Tillich saw man being ontologically shocked. Such a shock caused man to raise the basic philosophical question, "Why is there something? Why not nothing?".[1]

At this point Tillich was following very closely the

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[1] Ibid., p. 113.

work of Rudolf Otto. The annihilating affect of the revelatory event, i.e. the divine presence, was characterized by the 'mysterium tremendum.' The tremor resulted from the ecstatic ontological shock which was overcome by an element of captivation, i.e. 'mysterium fascinosum.' It was this latter point which was so crucial to the theistic point of view. Heidegger had emphasized the dread and its subsequent despair. While he had hinted at a positive element, it played a rather secondary role. Certainly, Tillich would have agreed that if the element of 'fascinosum' were eliminated the threat of non-being would have become dominant, i.e. obsessive, and would have tended to deteriorate into despair. Tillich felt that the ontological shock, i.e. dread of non-being, drove reason beyond detached analysis and controlling knowledge, confounding it with the mystery of its own depth. This depth was its participation in the ground of being.

Like Jaspers, Tillich felt that revelatory events were transparent, i.e. "sign-events." In such events reason became transparent toward its own depth and the ground of being which revealed the mystery of existence and one's ultimate concern. Also, like Jaspers, he agreed that the transcendent had broken into history on many occasions. Unlike him, however, Tillich contended that the ecstatic

encounter with the ground of being was characterized by the "holy," i.e. the divine, and further that a concrete final and universal revelation appeared in Jesus as the Christ. It was precisely at this point that Tillich could offer the theological answers to the philosophical questions. It was his position that when one was grasped by the truth of the revelatory event, it became final for him. If it were compared and contrasted with other revelatory events, then the sense of participation was replaced by detached analysis.

Tillich contended that final revelation had to be totally transparent to the mystery being revealed. Insofar as transparency was incomplete, the revelation would be historically relative. As a theologian, Tillich accepted Jesus, the Christ, as the final revelation. He felt that Jesus as the Christ was transparent to the ground of being, i.e. the divine presence (Immanuel or God with us). The crucifixion became the ultimate sign-event of sacrificing everything human to the divine. Tillich felt that the decisive factor was the self-surrender of the Jesus of Nazareth to Jesus as the Christ. Thus, self-sacrificing love was revealed as the divine imperative and the primary attitude of a Christian. The Christ-event was the revelation of God. Through the life of Jesus, one could encounter the mystery of the divine. However, such a judgment required a criterion. The criterion was the 'kerygma' of the Christian faith, i.e.

Jesus as the Christ. Thus, philosophical faith could be offered the content of the Christian faith when one's ultimate concern embraced the Christ-event, i.e. the New Being.

Because revelation involved receiving knowledge, it contained an element of risk. It could not rely on any empirical criteria to determine its verifiability. Yet, it brought a greater sense of authenticity because it involved the totality of personality. It was not merely confined to the cognitive. While it did not contradict the cognitive, it transcended it in depth. It brought an awareness of holiness. Thus, that which concerned man ultimately became the holy, i.e. the presence of the divine. As Tillich wrote,

> Faith is certain in so far as it is an experience of the holy. But faith is uncertain in so far as the infinite to which it is related is received by a finite being. This element of uncertainty in faith cannot be removed, it must be accepted. And the element in faith which accepts this is courage. Faith includes an element of immediate awareness which gives certainty and an element of uncertainty. To accept this is courage. In the courageous standing of uncertainty, faith shows most visibly its dynamic character.[1]

Whenever man committed himself to his ultimate concern, he had to courageously assume the risk. It became the greatest risk man could assume. If man's ultimate concern proved to be transitory, his meaning for life was annihilated, and he was left with despair. In such an encounter the threat of

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[1]Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958), p. 16.

non-being appeared victorious. It was precisely this notion which Sartre accepted. However, Tillich maintained that non-being presupposed being and could not become ultimate in and of itself. Non-being was a part of being-in-itself, i.e. God. Thus, man had to be willing to risk the threat of non-being in committing himself to his ultimate concern which could transcend the abyss of non-being by becoming transparent to being-in-itself.

The doubt which was involved in every risk was called "existential doubt." It was the persistent doubt within every existential truth which kept the person from making an idol of the concrete content. Through an act of courage, the person could accept the doubtful within his faith. At this point Tillich was agreeing with Marcel on the dangers of the fanaticized consciousness. Thus, that which concerned man ultimately always contained existential doubt to counter the anxiety of despair which occurred when finite being was mistaken for the ultimate. One had to always remain open to new revelation.

Because the divine life was viewed as dynamic every encounter with it contained an imperative to express and communicate what concerned one ultimately. Similar to Jaspers' cyphers, Tillich spoke of symbolic language in order to communicate those meanings which transcended the ordinary language structures. Tillich felt that symbols,

unlike signs, participated in the reality which they symbolized. Because of this quality, they opened new dimensions which were not available where the detachment of the subject/object consciousness prevailed. Thus, man's ultimate concern was expressed and communicated symbolically. He saw the fundamental symbol of the ultimate concern as God. As he stated,

> The fundamental symbol of our ultimate concern is God. It is always present in any act of faith even if the act of faith includes the denial of God. Where there is ultimate concern, God can be denied only in the name of God. One God can deny the other one. Ultimate concern cannot deny its own character as ultimate. Therefore, it affirms what is meant by the word "God." Atheism, consequently, can only mean the attempt to remove any ultimate concern--to remain unconcerned about the meaning of one's existence.[1]

If one asked Tillich, what does God symbolize?, he answered, God. Such a symbolic statement had the immediate experience of ultimacy as well as an ordinary experience which symbolized God within the concrete. Certainly, most of the historical symbolizations of man's ultimate concern took the form of myth. The only verification which Tillich offered for symbolic language was the adequacy with which it communicated and expressed one's ultimate concern. By adequate, he meant whether or not the expression created a reply or response. It had to convey both ultimacy and existential doubt. The expression could not seek to be

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[1] Ibid., p. 45.

exhaustive or final. Thus, an element of humility would accompany any authentic expression of ultimate concern, i.e. a spirit of love would prevail.

Tillich was careful to differentiate the symbolism of ultimate concern from scientific and aesthetic symbolism. It could neither be replaced by the aesthetic nor criticized by the scientific. Both of the latter may express something less than ultimate for the person. They may participate within the totality of one's experience but they represented more specialized levels of expression and communication. The validity of such expressions, as was pointed above, depended on the adequacy with which they expressed ultimacy. Every expression of ultimacy included a concrete medium through which the encounter was made possible. It was Tillich's contention that any piece of reality could convey man's ultimate concern. However, he was quick to point out that man had a tendency to identify the finite with the ultimate.

Those pieces of reality which became transparent to the divine were considered sacred. More often than not the sacred object was mistaken for the divine and treated or worshipped as if it were ultimate, i.e. idolatry. Thus, in the ecstatic encounter man was pulled out of the ordinary and idolatrous toward the holy and divine. He then attempted to express and communicate the mysterious in a symbolic language whose validity was determined by its

adequacy of expression. Tillich insisted that while the depth of reason could not be verified in the same manner as autonomous and technical reason, it would in no way be in contradiction with it. While understanding and meaning could have many dimensions, they would complement and integrate one another.

For Tillich, any expression of faith involved existential doubt. Only the idolatrous and fanatical would attempt to be absolute. However, in both instances self-sacrificing love was not the central ethical motif. It was characterized more by insistence of its own validity and ignored existential doubt. It proved to be neurotic because it became defensive of the threat of non-being and sought escape. Only a genuine encounter with ultimacy could transcend the threat and accompanying anxiety of non-being. Only a genuine encounter with the holy could allow man to emerge with an attitude of humility and a sense of worth. Such an encounter was based on a knowledge of participation and brought verification from the ultimate concern. He felt that any criterion for the truth of faith had to involve an element of self-negation. This was the reverse side of the notion of transparency. That which allowed one to look beyond could not hinder the vision. The best symbols had to negate their own ultimacy in order to adequately express the ultimate. Thus, he concluded that the cross

became the primary Christian symbol, i.e. the finite Jesus sacrificed his humanity for the divinity of the Christ.

The criterion contained a basic premise for faith which Tillich called the "Protestant Principle." It affirmed that one could not reject truth in any of its historical manifestations. No preconceived notions could be established which could exclude any media save idolatry. Idolatry appeared when any one person or group of persons claimed exclusive and final revelation of the ultimate. However, it was that very truth, i.e. the Protestant Principle, which Tillich felt was final and revealed in the self-sacrificing love of Jesus as the Christ, symbolized in the crucifixion.

The symbolism of the cross also demonstrated the element of courage which was involved in every act of genuine faith. As he so often pointed out, every act of faith involves a risk. When reason was combined with its depth, it involved both separation and participation. If only participation were involved, there would have been only knowledge and not faith, and reason would have become heteronomous. On the other hand, if only separation were involved, the ultimate concern would have been lost and reason would have become autonomous. Thus, faith required theonomous reason. Through participation, faith gained

certainty, and through separation, doubt was maintained. It was the element of existential doubt which raised the need for courage. It was Tillich's contention that courage never overcame doubt but persisted in the face of it through the conviction of faith. Where the integrative process of theonomous reason occurred, there was a transformation of that which had been alienated, i.e. the New Being. Thus, Jesus as the Christ was the New Being. As the New Being, Jesus as the Christ revealed the ground of being, i.e. the mystery of God. As Tillich stated,

> The religious word for what is called the ground of being is God. A major difficulty of any systematic theology is that it presupposes all other parts in each of its parts. A doctrine of God as the ground of revelation presupposes the doctrine of Being and God, which on the other hand, is dependent on the doctrine of revelation.[1]

As was stated above, Tillich used a similar ontological structure to the one used by Heidegger. However, he ended with radically different conclusions. Instead of concluding that finite being ('das Seiende') and being-in-itself ('Das Sein) presupposed non-being as Heidegger, Tillich concluded that being-itself, i.e. the ground of being, was logically prior to both finite being and non-being. It was Tillich's notion that non-being ('ouk on') was the negation of being and, hence, presupposed being. Thus, being-itself both

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[1]Tillich, Systematic Theology I, op. cit., p. 156.

included its negation as well as transcended it by including itself as well as its negation. Tillich argued that because being-itself was not a thing it had neither a beginning nor could it have an ending. Finite being, on the other hand, was intermingled with non-being and was considered to be in the process of coming from and moving toward non-being, i.e. finitude.

The basic question which naturally arose was how they could come out affirming opposite interpretations, i.e. Heidegger's atheism and Tillich's theistic answer, from the same presuppositions. Obviously, Tillich's answer was revelatory. Only from faith could man encounter the answer to his metaphysical questions. Only in the mystery revealed through man's encounter with ultimacy could man know God. Any condition short of the miracle of transparency left a predominance of doubt and autonomous reason. All efforts to answer questions from that condition left tentativeness, skepticism, agnosticism, and, ultimately, absurdity and despair. Through man's ultimate concern, he could be grasped by the power of being-itself. Such an encounter presupposed an attitude of openness toward the depth dimension of reason. Thus, like Buber, Tillich felt that God remained hidden from a subject/object structure of awareness, i.e. Buber's "I-it." When one had been grasped by the power of being-itself, it possessed the necessary courage to affirm one's being in the

midst of the threat of non-being.

Tillich felt that because man had the power of infinite self-transcendence, which questioned every finite condition, he belonged to being-itself as opposed to non-being, i.e. finitude. Man was motivated, according to Tillich, because of the anxiety which was involved in finitude. Anxiety was a response to the threat of non-being and was, therefore, ontological in structure. Unlike fear, which presupposed an object, anxiety had no object. Anxiety was always part of the human condition because that condition was finite and presupposed the threat of non-being. Yet, Tillich was careful to point out that there was a very important difference between the threat of non-being, i.e. its possibility, and its actualization. If one interpreted the threat of nonbeing as its actuality, despair would be inevitable. On the other hand, if one interpreted the threat as potential, he could entertain the possibility of being-itself as more fundamental than nonbeing. Thus, through the courage to be, one could affirm the power of being-itself in the face of threatening non-being. From that basis Tillich could argue that Sartre and, to a lesser extent, Heidegger had misinterpreted the meaning of meaninglessness, i.e. non-being.

Tillich felt that by identifying God with the ground of being that the traditional concerns and criteria for

divinity could be met. As being-itself, God transcended finitude as well as giving it its substance. God also exhausted all definitions which could be applied to him. The only nonsymbolic statement that could be affirmed about God was that he was being-itself. Because being-itself was the ground, i.e. isness, of all finite being, any being could become symbolic or transparent toward being-itself. God became personal as a result of being that about which a person became ultimately concerned. Thus, God had both an unapproachableness, which was characterized by his non-objectifiableness, and an approachableness through man's concern for ultimacy.

Tillich interpreted the meaning of Omnipotence as God's power to resist and conquer non-being. Omnipotence was a symbolic expression for the priority and power of being-itself. Because God transcended finitude and temporality, he could be said to be Omnitemporal, i.e. eternal. Likewise, the spatial was also transcended, allowing God to be Omnipresent. In a similar manner Tillich pointed out that because God both participated in the subject/object structure of reality as well as transcending it, he Omniscient.

In summary it can be seen that Tillich accepted a structure similar to both Heidegger and Jaspers. Like them, he analyzed being-itself into being, non-being, and the human being. Man partook of all three categories of being-itself.

Through self-relatedness, being-itself became conscious of itself as being and non-being through the human being. Through the threat of non-being, man was goaded to raise the basic metaphysical question of being. Once confronted with the ontological shock of non-being, man had to conquer his anxiety through the courage to be, i.e. authentic acceptance of the power of being-itself, or seek some neurotic defense against the anxiety, i.e. unauthenticity. Like Jaspers, he offered two dimensions to reason. Reason could either remain technical and autonomous as controlling knowledge or become transparent toward its depth as receiving knowledge through participation.

Through transparency, man could encounter the holy. However, every encounter with ultimacy involved existential doubt as well as the courage to act in the face of the risk implied in any act of faith. Knowledge gained through revelation was expressed in symbolic language and could only be verified by the adequacy with which it communicated one's ultimate concern. Despair was avoided by recognizing the difference between the threat of non-being and its actualization. When man encountered the power of being-itself, he could gain the necessary courage to act in the face of anxiety over the threat of non-being. Such courage brought about a transformation of the person and allowed a more authentic form of existence, i.e. the New Being.

The human condition as estrangement and sin. In discussing the difference between existentialism and essentialism, Tillich pointed out that to remain totally within the existential frame of reference could not elicit any answers to the questions posed in one's existence. It was his feeling that any answers presupposed some type of essentialism. At this point he was in agreement with the basic assumptions underlying the typological divisions in this inquiry. However, Tillich interpreted this to mean that existentialism could not be divided into atheistic and theistic types. One could be an existentialist only so long as he analyzed the human predicament and raised the metaphysical questions implied in existence. However, one ceased being existential the moment he offered answers involving his ultimate concern. Thus, theistic and atheistic existentialism presupposed essentialism and transcended the knowledge available within the conditions of existence.

On the surface such a notion appeared to undercut one of the basic assumptions used in this inquiry. However, Tillich's distinction between existentialism and essentialism involved a subtle glossing of the facts. The fundamental question involved was why, when the existential questions were asked in one manner did they merely encounter the dread of Nothingness, i.e. the threat of non-being (atheism), and, if asked in another manner did they encounter the power of

being-itself which stimulated the courage to conquer the anxiety of non-being (theistic). All the theists seemed to be implying that the available answers were conditioned by the attitude with which they were asked. If such were the case, it would be difficult to understand how anyone could introduce any radical cleavage between the essential and the existential. If the implied dualism were complete, the theistic position would be reduced to supernaturalism.

All of the men included in this study felt that the human condition was best characterized as a fallen condition. Tillich interpreted the fall as a "transition from essence to existence."[1] He felt that the key for understanding the meaning involved in the transition was finite freedom. Through freedom, man was capable of turning away from God. This was both a strength and a weakness. Tillich defined man's prior essential condition as "dreaming innocence." Dreaming within this context emphasized the potentiality, i.e. the non-actual, while innocence implied the lack of moral guilt. In order to move from dreaming innocence an awakening was required on the part of man. Man was tempted by the lure of existence to actualize his potentiality and accept his responsibility.

Unfortunately, many theologians in the past attempted to paint the condition of dreaming innocence as a state of

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[1]Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 29.

perfection. However, for Tillich, such a notion was untenable. It, likewise, made any notion of the fall through temptation utterly absurd and nonsensical. What lack within perfection could be tempted? From Tillich's point of view potentiality could not be considered as perfection. Only the conscious union of essence and existence, i.e. God, could be perfect. For Tillich, Adam in paradise was an undecided potentiality. It was the choice between remaining in a state of dreaming innocence or of becoming actualized in existence which constituted the basis of finite freedom. Man was torn between the desire to remain in dreaming innocence or assume the responsibility of actualization. The resulting tension, i.e. loss of actualization or dreaming innocence, left man in a condition of anxiety. Man's decision to become actual, i.e. the transition from essence to existence, was assumed by Tillich as an original fact. This was substantiated by the fact that man does exist and the world is with him.

Accompanying the anxiety of finitude or existence was the ontological guilt over the loss of innocence. The state of fallenness was a condition of estrangement brought about by the desire of man to exist. In such a condition man was estranged from the ground of his being. However, the estranged condition was not a complete separating of

man's existential and essential being. Were it not the case, there would have been no grounds for postulating ontological guilt or any authentic justification for the threat of non-being. Anxiety over the threat of the inevitable would be sheer folly. While estrangement belonged to the given, Tillich insisted that man had to assume the responsibility for his freely chosen condition, i.e. "sin."

Tillich saw estrangement and sin in terms of unbelief, Concupiscence and 'hubris.' He interpreted unbelief as man's turning away from God. Through the desire to become self-actualized, man turned from his essential nature, i.e. potentiality. Thus, man could no longer cognitively participate in God as the conscious unity of essence and existence. When man was capable of asking existential questions which involved his ultimate concern, he both presupposed his relation to (participation) and estrangement from (detachment) essence. The turning away from God was a turning toward oneself, i.e. autocentric perception. A further indication of the separation was involved in the evolvement of the external law which demanded obedience. This implied a separation between the will of God and the intentions of man. In the face of estrangement faith took on the characteristics of an "in spite of" attitude. Man

could assert through the courage to be that God accepted him in spite of his decision to become actual. The disruption between man and God in the transition from essence to existence did not merely devaluate man in terms of his weakness in the face of temptation. Such a self-degrading attitude would have viewed the estrangement as complete and led to despair. It had to be seen also as a strength on the part of man. It was, indeed, not a weak creature who could turn away from the ground of his being.

The process of turning away from God was the sin of unbelief. The process of turning toward oneself as the center of one's being constituted the sin of 'hubris.' It was to 'hubris' that man fell into unbelief. However, this immediately raised the question as to why man was tempted to turn away from his center in God. Why was man tempted to elevate the significance of his own finitude to the ultimate? Tillich felt that the answer to such a question was centered in man's location between finitude and the infinite. Once man had fallen from the whole, he had the desire for reunion and completeness. Tillich characterized such a desire as "concupiscence." It had its origin in man's finitude and particularity and his striving for universality and wholeness. However, when man viewed himself as the center of the universe, freedom became arbitrary in the

Sartrean sense, i.e. one meaning being as valid as any other. As Tillich pointed out,

> When man makes himself the center of the universe, freedom loses its definiteness. Indefinitely and arbitrarily, freedom turns to objects, persons, and things which are completely contingent upon the choosing subject and which therefore can be replaced by others of equal contingency and ultimate unrelatedness. Existentialism, supported by depth psychology, described the dialectics of this situation in terms of the restlessness, emptiness, and meaninglessness connected with it. If no essential relation between a free agent and his objects exists, no choice is objectively preferable to any other; no commitment to a cause or a person is meaningful; no dominant purpose can be established.[1]

Thus, according to Tillich, any philosophy which remained purely existential, i.e. separated from the ground of being (essential being), would inevitably end in absurdity and despair.

In the condition of estrangement man was also cut off from participation in his own essence. Such a condition shut man within himself and made participation impossible. He either found himself falling under the power of objects which tended to objectify him or else he separated himself from the objective and was swallowed up in the emptiness and loneliness of his own subjectivity. Often fallen man tended to escape loneliness by being absorbed within the impersonal collective. However, as Tillich

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[1] Ibid., p. 63.

pointed out, psychology and sociology have often discovered the loneliness which still prevailed with the individuals who made up the collective. When individualization was separated from participation, man was dehumanized and objectified.

Because man belonged to the finite, he was under the domination of death. It was Tillich's contention that vital Christianity had never stated that man was naturally anything other than mortal. He interpreted the Genesis myth as meaning that man was eternal to the extent that he participated in the eternal. Only when he ate of the tree of life could he dwell in the eternal life. Participating in the eternal made man eternal. When man was separated from the eternal, he was mortal and finite. In the condition of estrangement man was left to the finite and cut off from eternal life. Because the atheistic existentialist elevated the finite to the ultimate, they found death as the cause of the chronic anxiety which reduced all human meaning to absurdity and the feeling of despair.

As Tillich pointed out, despair was more characteristic of the human predicament than death. It was a chronic condition of conflict between what man could potentially become and what he actually was. Because of estrangement and sin, man realized that he was responsible for his own

loss of meaning. Through sin, man had become autocentric and embedded within himself. It was from such a realization that the question of suicide arose. Through suicide, one contemplated the possibility of removing the conditions of existence. The same urge also appeared when one sought rest from his perennial longings and conflicts. Short of actual physical suicide man sought escape through narcotics, hypnotics, and intoxicants, all of which had self-negation as the primary goal. Tillich was willing to grant that suicide could end or escape despair at the level of finitude, but he raised the question as to whether or not it did so at the level of the ultimate.

Tillich felt that the feeling of despair could be understood in the symbol of the "wrath of God." He was careful not to fall into the fallacy of creating God in man's image by making him susceptible to the human emotions of wrath and anger. He interpreted God's love as that which stood in judgment of man's sin. God continued to love and accept man even though he had freely chosen to turn away from the ground of his being. Likewise, one could speak of the symbolism of "condemnation." It was not an eternal damnation of man. Quite to the contrary, man was cut off from the eternal. He could no longer participate in the divine life as long as he persisted in his sin.

For Tillich, despair was not final. There was a

striving and questing on the part of man to transcend his predicament. Man's discontent with the purely finite caused him to search for a new existence. He still belonged to potentiality as well as existence. He was estranged from his ground of being but, nonetheless, he was still a child of God. He had the ability to penetrate the depths of reason and transform the objectified and estranged world. This historical symbol of the Messiah (Christ) testified to the Judeo-Christian quest for the incarnation of the New Being.

Thus, Tillich saw the human condition as one of estrangement and sin. Through sin, man had chosen to turn away from God (unbelief) and through autocentricity ('hubris') become self-actualized, i.e. a loss of dreaming innocence. This condition created a tension, resulting in anxiety between what man could potentially become and what he was in actuality. If the resulting anxiety were taken as ultimate, it could lead to despair, escape, or suicide, or it could lead to a questing and searching for a more authentic type of being. When the finite was taken as ultimate, death filled one with dread. Likewise, one was caught within oneself and cut off from others as well as God, leaving one empty and lonely. However, dread, anxiety, emptiness, and loneliness pointed beyond themselves toward that from which man had turned away, i.e. the ground of his being. They were indications of a lacking and incompleteness. Man could either find

the courage to be or seek escape. Despair was only possible to a being that was essentially more than its existence would allow or imply. Hence, questions were raised which presupposed an essence beyond the existence, questions which goaded man to quest for a New Being.

The solution to the human condition as the quest for the New Being and Jesus as the Christ. The major mark of fallenness was estrangement. In such a condition man was separated from the ground of his being, i.e. his essence. In order to be reconciled with his essence there had to be a transformation of his being. This was characterized by a quest for a New Being which could reunite the essential and existential elements of man. In other words, the New Being conquered existential estrangement. In so doing the New Being made faith possible. Through man's ultimate concern, he could affirm the power of the New Being. For the Christian the New Being appeared under the conditions of existence in Jesus of Nazareth, i.e. Jesus as the Christ. Tillich felt that faith could only guarantee the revelation of the New Being as far as its own ultimate concern was involved. However, it could not guarantee that Jesus of Nazareth was the name of the historical figure who revealed the New Being under the conditions of existence. At the point of man's ultimate concern the Christ (symbol for the

New Being) appeared. However, due to the existential doubt, involved in every affirmation of faith, the exact characteristics and personality traits of the historical figure remained questionable.

Because ordinary fallen existence was brought to a close, Jesus as the Christ could be said to have ushered in the new eon. One could speak of the biblical reference of a new age as well as the end of time. For Tillich, the christological problem arose as soon as man became aware of his existential predicament and sought a new condition which transcended his estrangement. Such an answer indirectly implied an awareness on the part of man of his essence. For such an answer to have been intelligible, it would have had to appear under the conditions of existence. For it to have been significant, it would have had to maintain its unity with the ground of being. It was at this point that Tillich became most resoundingly a theologian. He accepted the Christian answer of Jesus as the Christ, i.e. the New Being.

In line with the traditional form of the christological arguments, it was necessary to show that Jesus as the Christ could in actuality conquer the estrangement between essence and existence. In one sense Jesus as the Christ had to assume the universality of estrangement without yielding to the temptation of sin and its consequent guilt. Tillich

maintained that at no point did Jesus as the Christ turn away from God in unbelief. He did not become autocentric ('hubris'). He became transparent toward the will of God and sacrificed all that was existentially Jesus of Nazareth to what was essentially Jesus as the Christ. By not assuming himself to be the center of his own existence, he did not fall into the sin of concupiscence. Thus, while Jesus as the Christ partook of universal estrangement, he never cut himself off from his dreaming innocence as potentiality. He assumed his responsibility for the actualization of potential values without idolatrizing any of them. Even the value of existence itself was willingly sacrificed toward his ultimate concern, i.e. God.

Tillich was also concerned to point out the marks of finitude in Jesus' life. Like all other human beings, he was "thrown into existence." He had to face anxiety and death. He had to battle the foes of communication, i.e. misunderstanding, as well as personal rejection. He had to face the hostility of the political and religious leaders and the disappointment of betrayal, the mockery of an emotionally enraged trial, and the agonizing death of crucifixion. Yet, he remained loyal to what seemed ultimate in his faith.

As the church gradually evolved a dogma, it was plagued by the inadequacy of expression and communication

of the 'kerygma' of the faith. Like every other historical institution, it had to communicate within the thought forms of its generation. As Tillich stated,

> In order to be received, the church had to use the forms of life and thought which were created by the various sources of Hellenism and which coalesced at the end of the ancient world. Three of them were of outstanding importance for the Christian church: the mystery cults, the philosophical schools, and the Roman state. Christianity adapted itself to all of them. It became a mystery cult, a philosophical school, and a legal system. But it did not cease to be an assembly based on the message that Jesus is the Christ.[1]

Tillich accepted that while the church had to apologetically reinterpret itself in each generation, it did so in order to express and communicate the meaning of the 'kerygma,' i.e. Jesus as the Christ. In so doing he felt that he maintained the traditional contribution of the early church, namely, that the existential Jesus and the essential Christ are preserved. Through Jesus as the Christ, the unity between God and man was reestablished. By remaining open to the depth of reason, Jesus maintained the ecstatic element of reason's ability to transcend any finite meaning, i.e. theonomous reason.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Tillich's position in relation to this inquiry was his notion of the universal significance of Jesus as the Christ. He felt that

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[1] Ibid., p. 141.

the central symbol for Christ's subjection to existence was the cross. The central symbol for Christ's conquest of estrangement was the resurrection. Tillich saw the symbols as interdependent. While the former was open for possible historical observation and study, the latter was veiled in the mysterious experience of a few devoted followers. Those followers found something in his life which revealed a mysterious divine essence. It contained a challenge and imperative to follow and preach the "good news" of the Christ's appearance. In his life they encountered the New Being and found the power of the courage to be. In and through his life they encountered God.

It was stated above that Tillich felt that the language of the New Being was necessarily mythological and symbolic. It was a language which transcended the ordinary language structures of the subject/object world. It was the language through which man could communicate and express his knowledge through participation and its consequent affect on his perceptions which were formerly distorted by unauthentic interpretations of reality. Tillich saw the cross as the central symbolic expression of Jesus' subjection to existence. Through the cross, Christ suffered the bonds of finitude and death. However, it also broke the chains of autocentric sin and its subsequent guilt, i.e. forgiveness, by not breaking the first commandment against idolatry. It

manifested the divine attitude of self-sacrificing love. Such a self-sacrifice turned Jesus from himself toward the ground of his being. Likewise, the idolatry of those who sought to destroy him was revealed. The cross marked his openness and the rulers and mobs narrowness. However, precisely at the point where the rulers were unauthentically preserving their concerns, i.e. gods, they were revealing the divine mystery of love through the authentic concern of Jesus as the Christ.

The second great symbol of the resurrection pointed toward Christ's victory over the estranged conditions of existence. The tragedy which surrounded the crucifixion brought the disciple face to face with absurdity and the threat of meaninglessness and despair. Yet, the miraculous reassurance of Jesus as the Christ transformed their despair into the courage to be, the courage to witness for the strength of their convictions. The resurrection was symbolic of the triumph of being over non-being, of the meaningfulness of the apparent meaninglessness. Had Jesus sought to preserve his life, he would have fallen sway to the sinful desire to preserve one's unauthentic ambitions and distorted meanings. Through the death of the unauthentic, man was born or transformed into the New Being, i.e. the allocentric and authentic self. As one turned toward his autocentric self which cut man off from the ground of his being, he was confined within

the finite. When he found release from such existence through the revelation of the New Being, he had the opportunity of participating in eternal life, i.e. salvation.

Through the symbolism of the resurrection, man encountered the eternal. Man could shatter the dreadfulness of death by participating in the divine life. When reality was viewed entirely from the finite distortions of unauthentic perception, death spelled the triumph of non-being over being. If such were really the case, man should not have had any genuine sense of despair. Only a being who felt that more should be available should have been disturbed by the possibility of nothing. Thus, Tillich felt that when one asserted the ultimacy of being-itself over non-being that one could gain the necessary courage to be. If being were merely left in a struggle with non-being (Sartre), then death would offer no way out for man's projected meanings. However, when the threat was viewed as possible rather than inevitable (Jaspers), the resulting attitude was drastically altered. When being-itself was viewed as ultimate (Tillich), the attitude was altered from despair and tentativeness to courage and assurance.

Through the New Being, man could be reconciled with the ground of his being. It created a condition in which man was willing to courageously accept the risk and personal

responsibility for the actualization of meaning and value while remaining open toward new potentialities. Man was never to make an idol of his finite meanings and values. He was always to penetrate the surface and create from the depth of his encounter with the ultimate. The religious life was characterized by a striving toward the unity of potential and the actual. While God was felt to be the perfect union, man was always striving under the conditions of existence. Thus, to become like God in terms of unity was seen as the virtue of the "good life." While man was to actualize meaning and value, he was to remain open to his potentiality. However, to attempt to play God by seeing oneself as the essence of existence was sinful. The attitude of openness was also lost in autocentrism. When man became autocentric, he reduced others to objects within his own finite 'gestalten.' Their value was derived from their usefulness in terms of need reduction. However, if man treated others, as well as objects, as potential revelatory medias, he could treat them as ends rather than means.

Man's striving to become like God gave him a dynamic structure. He was always in a process of becoming actualized. With each new actualization, he was confronted with infinite new possibilities. It was his responsibility to decide which of many alternatives he would attempt to make actual. This introduced both a creative as well as a

demonic and tragic element into man's decisions under the conditions of existence. Because of the qualities of finitude, some meanings and values could not be actualized simultaneously. Likewise, one could not be certain that he had chosen wisely. Only through courageous faith could man muster the power to commit himself to the creative process. He always ran the risk of initiating a tragic sequence of events, i.e. non-being. Yet, this threat could be conquered in the knowledge of the power of being to persist in the face of non-being.

Criticism and evaluation of Tillich's position. Tillich apparently accepted a fundamental assumption concerning man's ability to understand, express, and communicate his encounter with reality. He seemed to be saying that every understanding, expression, and communication of an encounter with being-itself through autonomous reason alone was inadequate to the depth dimensions. This also raised another fundamental assumption, namely, that adequate expression was desirable. Man could not be content to express and communicate his encounter in an inadequate form, i.e. autonomous reason and ordinary language. When man did attempt to remain content, he was shocked by the threat of non-being which forced him to reevaluate his meanings. However, such an experience did not merely force him back on himself. It also involved the revelation of a mystery which

transcended the threat of non-being. Through ontological shock, reason was called out (ecstatic) of complacency to a more immediate awareness of reality which transcended the subject/object structure of estranged existence. Yet, all this occurred within the self-consciousness of being-itself. Like Heidegger, Tillich accepted the givenness of the self-consciousness of being-itself out of the differentiation and contrast of being and non-being. Also, like Heidegger, he felt that when the finite meanings were confronted with the ultimate their unauthenticity was felt as personal and a sense of guilt arose.

Similar to Heidegger and Jaspers, Tillich accepted the givenness of estrangement and defined sin as that attempt to reconcile oneself to the condition of estrangement. Once man accepted his responsibility for attempting to remain unauthentic, he was filled with guilt. It was anxiety combined with guilt which lead to ultimate despair. Anxiety did not become associated with dread until it was felt to be inevitable and final. When the threat of non-being became final through death, man felt responsible for the inevitability of his condition, i.e. absurdity. On the other hand, when man could accept his responsibility and actualize a more authentic condition, he could conquer the paralyzing affect of anxiety. Thus, through the ontological shock of non-being, man was faced with the anxiety of

unauthenticity and the guilt of personal responsibility. Both of these pointed toward a deeper participation in the essential authenticity of the divine life, i.e. being-itself. Through the New Being, man could be reconciled with the authentic center of his being. Man was, therefore, saved from himself by surrender toward God. His unauthentic self was sacrificed for the emerging authentic self.

While Tillich accepted Jesus as the Christ, he shared a common problem with Marcel. Tillich admitted that the theologian had to assume the risk of faith in his ultimate convictions. Certainly, Jesus as the Christ could be said to fit the major criterion of verification for a statement of faith, i.e. the adequacy with which it expressed the content of one's ultimate concern. However, nothing prevented any one of a number of historical figures from becoming the media of the New Being. Yet, it is questionable as to whether or not certainty in the fundamentalist sense of the term is desirable. Such certainty would be unauthentic and point toward the neurotic fanaticized consciousness which Marcel so accurately noted.

Perhaps the biggest problem presented by Tillich's position was what Sartre insisted was a contradiction, i.e. that God was the conscious union of potentiality and actuality. Like Sartre, Tillich seemed to be saying that, with estrangement, striving appeared as the result of a loss

of certain potentiality, i.e. lacking. However, the striving was not viewed as the attempt to become self-sufficient except as a form of sin. To become self-sufficient would have been a denial of finitude, i.e. unauthenticity. This latter situation would have led to perpetual dissatisfaction and inevitable failure. Because Sartre chose the latter interpretation, he was correct in his subsequent analysis. However, Tillich argued that the analysis was essentially correct but the premise was fallacious. When the striving was understood as the potential to create new meaning and value, man was motivated into the unknown as an adventure with challenging possibilities for growth and development. When he failed to accept the creative challenge, he encountered emptiness, stagnation, boredom, and a feeling of worthlessness.

The question as to whether or not God could be both potential as well as actual involved another misinterpretation on the part of Sartre. He was correct in the sense that a being could not both be lacking and self-sufficient at the same time. However, to be both actual and potential are not necessarily contradictive modalities. God could both include all that was actual at any given moment as well as all that is potential in light of what is actual at the same moment. He could be limited in his potentiality by what is actual and limited in his actuality by what is

possible. It would become contradictive and absurd if he were thought to be potentially what he could not actually be or actualize what is not potential. Only when the attributes or modes were defined as either/or were they mutually exclusive. Likewise, such contradictions could arise when purely finite meanings and definitions were applied to the infinite.

Theological expression often carried a paradoxical quality. This quality pointed more toward man's inability to express and communicate the divine than any inherent duplicity within the divine nature. When the "otherness" of God was taken as absolute separation, agnosticism or supernaturalism resulted. When it was dissolved, atheism and humanism resulted on the one hand or pantheism on the other. Tillich insisted that the tension between separation and participation and between potentiality and actuality had to be maintained. Thus, God was seen as the "wholly other" ('ganz andere') at the point of transcendent separation and as immanent as participation in the ground of being. As transcendent, God was potentiality, and as immanent, he was actuality. However, God participated directly in the evil of estrangement in his immanence. He could transcend the evil of non-being through the power of his own being, i.e. being-itself. Because non-being presupposed being, God was both threatened by non-being and

glorified by it. He was threatened by annihilation and glorified by his continued victory over it.

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THEISTIC EXISTENTIALISM

The big question mark which gradually developed within this inquiry centered on how existentialism could lead to either atheism or theism. Did the atheists actually use the same starting point as the theists? If they did, how could they arrive at opposite conclusions? If theydid not, could both approaches really be considered existential or was one merely disguised as such? Or, perhaps, it was less a problem of presuppositions and more a problem of interpreting the meaning of the knowledge which was derived from such assumptions. The latter notion seemed to come nearer to the heart of the matter. All of the men in this study accepted the threat of non-being and absurdity. All accepted a distinction between an authentic attitude toward existence and an unauthentic one. However, Sartre seemed to be saying that an honest appraisal of existence leads to absurdity. He maintained that the Nothingness of 'pour-soi' became final in death. Because lacking was characterized by a striving to become self-sufficient, death spelled the final inability to become self-sufficient. Likewise, the inherent contradiction within 'en-soi-pour-soi' meant perpetual inadequacy and frustration. Man, indeed, could

not be anything less or more than absurd, i.e. a useless passion. Thus, because of Sartre's phenomenological approach, non-being conquered being.

Heidegger, on the other hand, saw Nothingness related more to finitude. Also, it appeared to be related to that which utterly transcended any finite meaning and value 'gestalten.' When 'Dasein' realized its finitude through death, it could become aware of that which transcended the perpetual flux of time, i.e. the permanent or constant. That which both included and transcended 'das seiende' and 'Dasein' was 'Das Sein.' Thus, Being-in-itself was more ultimate than that which was finite and revealed itself as No-thingness, i.e. the unobjectifiable. Heidegger could offer man nothing more than an authentic realization of his finite existence and its meaningless efforts to project inadequate meanings. Both Sartre and Heidegger could only offer despair as a final word. In Sartre, man was attempting to do the impossible and, in Heidegger, he was attempting to understand the incomprehensible. However, anything less than doing the absurd was unauthentic. Yet, Heidegger left the door open when he made Being-in-itself more comprehensive than being and non-being.

It was the notion of comprehensiveness which captured the imagination of Jaspers. He also recognized the finitude of 'Dasein.' However, he also realized that the transcendent

qualities of being's comprehensiveness were not without meaning for man's 'Existenz.' It offered man an authentic attitude toward all of the meanings which he projected into his world. However, they were not verifiable in any universal sense. Through encounter with the transcendent, man could discern certain truths which he felt were valid for his own life and gave him a more comprehensive meaning for his 'Existenz.' It was out of such depths that man encountered his fullest and richest meanings. Thus, non-being became the basic quality and substance of the Comprehensive. Its meaningful nothingness created an anguish which called man from 'Dasein' toward 'Existenz.' This call was interpreted by Camus as a revolt against the "absurd walls."

Camus, perhaps, more than any of the others felt the impelling urgence of man's struggle with the threat of absurdity. He refused to merely stoically accept the absurdity of human existence. He felt both the alienation of everyday awareness as well as a longing weariness for a fuller participation in nature. He was convinced that man had cut himself off from his vital sources of creativity and his solidarity. When man encountered absurdity and meaninglessness, he was either challenged to rebel in the name of honesty and lucidity or seek escape through unauthenticity. The latter was a coward who committed one or more types of suicide and, thereby, gave into the absurd. Through revolt,

man brought to actualization certain irreducible values which challenged him to courageous and compassionate action. Through revolt, man was driven beyond the paralyzing affects of anxiety and despair. Through a change in attitude, man was enabled to transform anxiety from an end to a means for carrying on more meaningful action. Thus, like Jaspers, Camus saw anxiety goading man as opposed to paralyzing and turning him inward, i.e. autocentricity. Anxiety could either turn man away from that which appeared as a threat, i.e. defensiveness, or he could see it as a challenge which called him outward in the name of irreducible values, i.e. allocentric actualization. Camus made a plea for all men to rise up in the name of authenticity against those forces which threatened to reduce man to absurdity.

Martin Buber amplified various themes which appeared in the previous authors. He identified the transcendent with the divine life, i.e. God. He also championed the notion that God was not dead but had been eclipsed from view through the sin of absolutizing the I-it form of consciousness. Because Sartre never really transcended such an attitude, people were always reducing others to mere objects (an it) as opposed to meeting them as subjects (a thou). Only when man assumed the I-Thou relationship was he able to move beyond the structures of objectification and

depersonalization. Likewise, when the world was viewed in such a manner, the divine life was revealed. Because God could never become an object, he was forever hidden from the I-it form of awareness and was for all practical and empirical purposes dead. When man was cut off from his relations with God and other men, he existed unauthentically and encountered the guilt of sin, anxiety, and despair. His life became empty and meaningless. When man encountered the world through the I-Thou attitude, it was no longer alien and meaningless. Buber felt that man gained a sense of trust and security which allowed him greater freedom to explore and create. As a person emerged toward authenticity, he gained a sense of confidence. The more man freed himself from the bondage of his defensive autocentric attitudes, the more fully he could participate in the totality of reality. As man changed his attitude from the curiosity involved in the I-it concern for understanding, he could assume the I-Thou attitude of meaning and the appreciation of value. When man's total being was responding to ultimate reality, there was a 'numinous' sense of the holy.

The I-it and I-thou attitudes were quite similar to what Marcel meant by primary and secondary levels of reflection. He attempted to show that the constancy which Heidegger mentioned in 'Das Sein' was God. The security and stability which man felt when he was open to the divine

life was his relationship with God. It was the ground of hope as opposed to despair which appeared whenever man was cut off from being-in-itself. Marcel, like Bergson, recognized the abstraction process involved in the reflective level of consciousness. Such reflection glossed over the relationships of participation by accentuating the elements of contrast and differentiation, i.e. objectification. While it illuminated structure, it alienated the structure from its context. Only at the secondary level of reflection could man attempt to reintegrate that which had been estranged. Likewise, the mysterious dimensions of the whole were infused once more with the abstractions of primary reflection. Unless such a process were accomplished, man would have an unauthentic conception of reality. He would also be dishonest with himself and others in attempting to ignore that which was suffused in the initial encounter with reality.

Tillich agreed that man had to be aware of the tendency of reason to become either autonomous or heteronomous. Only when reason was transparent to its depth, i.e. theonomous reason, could man encounter the mystery of the divine life and be drawn back to the ground of his existence and participate in the New Being. However, he was careful to insist that one had ceased being existential the moment he identified the ground of being with God. In one sense it was a rather insignificant distinction. Seemingly, the

theistic existentialists were trying to say that, if one were really attempting to be authentic and honest with themselves, they would be led to the realization that being-itself was more comprehensive than being and non-being, i.e. finitude. God became the mythological and symbolic term for being-itself. More important was the affect it had on the person who maintained authentic perceptions of reality. It could be argued that all types of existentialism have the same starting point but vary in the degree of penetration into the depth dimensions of being-itself.

The theistic group could quickly point out that Sartre attempted to absolutize the finite and ended in despair because he was willing to ignore man's relationships with being-itself. In so doing they would have insisted that he was being unauthentic and sinful and would have felt the pangs of guilt and helplessness when confronted with the dread of Nothingness. Such loss of potency would have tended to be accompanied by the psychosomatic visceral responses (nausea) of rejection and revulsion. Only a being who had fallen short of his expectations and self-concept would have responded in such a manner. Such self-devaluation tended to become pathological. It reflected a catastrophic fear of rejection and abandonment. The feelings of inadequacy and the resulting hostilities were either turned on

oneself or projected to others with the consequent paranoic reaction of the "Other's stare." The attitudes tended to be distorted by strong dependency needs which were masochistically denied, leaving loneliness, dread, and despair.

The theistic group argued for that "call" which prompted man's anxiety. It suggested the inadequacy of remaining confined within the meaning and value structures of 'Das Man' which sought the impersonal and universal. It cried out for a richer and fuller 'Existenz' which opened man for a more authentic encounter with ultimate reality. It called on man to actualize new meanings and values which had been all but smothered under the press for conformity. The anxiety of dissatisfaction challenged man's embeddedness and impelled him back toward emergence and ongoingness, i.e. maturation through actualization. Thus, the theists saw man in the process of moving away from embeddedness and dependency (autocentrism) through anxiety toward freedom, responsibility, and self-actualization (allocentrism). It was a movement toward allocentric interdependence and away from autocentric independence. It was characterized by a movement toward others (love) as opposed to away (withdrawal) or against (aggression) them.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS, FORMULATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

The very breadth and depth of existentialism hinted at in this inquiry pointed toward many avenues of fruitful study. In conclusion three such avenues were chosen for their relevance to an Orthodox Christian understanding of man as well as their particular interest to the author. However, it was not intended to exhaust these avenues but merely to assist in stimulating further interest and study on the part of the reader. This chapter was divided into three divisions: (1) philosophical and thematic structures of existentialism; (2) religious experience, and the existential-ethical imperative; and (3) existential psychopathogenesis.

The section on the philosophical and thematic structures of existentialism was not intended to repeat what has already been stated as the basic presuppositions of each author included in this study, but rather to state in summary form the general philosophical themes developed by the authors. The second division attempted to correlate the criteria established in the field of "Religionswissenschaft" regarding the religious experience with man's existential encounter with being-in-itself and its imperative

to take ethical action. The third division was a consideration of the existential interpretation of man and his society in relationship to the origin and development of psychopathology.

I. PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEMATIC STRUCTURES OF EXISTENTIALISM

Perhaps the most fundamental notion which characterized existentialism was its distinction between what it meant "to exist" and "to be." Through ecstatic reason, man could separate himself from being-in-itself, and through the subject/object awareness, man could exist ('existere'), stand forth. Man was capable of standing outside of being-in-itself in ecstatic detachment. In so doing, man was free from absorption into unconscious being and free toward self-conscious existence. However, "to exist" did not exclude "to be." The existentialists included in this study agreed that "to exist" left something to be desired on the part of man. The transition from essence to existence was possible only through freedom which introduced responsibility. Thus, man moved from a potential unconscious automation toward a conscious, free, and responsible individual.

Through differentiation, contrast, comparison, and reflection, man created both himself and his world out of an encounter with being-in-itself. In the objectification process, various aspects of being also entered into existence

by virtue of man's awareness and use of them. As a consequence of man's existence, he was free to project his own meanings onto the objects of his awareness. As primitive self-consciousness gradually emerged from the collective unconscious, the world was infused with mythological enchantment. However, as the objectifying processes of reason were honed to razor-sharp preciseness, the mythological consciousness, which had maintained an openness toward the depth of existence, was stripped away and only the empirical skeleton remained. Existentialism could be viewed as a reaction against those forces which threatened to depersonalize and dehumanize man by losing sight of the depth dimensions.

However, contrary to many critics, the existentialists were not anti-reason. They were concerned over its attempt to monopolize one's perception. They felt that the method by which scientific truths were verified often left man with an unauthentic attitude toward his own being and the ultimacy of existence. When man assumed such attitudes, he introduced a distortion into his perceptual response system. He viewed himself exclusively as an object within objectified existence. He lost sight of his roots in being-in-itself. In so doing, he became alienated from the ground of his being. Because subject/object awareness allowed man to stand forth from being, it endowed him with transcendence. Man was capable of transcending any given spatio-temporal

situation including its projected meanings. Thus, the objects within the world participated in existence to the degree that they were meaningfully present in man's existence.

The existentialists implied that there was a quality of being which insisted on recognition when confronting the perceptual structures of man under the conditions of existence. The encounter between man and being was dynamic, urgent, and transforming. There was also a tendency on the part of man to clothe his world in static and rigid meanings which offered a type of unauthentic familiarity. The 'gestalten' which was developed in order to orient man in this alienated world was always threatened by the unobjectifiable dynamism of being-in-itself. Man was confronted with the imperative to create new meanings and assume new attitudes which could more adequately express and communicate the impelling persistence of being-in-itself to mysteriously elude the subject/object consciousness. When one persisted in using autonomous reason and its derivative meaning structures, one encountered a threatening quality to the persistence of being-in-itself to remain itself. It constantly reminded man of the inadequacy of his finite meanings. It, also, goaded him to the realization that he was free and consequently responsible for the meanings and values he projected. Man had to freely choose whether or not he would

accept his freedom or attempt to escape or deny it. If he chose to deny it, he was acting unauthentically and dishonestly. Likewise, it was absurd to use one's freedom in the escape and denial of freedom.

Man was faced with the choice of becoming that which he chose to become. Existence involved a perpetual transcending of any given set of conditions. When man encountered that which transcended his subject/object perception, which possessed the power of being-in-itself, he needed no objective verification. Yet, while it needed no verification, it became the pivotal point between the atheistic and theistic types of existentialism. It was either viewed as an irrational Nothingness which threatened to reduce all meaning to absurdity and become final in death, or else it was felt to be the nonrational encounter with the divine which could make all things (objects) new, i.e. offer an expanded and more integrative meaning for reality. Both the atheists and the theists agreed that such an encounter was necessary for man in order for him to sense his unauthenticity.

The realization of authenticity brought anguish and guilt. These could become either pathological or motivate man to rebel against his existing conditions and alter his attitudes. In either case man had to commit himself to a course of action. Either he had to devise various defenses against that which threatened his existence and remain

embedded in his unauthenticity, or else he had to be willing to courageously champion those "irreducible values" which respected the impelling force of being-in-itself. In either case, man had to freely choose one or the other. In Camus' sense, the former would amount to suicide and the latter to revolt. The "irreducible values" led to a passionate commitment which was felt to be authentic.

The encounter with being-in-itself and its subsequent passion to rebel against the unauthentic left two basic questions which had to be resolved. The first centered on how one could be certain as to whether or not he had encountered anything which could be verified as genuinely transcendent and comprehensive. Secondly, what were those attitudes involved in one's passionate rebellion against the unauthentic. These two questions were examined in sections II and III below.

Many critics have questioned the existentialist definition of existence. J. M. Spier pointed out, that because Existentialism was a reduction philosophy, it was guilty of an oversimplification of the problem of being.[1] It also became evident that the existentialists gave a rather exaggerated role to philosophy in comparison to many

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[1]J. M. Spier, Christianity and Existentialism, trans. David Hugh Freeman (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1953), p. 107.

contemporary trends in society. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the movement could be reduced to a post-war phenomenon of Europe or a reaction against the present positivistic and linguistic trends within contemporary empiricism. Such an assumption would overlook one of the cardinal virtues of man's ability to transcend any conditions which supposedly determined man's thinking. He was not merely reactionary, he was attitudinally free in relation to all conditioners.

However, many serious questions have been raised concerning the degree of freedom which man really possessed. If one were not aware of some of the exaggerated tendencies within existentialism, he could easily underestimate the role of the conditioners within any given situation. While man could be limited and determined in many ways, he was still free to determine the attitudes he would maintain in the face of such conditions. He could attempt to scapegoat his conditions by claiming to be a victim of unforeseeable determiners. In so doing, however, he would be attempting to relinquish his freedom of attitude and deny his responsibility, i.e. avoid guilt. It should also be remembered that criticisms which hold for a few individual writers are not necessarily valid when the movement is viewed as a whole.

Another point which many critics raised was existentialism's extreme subjectivism and emphasis on the irrational.

Such criticisms again failed to view the movement as a whole and, likewise, failed to grasp the deeper meaning of subjectivity. The existentialists claimed that all emotions could not be reduced to the purely subjective. They contended, to the contrary, that certain feelings transcended the usual emotional categories of the subject/object consciousness. Failure to distingusih between the 'I' of the I-it relationship and the 'I' of the I-thou relationship could easily be misconstrued as extreme subjectivism. Likewise, a failure to appreciate the appearance and persistence of the transcendent within the meaning structures of finitude tended to confuse the irrational, i.e. the logically self-contradictory, and the nonrational, i.e. that which was transcendent and symbolically paradoxical.

Another area which had been clouded by misunderstanding was the feeling of anxiety. Many psychologists had been willing to treat anxiety as a chronic fear of an unknown origin. However, the existential notion of transcendence allowed the patient to freely adopt an attitude even toward the affects of anxiety. They also distinguished between those who allowed the experience of anxiety to become pathological through deteriorization of the self-concept and those who utilized it in rebelling against the unauthentic. When the self felt impotent against the unknown source of fear, i.e. No-thingness, the depressive reaction led toward dread and despair. It was the contention of many existen-

tialists that with altered perception through attitudinal changes one could gain a more authentic self-concept by realizing the meaning of anxiety. Thus, the mysterious Nothingness could become a source of inspiration, and challenge as opposed to dread, and hope as opposed to despair.

It appeared to this author that the majority of the existentialists agreed with the basic tenets of the Judeo-Christian Mythos. They certainly would have agreed that man was not responsible for being "thrown into existence," i.e. essentially innocent. However, he was responsible for maintaining the attitude that infinite potentiality could be exhausted within finite meaning structures, i.e. idolatry. They also agreed that man possessed the necessary freedom to enter existence and attempt to escape and deny the responsibility for the alienation which developed as a result of idolatry. While they accepted the notion that man had a tendency to become idolatrous, they maintained that man was inevitably confronted by the insistency of being-in-itself to remain unobjectifiably transcendent.

It was obvious that such an encounter was the source of man's feeling of guilt and triggered his anxiety. It was essential to discover, if possible, the resulting attitudes and emotions which could be considered authentic, honest, and lucid. What criteria could be established which could identify and differentiate a genuine encounter with being-in-itself? What, if any, principles for action could be

discerned? In what ways could the content be meaningfully expressed and communicated to others so that they could understand with a certain degree of clarity? If the anxiety was indigenous in the awareness of alienation and estrangement, what was man to do in order to overcome the sense of 'splitness?' Sartre accepted the notion that nothing could be done and dreadful anxiety became his final word. Most of the others at least felt that an attempt should be made to transcend dreadful anxiety.

II. RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, AND THE EXISTENTIAL-ETHICAL IMPERATIVE

It was assumed in this section that there was a radical distinction between what will be understood as the religious experience and what has historically developed as organized religion. It also assumed that there is a religious experience which can be differentiated but not separated from general experience. It has been characterized as man's total response to ultimate reality. Because it contained many nonrational elements, it could not be totally comprehended, and its subsequent expressions were to varying degrees inadequate to the experience. Likewise, ultimate reality was infinite and inexhaustible to the finite oriented expressions and communications of it. There was a recognition that an element of ultimacy was

revealed in such an encounter, but not all that was grasped and expressed was ultimate.

Anyone who has analyzed with any degree of concern the criteria established for the religious experience will immediately be impressed with the sense that much of the encounter with being-in-itself described by the existentialist was quite similar, if not identical, at many points. However, it must be kept in mind that the religious experience has been studied from its highest expressions as opposed to its less adequate ones. The highest expression of the religious experience included the whole person and, at many points, would represent an extreme as well as supreme understanding of man's encounter with what was felt to be ultimate. It was usually expressed within an organized religion and was clothed in the symbolism of the particular cult or fellowship. It would be a gross error, however, to assume that merely because such an experience was expressed in very unorthodox terminology that it was any less religious. In spite of their insistence on individuation, the existentialists noted a quality of 'Zusammenleben' (the together life) between those who had had similar encounters with being-in-itself.

Joachim Wach in his book, Types of Religious Experience, listed four criteria which he felt had to be present

if the experience was to be considered religious, i.e. an encounter with the transcendent divine life. The first was the feeling on the part of the person that they had encountered stimuli which represented an active reality which was viewed as divine.[1] However, it had to always be remembered that some individuals had been conditioned through their experiences to rebel against anything which was considered "religious." Such an individual would have undoubtedly sought a very different terminology. In fact there would have been a tendency to use anything except religious language or symbolism. Also, if an individual had had very little acquaintance with the nature of the mystical and religious, he would have been faced with the task of interpreting, expressing, and communicating something quite foreign to anything he had previously experienced. He might have used such a subjective symbolism that it would have been totally unintelligible to anyone else. Yet, for him, it would have stood out in relationship to the familiar and general in his everyday experiences.

The second criterion stated that religious experience was a total response of the total being to what was apprehended as ultimate reality.[2] The fact that it was a total

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[1] Joachim Wach, Types of Religious Experience Christian and Non-Christian (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 32.

[2] Ibid.

response meant that it far surpassed any experience which utilized or stimulated only part of the organism. In the existentialist sense of transcendence, it moved beyond the purely cognitive, i.e. autonomous and technical reason. It did not exclusively involve the rational but the affective as well. It involved the integral person and tended to integrate the various dimensions of the individual. It did not tend to split or alienate him. On the other hand, one could not overlook the fact that an individual who had attempted to ignore his estrangement through defense mechanisms would be shattered by that which refused to remain split and demanded integration. It would have tended to aggrevate anxiety in the idolatrous individual who was attempting to comprehend the ultimate with a lesser god.

The third criterion contended that the religious experience was the most intense experience of which man was capable.[1] It was a dynamic encounter with the ultimate power of reality, i.e. the power of being-in-itself to remain itself. It was an experience which refused to be reduced to the ordinary. It was a shattering experience which was described by many of the existentialists. It brought man face to face with the inadequacy of his finite meanings. Its transcendent quality threatened to reduce

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[1] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

all meanings to absurdity. Man's seeming impotency to deal adequately with such an encounter could have easily deteriorated into a demonic sense of helplessness and worthlessness in those who were overwhelmed or shocked beyond the point of recovery. If the initial shock were too great, many would have been too stunned to really appreciate the positive force for conversion and the desire to understand, express, and communicate to others.

The fourth criterion stated that the religious experience was practical and involved an imperative and commitment to act.[1] There was an impelling urgency which grasped man and sent him searching for new meanings and modes of expression. If the urgency were too mingled with hostility over the feelings of inadequacy, it could easily deteriorate into aggression. Such aggression could be turned on others in revolution or oneself in suicide. However, the rebellion against what was felt to be inappropriate, unauthentic, inadequate, and sinful was capable of issuing in ethical commitment to that which was apprehended as holy and valuable. Certainly, all the existentialists accepted the notion that once man had realized the unauthenticity within himself, he would resolve to face life more realistically. It was the fourth criterion which

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[1] Ibid., p. 33.

motivated the missionary movements within many of the organized religions. It also goaded individuals to share with others what they had experienced. In so doing, it was necessary to evolve through myth and symbolic language a means of expressing and communicating that which transcended the ordinary modes of communication within the sphere of objectification.

It should always be remembered that the above criteria were based on the ideal and represented what could be considered an authentic religious experience. On the other hand, a lesser encounter would have a correspondingly lower degree of intensity but might be indicative that an individual had at least glimpsed the ultimate. However, mere glimpses of the ultimate ran the greatest possibility of being misconstrued as to content. Through misunderstanding, one could easily feel that the Nothingness was more ultimate than the power of the ultimate to remain transcendent, rather than allowing itself to be reduced to the ordinary. That which demanded a transformation and conversion could be viewed as a threat or a constructive force which made all things new. If the individual were extremely autocentric, the threat would have been final to all that was felt to be valuable. It would have meant complete impotency and inadequacy. It would have introduced an anxiety state which could not have been alleviated short of depressive

psychosis or suicide. Man had to either reevaluate himself authentically or be chronically paralyzed from further "ongoingness" and creativity by pathological anxiety. It was not too many years ago that many psychiatrists were attempting to help many patients to reach compromise adjustments with the unauthentic demands of civilization. To merely become adjusted to a fallen society was not to become healed, i.e. reunited with one's authentic potentiality for creativity. Often those great spiritual people who were willing to remain open to their creative sources were ostracized by the masses. Authenticity has often meant complete self-sacrifice, i.e. martyrdom.

Because the religious experience was of a transcendent quality, it could not be contained within the cognitive meaning structures. Thus, as was noted with the existentialists, there was a tendency to rely on emotional responses and attach verification to their intensity and sense of authenticity. Many of those feeling tones were isolated and analyzed by Rudolf Otto in his book, The Idea of the Holy. He pointed out that there was a sense of the 'numinous' which was felt as the 'mysterium tremendum.' The closest English equivalent for the concept of the 'tremor' was awe or awefulness. One was filled with personal nothingness and submerged before the awe-inspiring object directly experienced. Here the 'homo religiosi' encountered the 'orge' or

the so-called "Wrath of Yahweh" depicted in the Old Testament. There was also an element of 'majestas' fused within the experience of awe. The 'tremendum majestas' filled the creature with the feeling of majesty for that which absolutely overpowered his existence. It contained the 'numinous' sense of unworth. It involved a feeling of humility which offered the individual a more adequate and authentic criterion for self evaluation. It was sobering but not nihilistic. The 'tremendum' also contained the element of urgency or energy. It infused man with an imperative to act.

The sense of awe was also mentioned by Heidegger in connection with the encounter with 'Das Sein.' In fact the experience of transcendence seemed quite similar in most of the existentialists. However, those who failed to assert the sense of the divine apparently misunderstood the element of 'majestas.' Otto also analyzed the meaning of the 'mysterium.' The 'mysterium' fell outside of man's ordinary 'gestalten.' It was often expressed as the 'ganz andere,' i.e. "wholly other." It was the intelligible filling of the mind with wonder and astonishment. It was beyond apprehension and comprehension and struck with a wonder that left the person chill and numb, i.e. the trauma of No-thingness. By this nothing was meant that nothing could be predicated and was absolutely and intrinsically other than everything that

was and could be thought. While the experience was negative in many aspects, it was positive in the highest degree. The "wholly other" could be felt, but it could not be given any clear conceptualization. This again was mentioned by Heidegger.

For Otto, there was another element within the 'numinous' experience which attracted and captivated the person, i.e. 'fasinosum.' The 'mysterium' was more than something to be wondered at and contained something which entranced, bewildered, confounded, and, finally, captivated. Thus, the 'mysterium tremendum et fasinosum' revealed the holy. It was revealed as both threatening and alluring. However, its threat in actuality was a call and challenge for man to give up his idolatry. It brought a sense of sin and guilt. It forced man to face the realization that he was unauthentic in his autocentric approach to life. It called man from embeddedness toward creativity and becomingness. It judged his absolutized objectifications as unauthentic and sinful. It reminded him of his freedom to remain unauthentic or responsibly accept the challenge of authenticity and an allocentric perspective on life.

Because man participated in both being and non-being, he was always faced with the possibility of annihilation. Yet, he was also related to and comprehended by being-in-

itself. He was goaded toward a unity with being-in-itself by virtue of the fact he participated in that which persisted in being-itself. When he lost sight of his participation in being-in-itself, there was no way to conquer the threat of non-being. He became isolated, helpless, abandoned, and impotent to conquer non-being and was left with dread and despair. However, these were unauthentic results which tended to become pathological. Because man could not entirely remove the persistence of being-in-itself, he could not find any gratification or contentment within the unauthentic.

There was no question that the existentialists covered in this inquiry were well aware of the threatening Nothingness and its resulting anxiety. Each in his own way called man to reevaluate himself and cease trying to escape freedom and scapegoating responsibility. They apparently were captivated by the urgency to help others strike out against unauthenticity. However, only the theistic group were able to establish anything which could approximate a community or fellowship of those who had encountered the same dynamic reality. Perhaps most important of all, each author felt that man's autocentric pathology could be arrested and a more allocentric perception produced. Such a clearing of perception required a conversion of perspective and attitude on the part of man. It was toward this end that many existentialists turned to the field of psychoanalysis.

III. EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOPATHOGENESIS

Existentialism was not only fruitful for philosophy and theology but psychology as well. Many psychiatrists and psychotherapists have been employing many of the insights of the existentialists. Sartre wrote his own theories of psychoanalysis; Jaspers is a psychiatrist who has made many contributions to the study of psychopathology; Buber has often been requested to give lectures on his theories of interpersonal relationships; and, Tillich has written widely in the field of pastoral psychology. While their ideas were included, other men such as Fromm, May, Schachtel, Viktor Frankl, Maslow, Erle Fitz, and others were used in this brief introduction to existential psychopathogenesis.

Because the existential analysts have their own personal approaches to therapy, this inquiry contented itself with the more general themes which seemed to be pertinent to the majority. It should also be remembered that existential psychotherapy is indebted as much to the historical development of psychology as it is to the philosophy of existentialism. The existential approaches have attempted to update therapy to fit a contemporary world-view and the types of emotional disturbances resulting from such a view. Many of the existentialists pointed out that the Freudian concerns over thwarted sexual desires

and the battle between the individual and his environment have undergone considerable transformation. It was their contention that, more than thwarted libido, man was faced with the problems of depersonalization and objectification which left man feeling lonely, empty, isolated, abandoned, impotent, and meaningless.

If these were accepted as characteristic of modern man's psychopathology, then one had to ask why, and what could be done to alleviate the syndromes. Many of the existentialists accepted the principles of modern dynamic psychology and stressed man's becomingness and self-actualizing processes. It was primarily a movement from dependency and primary autocentrism, i.e. need dominated perceptual responses (infant), toward interdependence, freedom, and allocentrism, i.e. actualization of values and meanings for their own sake. Allocentrism led to ever expanding horizons of awareness. Its perceptual responses were exploratory, experimental, and emerging. It was a testing of reality, i.e. the authentic, and the joys derived from responsible exercising of one's freedom in imaginative and creative actualization of meaning and value. As man openly perceived new data, he adventurously sought to integrate it with the familiar. His capacities for learning, exploring, and adventuring were strengthened, and he developed many areas of competence and self-confidence, i.e. high self-esteem.

The self-actualizing person sought value for its own sake and not from a need dominated motive. Autocentric perception, on the other hand, saw the world in terms of objectification. The world was viewed as a set of objects to be used for serving one's needs. By objectifying the world, man tended to distort its unobjectifiable qualities and tended to disregard those objects which could not be used. The resulting distortions were unauthentic. In so far as one's perceptions were devoid of need, he viewed the world with a detachment which allowed a fuller realization of its actual relationships as opposed to overevaluating need reduction relationships.

The self-actualization theory of A. H. Maslow assumed that the human being perpetually developed new needs as he gratified more basic ones. He saw them as hierarchical in nature. He felt that when certain physiological needs, e.g. homeostasis, were satisfied higher needs arose. All tended to preserve the organism at higher levels of awareness as the lower needs were gratified. It was also a maturing of sensitivity. As the organism was freed from lower concerns, it became sensitive to higher ones. After the physical needs came those of belongingness, love, self-esteem, self-actualization, and others in ascending order. As soon as man achieved a certain degree of gratification

at one level, a new set of needs became dominant. By such a theory, a culture which thwarted sexual expression would give rise to a psychopathology of sexual frustration. Likewise, where a culture discouraged deep interpersonal communication, it would leave individuals lonely and empty. The general direction of Maslow's emergent approach was from dependency and inadequacy toward freedom, integrity, and self-actualization. He carried the maturation process on toward interpersonal and democratic needs. One such need was 'Gemeinschaftsgefühl' which was characterized by empathy and fellow-feeling ('agape'). Through the interpersonal, he saw greater community with a further obliteration of the ego boundaries. In other words, as man gratified his more biological and egoistic needs, he turned outward for greater growth and interdependence. Interdependence varied from dependency and independence in that its gratification was centered on helping others gratify their needs. At this latter point one continued self-actualization through helping others become self-actualized. The psychopathology of modern man would indicate that he has not been able to adequately gratify his interpersonal needs of empathy and fellow-feeling, i.e. love.

It was evident that the self played a very important part in existential thought. It was at the point of the self that the existentialist notion of self-transcendence

was of great importance. It was their contention that personality was not synonymous with any given self at any given point in time. The self was always in the process of emerging through ecstatic reason. The person could take definite attitudes toward his self, his world, and others. His attitudes determined his expectations of himself as well as others. Ideally, if an individual had an accurate understanding of himself, the world, and others, he would be "cognitively correct," i.e. authentic. From an existential point of view such a person would be dynamic, creative, and emerging. Unfortunately, such ideal conditions seldom, if ever, exist.

From early infancy the individual began to encounter various threats toward his well being. Much of the infant's activity was viewed as unconscious and automatic. However, as self-consciousness began to emerge the subjective and objective were gradually separated, and alienation and estrangement were introduced. The infant was extremely vulnerable to any threats toward his existence, i.e. inadequate. He was, therefore, dependent on others to provide most of his protection and defense against self destruction. Because of such inadequacy, most fears and threats were catastrophic in appearance. The self was felt to be rather helpless and impotent while others, predominately the parental figures, were perceived as quite adequate and

powerful. Others were viewed as a means to various ends for the emerging self. Throughout the process of becoming, the individual was creating a self-image as well as attitudes toward the environment and others. Because of the feelings of inadequacy, the child often developed fears of abandonment and rejection which served to inhibit the impulses to emerge toward interdependence. Often the child was controlled by threats of abandonment, humiliation, disapproval, condemnation, injury, or deprivation. All of these established a basic psychopathological constellation of attitude toward oneself, the world, and others.

Much anxiety was created over threats which never really materialized. The child confused many unauthentic threats with actual dangers and treated both identically. Because of his dependency on others, he felt obliged to pattern much of his behavior to their dictates. This often meant sacrificing authentic impulses for unauthentic inhibitions. He gradually developed a deflated conception of himself while overevaluating the abilities of others. Because of the diminished self-concept, the person many times felt that his own authentic impulses which were contrary to society were perverse and unhealthy. Thus, the conflict between unauthentic and authentic became a primary source of anxiety.

In the psychopathological constellation the feelings of helplessness and worthlessness became associated with

the feelings of inadequacy. Every time the individual felt inadequate, he felt helpless and worthless. He gradually convinced himself that to feel inadequate was to be worthless. This was also the origin of the Adlerian striving to compensate for inferiority. However, such a notion was "cognitive incorrect." Due to self-transcendence, the person could never become totally adequate to a given condition. Such adequacy would have amounted to complete self-sufficiency and independence. Anything which threatened the common core of inadequacy was viewed as a direct threat to the self and produced anxiety. This, in turn, triggered the defense system of the individual. Thus, man attempted to create a situation which would maintain a sense of adequacy and a consequent feeling of worth. In order to maintain such concepts, man had to continually adopt the externally imposed meanings and values of his culture. He had to sacrifice his freedom and responsibility in order to conform to society's expectations.

Due to the many successes of a technological society, man was forced into a dehumanized and objectified existence. He was also forced to use the language of a subject/object consciousness. His life became more and more routinized, regemented, and rigid. Each deviation from the norm was often accompanied with the usual threats of being ostracized. He became a stranger to his closest friends.

He attempted to maintain the status quo, identify with images, fit into stereotypes, and speak in cliches. He became a stranger in exile in a baron and lonely land. His vision became narrow and distorted, and he felt a longing which constantly eluded his scrutiny and became a source of anxiety. That longing was for freedom and authenticity.

Because all defense mechanisms left something to be desired, they were ultimately ineffectual. Even though man's perception was autocentric, there was a prevailing uneasiness which constantly triggered his sense of inadequacy and created hostility over his seeming inability to successfully defend himself against anxiety. Because he had attempted to convince himself that he should not feel or be inadequate but should be self-sufficient and independent, he was to that degree unauthentic. To attempt to be adequate and independent in an unauthentic manner led to isolation and loneliness. Likewise, because reality was dynamic, no set of static or finite meanings could adequately understand it. There was an urge in man to expand his consciousness in order to comprehend the changing and novel within the familiar. The expansion process was motivated by the needs to complete the partial, integrate the contradictory, fill the void, and include the new.

Man developed certain symptoms as he rebelled against unauthenticity which blocked further emergence. Whenever

the emergent process was frustrated, man failed to actualize his potentiality. Because man could not finally deny his freedom, he felt ontological guilt at the point of recognizing that he had chosen to attempt to escape freedom and scapegoat responsibility. The guilt resulted in further anxiety. The combination of anxiety and guilt brought man to the realization of his responsibility. The patient at this point usually displayed a great deal of hostility which was symptomatic of his rebellion against the unauthentic. It was also the pivotal point of turning the hostility on others, i.e. revolt, or turn it on himself, i.e. self-destructive impulses.

In man's immediate encounter with reality he participated with his total being. Only at the level of reflection did he separate the self from the world in the subject/object awareness. At this point his vision was autocentric and tended toward objectification. It was an estranged condition brought about through abstraction. The self-image which appeared at this point was oriented within an objectified world. Its meanings were derived from an I-it attitude toward the self, the world, and others. It was a self which was threatened by that which could not be objectified and remained as a No-thingness to the objectified consciousness. At the point of immediacy in the encounter

prior to abstracting reflection, the self and the world were suffused and knowledge was through participation and directly verifiable. Following the separation of self and world through reflection, knowledge was no longer direct and became problematical. During the encounter, the non-objective appeared as an integral part of that which emerged as the self following the abstracting process. However, after estrangement, it often appeared as a threat. This left man with a striving to reunite that which had been separated in the reflective processes in such a manner that the meaning and value of both are preserved.

The nonobjectifiable pushed and pulled man to expand his consciousness in order to integrate that which could not be included within the abstract structures. It appeared as the meaningless and threatened the existing 'gestalten' with inadequacy. Such a threat triggered anxiety and the self's defenses. Most of the defenses tended to limit and narrow the scope of consciousness so the depth dimensions could be avoided. When man was faced with the anxiety effected by inadequacy, he could either attempt lucidly to evaluate what was actual or seek escape. If his escape were unsuccessful, he was led to self-devaluation, depression, and despair. Despair resulted when man was unable to alleviate the threat by insisting upon remaining unauthentic. If man made an honest and lucid appraisal of the

situation, it would have effected humility over the realization of inadequacy and motivated further expansion of consciousness, exploration, and experimentation.

The neurotic reaction sought to avoid responsibility by becoming or remaining dependent on something or someone else for its conditions. To the degree that he could maintain neurotic defenses he could with varying degrees of success suppress the anxiety of unauthenticity. He consciously or unconsciously assumed that one could avoid inadequacy and the feeling of unauthenticity if the right defense were employed. It was an attempt to be self-sufficient. It was based on the nonsensical statement that to feel and be inadequate was to be dependent, helpless, and worthless. However, this overlooked the fact that inadequacy was part of the human lot and to equate it with worthlessness and meaninglessness was fallacious, i.e. "cognitively incorrect." This same attitude also affected one's perception of others. In the growth and emergent process one saw others in the light of his own self-concept. The failure to recognize inadequacies in others either elevated them above oneself, i.e. overevaluation of others, or saw them as unable to meet one's dependency needs and therefore, inferior, i.e. over self-evaluation.

When a person had an authentic perception of himself and others, he was allocentric. He no longer viewed others

and the world through the narrowed perceptions of objectifying autocentrism. He remained sensitive to the depth dimensions within the encounter. The process which brought about the conversion was a genuine encounter with the authentic and "cognitively correct," i.e. reality.

Had the existentialists merely pointed out the conflict between the person and his culture, they would have done nothing more than had already been accomplished. To blame society for one's unauthenticity would merely have been another and more subtle form of scapegoating of one's responsibility. While society could make strong suggestions and attempt to enforce them through threats, the person had to decide to what extent he would allow himself to be influenced and to what degree he would conform. By taking freedom seriously, man could responsibly exercise decisive powers within the causal sequence of events.

Thus, it could be said that the existentialists felt that unauthenticity inhibited man's maturation processes. His embeddedness at any given point was prodded by the authentic need for further growth. The goading of authenticity created anxiety against which man attempted to erect barriers. However, all of these barriers were ineffectual in the final analysis. His need to communicate within the masses left him empty and lonely. If he sought to be

independent, he felt isolated. Often when he filled society's expectations, he was bored and left with a sense of meaninglessness. When he attempted to make the worse appear the better cause, he felt dishonest. The more embedded a person became the greater the threat of emergence appeared to be. When they realized the inevitability of death against which there was no affective defense, they were face to face with dread and utter despair. Only those who had attempted to live up to an unrealistic image of the self found such horror in the realization that they were not infinite. The person's perception became autocentric, and he was need dominated within an objectified world. Because of his distorted self-image, he began to feel more and more impotent and was unwilling to accept the challenge of becomingness. Only a new vision which could alter his perceptual response system could gradually tear down the barriers to further ongoingness.

While man remained broken and estranged, he lost most of his energy through stress, conflict, and chronic anxiety. He needed a new encounter with that which was vital and authentic. Only such an encounter could convert his self-destructive impulses, which led to one form of suicide or another. Only conversion could transform man into a more authentic mode of existence and allow him the necessary

courage to accept his creative freedom and responsibility. While that role was often the exclusive position of the church in past centuries, it failed to comprehend much of the rapidly advancing technological society. In recent years psychotherapists have replaced the clergy in helping people encounter the authentic. In many ways the church had absorbed too much of the unauthenticity and was in no position to lead the neurotically blind. However, it is good to realize that at the present time the church is once again taking seriously its role to help heal the sick. In one sense it could be argued that this section has indirectly attempted to put forth a "psychopathogenic argument for God." It is literally saying that when the person loses sight of the divine presence, the threat of non-being and the resulting diminished self-concept become pathological. While it is freely chosen the condition is no less destructive. On the other hand, those who realize the divine are able to utilize the energy from the anxiety for constructive purposes. In the former case the organism dissipates its energy in pathological anxiety, while in the latter, it channels it into productive and creative activity.

IV. FINAL STATEMENT

Looking at existentialism as a whole, the author feels

that it confirmed much more of the Judeo-Christian Mythos than it refuted. Any one author discussed left various things to be desired, but taken as a whole, they covered all of the essential aspects. Perhaps their greatest contribution was at the point of offering modern man a fresh look at what he has always been insisting about himself. Its relevance becomes clear when one realizes that many churchmen today are looking for fresh and challenging ways of presenting the mythos in a more meaningful manner.

Even if existentialism were naïvely assumed to be a reaction against the analytical and more positivistic forms of philosophy, one would have to account for why man reacts so forcefully against the purely rationalistic. What arises in man in every age to attest to the fact that there is literally more than meets the eye (empiricism) in his condition? Existentialism also opened the doors of communication between philosophy and religion as well as psychology. Many in the past insisted on their separation. Psychology and religion were at war and philosophy seemed so overwhelmed by the popularity of science that it was willing to bastardize itself in order to remain in the college curriculum.

There is little doubt in this author's mind that existentialism has much to offer and has already done a great deal. This was far from an exhaustive study and left

much to be desired in the form of organization. However, part of this was due to the very openness of the movement and its experimental stage as far as psychopathology is concerned. It is hoped that the reader has gained some appreciation for the magnitude of existentialism and will be motivated toward more extensive study.

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